In undertaking this thesis, and in particular, developing the methodology, I do not pretend to be an objective commentator, nor do I purport to be able to reveal a monolithic truth by means of notional objectivity, (after Flyvbjerg, 2001 p139). In accordance with Minichiello et al., 1995, I believe that, “Objectivity is an aim or goal which is not really an achievable one”, and more importantly that, as per Wadsworth, 1984 & Fay, 1980, it is not necessarily desirable.
20The term ‘Human Ecology’, is capitalised to differentiate reference to the field of study with this name,
This does not mean that I completely reject the concept of objectivity or its methodological value. I discuss this later in this section.
I concur with Minichiello et al., 1995, that, “The researcher should be critical and espouse particular values in an explicit fashion.” By ‘critical’, and thus ‘criticality’ or ‘critical thinking’, I refer to an approach that entails “interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation” (after Facione, 1990). Whilst the term ‘judgement’ is sometimes used in this context, for example by Anshen, 1971 p.xiii, consistent with Facione, 1990, I prefer to use the term ‘discernment’ as I do not use ‘criticality’ to mean that one should be critical in the sense of being derogatory or condemnatory.
Criticality equates to the “rigors of full disclosure” advocated by Braud & Anderson, 1998 p.xxviii, or asking ‘what’s really going on?’ – looking below the surface to the depths of an issue. My understanding of the Critical approach is broadly consistent with how it is defined by Connole et al., 1993 p12, namely that knowledge is subjective, problematic, capable of systemic distortion, never value-free and always represents the interests of some group within society, thus having the potential to be oppressive or emancipatory (though I reject the extremes of this dichotomy). This view is also consistent with the notion of humanism advocated by Anshen, 1971 p.xiii. Connole et al., 1993 p12, adds that the Critical approach sees “social action to improve the quality of human life as the desirable outcome of research”, a view advocated by the ‘participatory philosophy’ of Skolimowski, 1994 p.xv-xvi. I embrace Connole et al.’s notion of improvement but reject the anthropoexclusive aspect.
Connole et al., 1993 p12, also hold that the researcher and the researched are indivisible. I reject this simplistic amalgam, seeing instead that researcher and researched are interconnected but not necessarily indivisible, as per the discussion of the paradoxical nature of reality provided by Hitchcock, 1999.
In his work on critical systemic intervention, Midgley, 2000, encourages researchers to interrogate and document their assumptions in choosing a particular methodology. These include their values and small ‘p’ politics. Criticality is not just something that one applies as an external tool to use in analysing data. To be authentic, one must also apply it internally, i.e. to both the research and to the researcher. Midgley, 2000, suggests that doing so is a necessary response to acknowledging that we cannot achieve intellectual purity in our research. Such bidirectional criticality includes the concept of ‘self-regulation’ (after Facione, 1990), ‘self- reflexivity’ (after Maturana & Varela, 1992), or simply, ‘reflexivity’. Reflexivity has been defined by Douglas & Johnson, 1977, as the mutual interdependence of observer or knower to
that which is seen or known. Varela, 1990, explains the concept of reflexivity as hinging on acknowledgement that “the knower and the known are co-implicated”21. Thus, authentic criticality or critical thinking encompasses the practice of reflexivity.
This thesis adopts the criticality advocated by Midgley, 2000, and the transpersonal methodology of Braud & Anderson, 1998, situated in the ‘transpersonal ecology’ of Fox, 1990. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘transpersonal’ as “designating a form of psychology or psychotherapy which seeks to combine elements from many esoteric and religious traditions with modern ideas and techniques”. Prominent examples include the work of Abraham Maslow (e.g. 1964) and Carl Gustav Jung (e.g. that compiled by Sabini, 2002) and more recently the ‘integral psychology’ of Ken Wilber (2000a; 2000b; 2001). The approach is also evident in the publication entitled ‘Values for sustainability: the necessity of transcendence and sacred realms’ by Peter Cock, 1991. ‘I also use ‘transpersonal’ to mean ‘beyond the self’ or ‘ecstasis’. My approach includes Midgely’s and Braud & Anderson’s notions of improvement of the researcher (self-improvement/personal development); improvement in the conditions of the research participant(s) (where relevant); and improvement of broader society.
In doing so, I am deliberately moving beyond the “assumptions and practice of conventional approaches to research” critiqued by Braud & Anderson, 1998 p5-6, namely:
• the notion that all research is a special type of knowledge that is of superior quality to other forms of knowing. “In reviewing the literature for relevant findings and interpretations, the researcher goes primarily or solely to research reports that have been published in the premier professional journals of the discipline during the past 5 to 10 years. Reports, or observations appearing outside scientific literature are not especially valued or useful”;
• that research and the researcher are value-free and unrelated to the development of the researcher, such that researchers can be interchanged without significantly affecting the findings. “Purposive and teleological considerations have no place in serious research, and the consciousness of the research personnel can have no direct influence on the phenomena being studied”;
• that research is primarily about identifying “general principles or universal laws that provide the possibility of explanation, prediction and control” i.e. it should be distinguished from endeavours such as practical applications;
21
This does not infer solipsism, i.e. that reality only exists in one’s mind, nor representationism, i.e. “the positivist view that the mind operates with representations of the external world” (after Macdonald, 1997, p13).
• “the preferred empirical and theoretical research approaches should be modelled after those of the physical sciences of the 18th and 19th centuries” (i.e. primarily quantitative and more experimental methods using “data derived through the senses, consensually validated by others, and extended and expressed via logically sound mathematical and linguistic formalism”, rather than qualitative and more naturalistic methods);
• the ideal research environment is as isolated from other influences as is possible;
• “the researcher is the expert, the authority whose observations, views, hypotheses, and interpretations are privileged over those of the research subjects”;
• “the preferred outlets for original research findings and interpretations are peer-reviewed journal articles and professional conference presentations. The researcher communicates primarily with professional colleagues”.
In making this choice, my previous training and professional practice as an ecologist and environmental planner caused me considerable methodological angst in constructing this thesis. As the thesis developed, it became increasingly evident that I was required to extend beyond the scientific and ‘legal-rational authority’ paradigms with which I was exclusively familiar. I was challenged to make the quantum leap from the ontology of the ‘empiricist approach’ to that of the ‘interpretive approach’; brushing over ‘post-modern and deconstructive’ epistemologies, and finally coming to understand, appreciate and accept the ‘critical approach’ as per the frameworks of Connole, 1993 p12. Not only did I face rejecting or at least moving beyond many of the fundamental assumptions associated with my earlier training and practice as represented in the assumptions listed on the previous page, but I also found myself outside the relatively comfortable academic confines created by ‘conventional research’. Malone, 1996 Chapter 7, reports a similar experience in her adoption of a ‘critical ethnography’ approach entailing the researcher also being and environmental activist who both transforms and is transformed by her research work.
I do not dismiss the contribution of the so-called ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ sciences, or that of ‘social science’ in its many forms. Instead, I believe they do not offer sufficient scope by themselves to address the scope of this thesis. I still use accepted scientific tools such as observation and accepted sociological tools such as policy analysis, but I do so in a broader context than allowed by conventional scientism. Nasr, 1996 p287 advocates that one need not abandon science, but that scientific knowledge needs to be seen as confined by the limitations that “philosophical suppositions, epistemologies, and historical developments have imposed upon it.” Nasr’s key point is that scientism holds that science is the only form and indeed the ultimate form of Truth, yet it makes such a claim without acknowledging its inherent limitations – something that is strictly against its own methodology.
I do not see science as having a monopoly on the truth, but as one knowledge system amongst others. This “is not a criticism of science qua science, but an indictment of a belief system that does not question itself” (Macdonald, 1997 p23). Thus, I have chosen to move from the ‘orthodox science’ to the ‘complementary science’ of Lorimer, 1988; from the purely ‘positivist’ to the ‘naturalistic’ axioms of Lincoln & Guba, 1985; from the ‘separateness science’ to the ‘wholeness science’ of Harman, 1991; from the ‘prevailing’ to the ‘alternative’ paradigms described by Global Co-operation for a Better World, 1990; and I have adopted the ‘extended science’ of Josephson & Rubik, 1992. For further information on these perspectives see Braud & Anderson, 1998. In short, my position is a case of a conditional ‘both and’ rather than simply ‘either or’.
An important aspect in my use of criticality is the dimension of personal reflexivity and experience. This is particularly important given that my research methods include ‘participatory action research’ and ‘grounded theory’, after Glaser & Strauss, 1967, and that I adopt the ‘participatory philosophy’ of Skolimowski, 1994. In mainstream, i.e. scientistic, research, inclusion of personal experiences arising through the research process is generally thought to contaminate a project’s objectivity and is subsequently frowned upon if not dismissed entirely, (Reinharz, 1992 cited in Malone, 1996 p284; Milton, 2002 p3; also Dobzhansky, 1967 p222). A different approach is possible and arguably essential to addressing the ecological crisis. “Presenting the personal ‘self’ … is not (used) as a form of ‘confession’ to overcome issues of bias as would be the case in positivist research, but as an explanation of the researcher’s standpoint”, (Malone, 1996 p284); a view also advocated by Milton, 2002, and Anshen, 1971. Such an approach is logically consistent with the basis of criticality. This is especially so when one acknowledges the interactivity between the researcher and the researched, and the personally as well as socially transformative potential of critical, reflexive, change-oriented research (after Skolimowski, 1994).
An additional aspect in my adoption of criticality stems from both my dismissal of the normative scientistic notion of ‘objective’ and ‘disinterested’ research, and from my acknowledgement of the existence and urgency of the global ecological crisis (which I discuss later in this chapter). Brady, 2000 p14, explains this in the context of The Earth Bible Series, which she notes is “a scholarly work, but it speaks to us here and now with some urgency – which is all to the good. A disinterested approach is of little use in a crisis. What is needed is passion – though this is a passion controlled by reason and respect for what is the case.” Anshen, 1971 p.xvii, comments similarly that “The ‘objectivity’ of science cannot help man
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“…speculations in the realms of philosophy and religion... are often regarded, among scientists, as regrettable foibles or even as professional misdemeanors. They are as often as not kept secret, for being caught at them is liable to damage a scientist's professional reputation” (Dobzhansky, 1967 p2).
[sic] in his [sic] present human predicament, since for science in this sense, there can be no commitment. So that in the end, we know everything but understand nothing.”
The development of my methodology revealed the extent to which I was required to experience a metanoia (a ‘change of mind’) in relation to my ontology, epistemology, and the research topic (as it developed through several iterations). In experiencing this sometimes very difficult process and through exploring the breadth and depth of literature related to my field of study, I discovered an under-current driving both my metanoia and the changes I was observing in the relationship between religion and ecology.
This under-current is the healing of the philosophical dualities between ‘Man and Nature’, mind and body, ‘head and heart’, body and soul, matter and spirit, science and religion, the sacred and the profane, the Divine and Nature, and ‘rationality’ and ‘emotion’. More broadly, the under-current is about the need to transcend dualism, itself a central tenet of Buddhism, but also a core philosophy of authors such as Skolimowski, 1994.
Many authors trace these dualities (in various forms) back to Plato and Aristotle, later intensified by key figures of the ironically-named Enlightenment, such as Descartes and Bacon, (see for example Birch, 1965, 1984; Gnanakan, 1999; Hitchcock, 1999; McGrath, 2003; Sherrard, 2003). My research topic requires that I address such deep issues to some extent, if only in relation to the controversial views of White Jr., 1967, 1973, and others who specifically or substantially blame Christianity (or in White’s case, a particular interpretation of it) for Western23 society’s destructive relationship with Nature (see also Hallman, 2000).
My methodology seeks to reunite at least some of these divisions through a form of transpersonal criticality that recognises the danger of an academia and a society that commonly demands a researcher isolate notionally separate and purportedly ‘pure’ rationalist, intellectual thought from ‘impure’ personal and transpersonal experiences such as emotion, intuition, and spirituality. The scars of such divisive scientism and so-called rationalism are all too evident in the causes and outcomes of the ecological crisis, the related social crises and in the personal spiritual crisis that lies at their core, see for example Anshen, 1971; Milton, 2002; Nasr, 1996; Skolimowski, 1994.
In healing such divisions, I adopt the notion of research as therapy; as learning to know and heal myself; as a process of self-actualisation; and through this, to better understand and
23
After Milton, 2002 p6, I use the term ‘Western’ in its common but unsatisfactorily defined sense, noting that ‘the West’ is not “a sealed container”; it has “no clear boundaries, and it is in the nature of market capitalism and liberal democracy, which characterise the west, to break down whatever boundaries there are.”
interact with the world. I see this in terms of the paraphrased view of J. Krishnamurti which says that ‘if you want to change the world, you first need to change yourself’ (Krishnamurti & Martin, 1997).
Much the same view is expressed by Skolimowski, 1994 p.xii: “Our world needs mending and healing; so does our psyche… The healing of the world (and ourselves within it)…are complementary aspects of the same process.” A similar approach is taken in the work of Joanna Macy24 and John Seed25, and to some extent by Wilber, 2001, who writes that:
“An increase in exterior or social development can only be sustained with a corresponding increase in interior development in consciousness and culture. Simply trying to put a new form of governance, political system, (techno- economic system) or social distribution network in place without a corresponding development in the levels of the interior dimensions of consciousness has historically guaranteed failure in societal transformation.”
Caduto, 1985, sees that only “whole, healed individuals who are willing and able to look beyond their own lives and to work for the welfare of society and environment” can achieve the necessary level of personal and societal change required to address the ecological crisis. I feel this view suggests that one has to be ‘perfect’ before one can be an effective contributor. My view is that one needs to be substantially ‘on the path’, and not necessarily at some nominal endpoint in order to be able to contribute meaningfully.
Further to the notion of healing our psyche to heal the world, my position is also commensurate with that of Maslow, 1964, who argues that “dichotomizing and pathologizing” are immature states of mind. He holds that:
“The empirical fact is that self-actualizing people, our best experiencers, are also our most compassionate, our great improvers and reformers of society, our most effective fighters against injustice, inequality, slavery, cruelty, exploitation (and also our best fighters for excellence, effectiveness, competence). And it also becomes clearer and clearer that the best ‘helpers’ are the most fully human persons. What I may call the bodhisattvic26 path is an integration of self-improvement and social zeal, i.e., the best way to become a better ‘helper’ is to become a better person. But one necessary aspect of becoming a better person is via helping other people. So one must and can do both simultaneously. (The question ‘Which comes first?’ is an atomistic question.)
24
See for e.g. http://www.joannamacy.net/html/books.html 25
See for e.g. http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/wrr2000/WRR_Oct/seedintro.htm 26
‘Bodhisattva’ is a Sanskrit term from Buddhism and can be roughly translated as someone who is ‘enlightened’ (at least to some extent) but remained embodied or chosen to be reincarnated in order to aid fellow beings on ‘the path’. Buddhism nominally holds that Jesus was a bodhisattva (see for e.g. Falvey, 2002).
In this context, I would like to refer to my demonstration in the Preface to the revised edition (1970) of my Motivation and Personality (59) that normative zeal is not incompatible with scientific objectivity, but can be integrated with it, eventuating in a higher form of objectivity, i.e., the Taoistic27.
What this all adds up to is this: small ‘r’ religion is quite compatible, at the higher levels of personal development, with rationality, with science, with social passion. Not only this, but it can, in principle, quite easily integrate the healthily animal, material, and selfish with the naturalistically transcendent, spiritual, and axiological. (See my ‘A Theory of Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of the Value-Life,’ Journal of Humanistic Psychology,
1967, VII, 93-127).”