Crecimiento del comercio electrónico en ventas totales al por menor en Estados Unidos

too far afield. There are many locations outside school zones where firearms pos-

session is generally lawful without a license. In examining Terry stops, it is easiest

to first examine the principles applicable in those locations; and we can put aside

attempts to gain certainty as to precisely where those locations are.

Federal law generally prohibits firearms possession by persons who have been

convicted of a felony

215

_{or a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.}

216

_{In addi-}

tion, federal law prohibits firearms possession by persons who have been involun-

tarily committed for mental health reasons

217

_{and illegal users of controlled sub-}

stances.

218

_{State law may add to the list of circumstances that prohibit firearms pos-}

session.

219

_{Or it may prohibit firearms possession by persons who have committed}

crimes in other states that, although not felonies where committed (or that do not

give rise to firearm disabilities where committed), are felonies in the jurisdictions

213. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.

214. See infra note 254 (concerning completed offenses).

215. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The prohibition relating to felonies excludes “any Federal or State of- fenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–140).

216. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). But see United States v. Pauler, 857 F.3d 1073, 1078 (10th Cir. 2017) (“We interpret ‘State’ to have the same meaning in § 921(a)(33) that it has throughout the rest of §§ 921 and 922 and therefore conclude that ‘a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law’ does not include a violation of a municipal ordinance.”); United States v. Enick, No. 2:17–CR–00013–BLW, 2017 WL 2531943, at *2 (D. Idaho June 9, 2017) (same).

217. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). 218. Id. § 922(g)(3).

219. E.g., MO.ANN.STAT. § 571.070.1(2) (Westlaw through 2017 First Regular Session and First and Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 99th General Assembly) (habitual intoxication); OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2923.13(A)(4) (Westlaw 2017 File 25 of the 132nd General Assembly (2017–2018) and 2017 State Issue 1) (chronic alcoholic).

where the firearms are then possessed.

220

_{Thus, there always is some possible pos-}

sessor-specific factor that cannot be excluded merely by observing a person and

that might make unlawful that firearms possession.

221

Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department addresses whether a person’s

openly carrying a firearm, where lawful (evidently without any further permit),

222

_in

combination with having received a 911 call indicating it was occurring, is sufficient

to initiate a Terry stop.

223

_{The court holds not.}

224

_{Of course, only after further inves-}

tigation could an officer conclude the possessor was not a felon whose firearms

possession would be unlawful. As to that, the court states, “Where it is lawful to

possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’ There is no ‘auto-

matic firearm exception’ to the Terry rule.”

225

Outside the context of firearms possession, one would think one could sum-

marily reject the assertion that for engaging in an innocent, otherwise unregulated

activity that is prohibited of those who have committed felonies, one may be de-

tained for questioning. A person who has committed a felony may not be allowed

220. Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 618 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating, in a case involving an out-of-state conviction for which the jurisdiction of conviction had reinstated the individual’s firearms rights, “A crime committed out of state is a disqualifying crime if the Maryland equivalent is a disqualifying crime.”); Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 165 F. Supp. 3d 315, 319 (D. Md. 2016), aff’d, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017) (out-of-state crime where firearms rights were reinstated in the jurisdiction of the offense nevertheless prohibited firearms possession); State v. Howard, 339 P.3d 809, 814, 816 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (holding a Missouri suspended imposition of sentence, which the court states under Missouri law, “doesn’t count it as a conviction,” nevertheless constitutes a conviction for purposes of Kansas prohibition on firearms posses- sion by those with previous convictions); aff’d, 389 P.3d 1280 (Kan. 2017); MO.ANN.STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (Westlaw through 2017 Second Extraordinary Session of the 99th General Assembly) (referencing “crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony”).

221. Age prohibitions also exist. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (concerning handgun possession). Of course, they might be excludable in particular circumstances.

222. The opinion is not as clear as one would like concerning the court’s understanding of whether the legality of the possession requires a license. The relevant discussion is:

Ohio law permits the open carry of firearms and thus permitted Northrup to do exactly what he was doing. While the dispatcher and motorcyclist may not have known the details of Ohio’s open-carry firearm law, the police officer had no basis for such uncertainty. If it is appropriate to presume that citizens know the parameters of the criminal laws, it is surely appropriate to expect the same of law enforcement officers—at least with regard to unambiguous statutes.

Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1131–32 (citation omitted). The cited statute provides for preemption.

223. 785 F.3d at 1131. As to the legality of the open carrying of firearms, the court cites a statutory provision that generally preempts non-statutory firearms prohibitions on the possession, etc., of a firearm, indicating the possession, etc., may occur “without further license, permission, restriction, delay, or process . . . .” OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 9.68 (Westlaw through 2017 File 20 of the 132nd General Assembly (2017– 2018)).

224. 785 F.3d at 1133. See generally Berry, supra note 3, at 153 (reaching that conclusion under Arkansas law).

225. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1132 (quoting United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013),

where the court states, “Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status.”). See also St. John v. McColley, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M. 2009) (noting that where the possession is generally al- lowed, the fact that a person possesses a firearm does not, “by itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory detention.”). Cf. United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (dis- cussed supra notes 155–164 and accompanying text and infra note 245).

to vote, and doing so may be criminalized.

226

_{However, one would expect vehement}

reaction to police officers randomly detaining individuals merely for exiting polling

places. One would think the outrage would be enhanced by the fact that it is a basic

civil right that would be triggering the ability to initiate a stop. But of course, fire-

arms possession is also, in contemporary jurisprudence, treated a basic civil right.

It is not a satisfactory response to assert that currently officers are not known

to stop persons for voting and, therefore, one can disregard that possibility, and

simultaneously assert the possibility one is a felon (or has some other prohibited

factor) will authorize a Terry stop. To assert the freedom from unreasonable

searches does not prohibit Terry stops of voters stops at governmental whim, but

the public is merely relegated to relying on this discretion not being poorly exer-

cised, is to assert there is not a right implicated.

227

Authority has not been found justifying such a total abrogation of freedom

from seizure at any time for vast segments of the American population.

In document Universidad de Sonora División de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas Departamento de Economía Posgrado en Integración Económica (página 73-0)