Credibilidad

While state owned broadcasters in Europe have been threatened by crumbling of ownership and entry barriers on the Continent, significant protections remain. Blumler and Hoffmann-Riem (1992) give several reasons for Western Europe's reluctance to abandon public service broadcasting. First, despite its limitations, European public service broadcasting had many widely appreciated achievements to its credit. Second, some of the strongest commercial forces in the broadcasting field are foreign, and large public broadcasters offer better defences against a flood of foreign programmes. Third, European countries have a strong socialist tradition, and the principle that a democratic

society should have some say in the direction of its broadcast media has been more readily accepted than in America. Finally, they say, there has been some recognition, based on the American experience, that an uncontrolled market has pressures that limit it: "It serves the consumer ... but shortchanges the citizen" (p.23).

Tunstall and Palmer (1991) say there has been a sea change in Europe. During the eighties there was a shift towards deregulation, but from 1989 onward there has been a strong trend to reregulate. This section summarises the experiences of three countries, Italy, France, and Germany, in response to deregulatory pressures.

When the Italian Constitutional court removed the monopoly of the state public service television, there was an explosion of television growth, with wide public support. By 1983, Sassoon (1985) estimates, Italy had 700-800 private television stations. Within this were four semi-national channels. In 1985 he described Italy as:

The only country in Western Europe with a multichannel radio and television system not subject to any form of regulation whatsoever (p. 121).

In all this, what happened to programming? High production costs meant private stations largely avoided local programming. They were forced into networking, first ignoring statutory restrictions and then using loopholes. By 1979, 80% of TV revenues went to three dominant private networks. Sassoon (1985) describes local companies as "mere terminals for distribution" (p.138). Moreover, he claims the growth of the private sector destroyed chances of a decentralised third channel for the state-owned RAI and had a negative impact on its financial base (which, like that of New Zealand, included advertising and licence money) and its programmes. RAI had to shift local production from quality programmes to cheaper games shows and debates, while buying overseas programmes to compete with private companies. Since 1981, Sassoon says, broadcasting has become increasingly liberated from political party dominance but increasingly subordinated to the commercial and cultural industries of the United States.

In the mid eighties a large number of local stations folded, bringing numbers back to about 250. Nationally, Silvio Berlusconi's Finivest Group emerged, as enormously

dominant, having bought out two principal rival networks (Italia 1 and Rette 4). Finivest also supplied programming and adverts to three other minor networks, and by the end of the 1980s controlled a major Italian advertising company, a radio network, several magazines, a publishing company, major film and record production companies and several cinemas.

After years of skirting the problem of broadcasting, the Italian Government became so alarmed by Berlusconi's power that it sought to re-regulate broadcasting. The 1990 Broadcasting Act allowed no company to control more than 20 percent of national mass media revenues and only one licence per person in each area (Cocker, 1 992). There were also controls on scheduling, content and levels of advertising. However, Berlusconi remains hugely influential. His electoral victory in 1994 was marked by an intense use of infotainment media (McGregor, 1996), while his recent defeat in the polls and subsequent trial for corruption have not stopped his media activities.

3.6.6.2 Constitutional

According to Porter {1989), West Germany provided a contrast to the United States in the role provided by public service broadcasters: "Private broadcasting is permitted, but only so long as public service broadcasting provides the fundamental pluralist needs of the German people" (p.16). He reviews the role of the Constitutional Court in five decisions concerning broadcasting, which laid down rules and developed models for regulating private broadcasting and outlined the essential role of public service broadcasters in providing universal service and a wider range of programmes, because they are not dependent on high audience ratings. Private broadcasters are required to permit all points of view and to exclude unbalanced individual broadcasters or programmes. The court also required regions to outlaw by formal legislation any cross­ media cartels which jeopardized the need for pluralism.

The reunification of Germany saw an extension of West German media companies into the former East Germany (Kleinsteuber & Peters, 1991), and within four years of reunification, the East was fully integrated with the Western broadcasting system, with its private and public broadcasting system based on the regions (Kilborn, 1993).

However, Kilborn argues, there is a strong sense that the system has been imposed on the East, dictated by West German political and economic interests:

One cannot entirely dispel the thought that the decision to dissolve the East German Television Service (DEF) in December 1991, was partly motivated by a desire to expunge any residual elements of a specifically East German identity (p.467).

Since 1990, Germany like most other European countries, has seen an increase in the number of private terrestrial channels, a rapid diffusion of cable television, and access to a large number of satellite programming services. However, policy makers have held

back from injecting a full-blown commercialism into their television system (Blurnler &

Hoffmann Riem, 1992).

3.6.6.3 France's with Moderation

Comparative broadcasting analyst Browne (1989) says transformations in the French system in the early to mid 1980s are "a case study of how a change in political leadership can alter an established system of broadcasting in a major way" (p.61). The socialist government of President Mitterand brought the era of state monopoly and blatant interference to a close. The Government, which had supported private radio while in opposition, first abandoned state monopoly in radio and then moved tentatively on television. In mid-1983 it announced the three channel ORTF would be supplemented by a pay television service, Canal Plus, and that cable television would now receive strong government backing. Browne says the driving force behind the policy change was economic, an attempt by France to capture some of the new telecommunications market.

Two years later, the Government authorised private commercial television, precipitating a scramble for licences. Critics charged the Government with granting licences for the two channels to "friends". Despite this, Browne (1989) sums up the socialist years as greatly increasing the diversity and objectivity of French broadcasting.

In 1986, the incoming Conservative government announced it was selling off TF1, one of the three public services. A year later, it went to a consortium headed by France's

largest construction firm, Bouygues, with a 10 percent shareholding by British media magnate Robert Maxwell. The Conservatives were also keen to ensure the two other private channels were in more sympathetic hands. In the 1987 relicensing, La Cinq was granted to a group made up of the former owners and Conservative publisher Robert Hersant, while Le Six went to another group chaired by a close friend of Prime Minister Chirac. The Government also said it was not prepared to subsidise the development of cable and satellite television to the same extent as the Socialists.

However, the changes wrought by the Government were closely fought and Porter (1989) reviews the role of the French Constitutional Council in "moderating some of the ideological excesses of the government of Jacques Chirac and, in particular, its wish to hand television over to the play of market forces" (p.17). He says the Council was important in three key areas. First, it laid out strict criteria for the sale of state-owned enterprises. Second, it tightened up the Government's proposals regarding press ownership, ruling that "pluralism of thought and opinion was a necessary goal for the regulation of the media" (p.18). Third, on the question of television deregulation, the Council ruled it was constitutional to replace the then current authority with a new commission and to delegate spectrum licensing to the commission. But it was unhappy with the government's proposal for a 25 percent limit for newspaper ownership. Porter says it took the view that there were two threats to the pluralist ideal of the constitution, "those emanating from the state and those emanating from the media moguls" (p. 19). The council therefore obliged the new communication commission to ensure as a priority the pluralist expression of currents of opinion when allocating licences.

Porter concludes that France (along with Germany) has asserted the signal importance of pluralism, within both the public and the private sector, in regulating television. He does say, though, that there has been some concern about the way the new law has been implemented. Browne (1989) comments that, despite new obligations, the re­ licensed fifth and sixth channels continued to rely heavily on imported material and that the privatised TF1 was placing a higher priority on light entertainment, with many news staff quitting, claiming a reduced commitment to news services. In April 1992, La Cinq, having lost its battle with the revamped TF1, succumbed to bankruptcy and went off air.