This section discusses the findings as they relate to the various identified components of the ostensive routines and their performance. It focuses on the role of the artefacts within the routines together with the observed reasons for the process deviation.
It is clear from both the Leximancer output and supplementary thematic analysis that the ostensive routines and the associated artefacts support the effective execution of a crisis response. While the focus of this research was on the processes designed for and applied within TCCS, the presence of routines and tools to guide a crisis response is common across business sectors. As documented in the Belgium case study, the ostensive routines and artefacts (including the tools and checklists) that are currently used within TCCS were designed and implemented post the crisis in order to bridge an identified gap.
When examining this crisis management program, it is evident that the behaviours as presented by Feldman and Pentland are present in the adapted model. As noted
previously, “the ostensive aspect of the routine is the idea; the performative aspect, the enactments. Both aspects are necessary to constitute what we understand to be the routine” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p. 102). From an ostensive perspective, the routines that support crisis management incorporate artefacts, including tools and checklists. It is evident that the presence of the ostensive routines, which find their roots in the crisis plan, and which incorporate the core artefacts, provide a crisis team, irrespective of experience and location, with a framework that can guide uniform
responses. The SMEs unanimously endorsed the importance of the artefacts for a number of reasons.
The artefacts not only act as a guide by providing cues, but they also construct the framework from which the response can be driven. By using this structure, a team is provided with the framework that establishes set parameters for the response. The artefacts have been described as providing a visual guide and process clarity, which can support less experienced teams. This is important, as teams can drift away on a tangent from their destination plan (SME10, 2016). While acknowledging the importance of the tools, there was conflicting opinion as to the level of utilisation that is required. Some argued (SME7, 2017; SME18, 2016) that the tools should be leveraged at all times. D’Adderio (2010) supports this position and argues that the artefacts perform a critical role in directing the performance of the actor. The more successful performative programs manage to utilise an array of materials and tools to create the most effective response environment. Applying this metaphor to crisis management, the script
embraces the plans, tools and checklists, which in combination provide the backbone of the ostensive routines. These scripts are the recurrent activities and observable patterns of interaction (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) during the crisis response. Other researchers in the extant literature, together with the participants in this research, contended that while the framework should be there, it should not be utilised to the extent that innovation is stifled (SME3, 2016; SME10, 2016). This aligned with the position of Iannacci and Hatzaras (2012) in respect of routines not being accepted as a single level of reality being flat and horizontal which diminished the existence of emergent
properties.
While acknowledging the value of the routines and artefacts, there was also a consensus that process deviation did not occur simply due to a negative perception of the value of the tools. Feldman (2000) noted that deviations could occur for a number of reasons. These included a perception by the user that the routines were not achieving their intended outcome or because other opportunities were revealed. This position was not reflected in this current research in which the evidence indicated that the routines and the associated artefacts were universally perceived as value adding. Rather it was argued that a lack of direction and structure within the crisis team and the crisis team’s
leadership, were the core contributors to the process deviation. This supports previous findings that the use of the artefacts must in fact become ingrained into team member behaviour and where this occurred, positive perceptions resulted. The most effective way of achieving this is through continuous rehearsals by the actors. In this way the routines can become second nature and automatic, at least to the extent of reaching for, and utilising, the supporting artefacts.
It was observed that teams tended to utilise a combination of what could be described as tools and checklists. The tools, such as the problem-solving tool served as a thought prompt and guide that established for the crisis team lines of investigation and
specialised thinking. The checklist provided a different approach from that of a guiding tool having several objectives including memory recall, standardisation and providing a framework (Hales & Pronovost, 2006) and ultimately minimising human error (Degani & Wiener, 1997; Gawande, 2011; Hales & Pronovost, 2006; Seifert, 2009; Thomassen et al., 2014). In the context of crisis management, a checklist is a mechanism that allows the crisis leader or a crisis team member to ensure that specific steps of the process have been adhered to. SME17 emphasised the importance of the confirmation checklist, as it provided a tool for members of the team to run their eyes across during any stage of the response. SME9 built on this, by arguing that since crises are not linear events the checklists ensure sure core requirements are revisited, particularly as it refers to communication to stakeholders. Building on this Gawande (2011, p. 79) argued that routines need to balance a number of virtues, in particular freedom and discipline, craft and protocol, and specialised ability, while most importantly fostering collaboration within the group. Ultimately the routines “supply a set of checks to ensure that the stupid but critical stuff is not overlooked, and they ensure another set of checks to ensure people talk and coordinate and accept responsibility while nonetheless being left the power to manage the nuances and unpredictability” (Gawande, 2011, p. 79) that will be experienced in a crisis response. Mistake minimisation is an overarching objective from the use of the checklist (Degani & Wiener, 1997; Thomassen et al., 2014). That said, one factor to bear in mind is that there is a risk that “checklist users may also become dependent on these tools in practice, which can interfere both with their professional judgement and the objectivity of their decision-making processes” (Hales & Pronovost, 2006, p. 234) and the leader needs to be cognisant of this risk.
The perspective of the importance of checklists was supported in the findings by confirmation from the SMEs, supported by the observations of the researcher, that the artefacts utilised by the crisis teams were extremely effective due to their ability to easily guide thought processes. This is linked to the ability of the checklist to provide operational structure and reduce errors (Degani & Wiener, 1997; Gawande, 2011; Thomassen et al., 2014). While the artefacts in their current form were confirmed as solid, there was discussion about potentially automating the process. This discussion related to leveraging technology to transform the artefacts into tools that would further enhance the capability of the crisis leader, and thereby enable them to provide more effective leadership. The considerations here mainly focused on consolidation of the existing artefacts into applications that could be utilised with smart technology.
Having validated the value of the ostensive routines and the artefacts, the question moves to the reasons for process deviations during crisis activation.