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Introduction

This chapter discusses the wider social, political and economic context of Malaysia in order to better understand the role of blogging and the internet during the 2008 election. It provides a brief historical account of the political and economic forces that contributed to the country‟s multi- ethnic and multi-cultural environment. It starts with a brief background of Malay society before it became a British colony, the struggle for independence in 1957 and the policies formulated after the race riot of the 1960s. This brief account provides an understanding of the dominance of the Malay community with UMNO holding political power as the dominant partner in the BN ruling coalition. It also provides an understanding of race-based politics and a culture of political patronage that exists until the present day. A closer examination of the dominant political culture is important for understanding its influence on the manner of blog use by the group of partisan bloggers, as discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. Moreover, Chapter Eight argues that the particular social and political circumstances can have an influence on blogging in electoral politics. This chapter, covering a range of existing legislation that regulates the media industry, also highlights the tight media control by the ruling coalition. This provides a backdrop for assessing the potential of blogging

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in promoting democratic practices and enriching political life in a relatively authoritarian society.

One of the defining moments in Malaysia‟s recent history is the race riots of May 13, 1969, which occurred after the dismal performance of the ruling regime in that year‟s national election. A brief discussion is dedicated to this period and its aftermath, particularly the creation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) that has been in place since the early 1970s. Certain key elements of the policy will be highlighted to provide an indication of their impact on the country‟s economic and political system. Some social scientists and political analysts attribute the creation of the Malay middle-class to this policy while others consider it to be a form of racial discrimination in the Malaysian society. This is because the policy is seen as having an unequal impact on the people‟s way of life in areas, such as education, housing and employment, because preferential treatment is afforded to the bumiputera (sons of the soil or indigenous people or more commonly referred to the Malays). Other critical scholars argue that the policy has witnessed an emergence of political patronage where preferential treatment is not only given to the Malays in general but more so to bumiputera who are members of UMNO, the country‟s dominant political party (Ho, 1988; Gomez & Jomo, 1997). Tracing the links of those bumiputera businessmen who secured multimillion ringgit projects in the country to political elites in UMNO, the scholars asserted that it was a part of the culture of political patronage that grew out of the NEP.

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Similarly, a discussion on how internet service providers obtain operating licences through their connections with powerful elites in the country suggests that political patronage runs deep within the Malaysian society. A major input of this chapter is focused on the country‟s laws that impact heavily on the mainstream media, restricting their operation as a free press. Apart from the constraining legislation governing the media industry, it discusses ways in which the traditional media are controlled by media owners, who are mainly coalition partners of the ruling regime. It explores changes in key editorial positions which appear to be connected with leadership change in political parties that control the traditional media. In addition to the tightly controlled media, the chapter also highlights other existing pieces of legislation that curtail civil liberties in various facets of political life in the country. Under those circumstances, many scholars conclude that Malaysia is a relatively authoritarian society, with some describing the country as a semi-democracy (Case, 1993), a pseudo democracy (Tan & Zawawi, 2008) or an authoritarian populism state (Munro-Kua, 1996).

Embracing the internet as a foreign investment appeal in 1996, the government, under the then prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, formulated regulations that guaranteed freedom of the internet (Mahathir, 1998: 53). This guarantee may be in line with free speech and association enshrined in the Federal Constitution but it can be challenged by other existing legislations that restrict those same civil liberties. Despite some of

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the constraining legislations, the non-censorship guarantee contributed to notion that the new information and communications technologies could become an alternative platform for free speech and expression. One often cited example that the internet could fulfil its potential to provide alternative information is the reformasi (reformation) movement that emerged after the sacking of deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 (Sabri, 2000; Abbott, 2001). The internet was widely used to communicate with supporters of the reformasi movement and publish information to counter accusations against Anwar Ibrahim (Sabri, 2000). On the other hand, UMNO websites were also set up to counter information of Anwar Ibrahim‟s reformasi supporters in the blogosphere (MyKMU.net, 2007). The ruling regime also had the support of the mainstream media, which were generally not sympathetic to dissenting views from opposition politicians and non-governmental organisations. As such, the internet is interpreted as having the ability to promote certain democratic practices that are not possible with the old media.

Claims that blogging and the internet are a form of „democratisation‟ for Malaysian society seem to have peaked with the 2008 general election (Tan & Zawawi, 2008; Welsh, 2008; Abdul Rashid, 2009; Mohd Azizuddin & Zengeni, 2010). The election saw the BN suffering a major defeat at the polls on March 8 while the opposition scored an overwhelming victory for the first time since 1957. The ruling coalition lost its customary two-thirds majority in parliament and its control on five

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states to the opposition (Loh, 2009). A content analysis of the blogs of candidates who contested in the 2008 election showed that more than 20 elected parliamentarians were maintaining a blog during the election (See Appendix 1). The unprecedented results saw many political writers and analysts describing the new digital technologies as a significant force in the defeat of the ruling regime (Suhaini, 2008; Tan, 2008; The Straits Times Singapore, 2008). The internet was, thus, generally accepted as having played a significant role in Malaysia‟s 12th

general election on March 8, 2008. It is within this relatively authoritarian environment that blogging is heralded as having the potential to promote liberal democratic practices and enrich political life.

Malaya in its early days and the struggle for independence

Before exploring modern day Malaysia, it is important to establish some of the defining characteristics of the Malay society and Malayan history. The traditional Malay society, which could be characterised as feudal, had its own set of social and political institutions before the Malay archipelago became a British colony (Hua, 1983). The traditional political system of the Malay society had the Sultan (ruler) of the state at the top of the hierarchy and he appointed chiefs who were also of the aristocrat class (Means, 1970; Hua, 1983). The chiefs, on behalf of the Sultan, collected produce tax from the peasants. Due to the political subjugation of the peasants to the Sultan, the chiefs also demanded free labour from the peasants under a corvee system known as kerah (Hua, 1983). The social

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set-up has the Malay peasantry centred in a kampung (village), which has its own headman, mosques and mosque officials, located within a district (Means, 1970; Hua, 1983). Such distinct features of the Malay villages are still in existence today.

Another important feature of Malaya before the British colonial rule is the spread of Islam in the 15th century. It was after the Malacca Sultan‟s conversion to Islam that the religion began to spread to other states in the peninsula. Under the influence of the Melaka Sultanate, the Sultans in Pahang, Terengganu, Kedah and Johor embraced the Muslim religion (Hua, 1983). Since then, Islam has become an integral part of Malay society to the extent that the religion gives Malays the bonds of communal identity, which are as strong as those developed by social or political institutions (Means, 1970: 17). However, the spread of Islam had little effect on the relationship between local Malays and Chinese traders, who had assimilated to a large extent by this point (Hua, 1983: 19).

The colonial power had preserved the social and political formation of Malay society throughout the 19th and 20th century. The British even co- opted the traditional Malay ruling class into the state after fierce resistance by the Malay peasantry against British rule (Hua, 1983: 20). The Malay peasants were left to continue with their subsistence mode of production in their villages while at the same time, growing demand for tin and rubber had resulted in massive immigration of Chinese and Indians into the country (Hua, 1983; Jesudason, 1989). By the early 20th century, British

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Malaya became one of the world‟s biggest suppliers of tin and rubber. The massive influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants had also changed the entire social structure of Malaya by the 1930s (Hua, 1983). Chinese immigrants were recruited for tin mining while Indians were employed in rubber plantations. According to the 1939 population records, the number of Chinese and Indians in Malaya had increased more than two-fold between 1911 and 1938. Although the influx of immigrants saw a growing working class, a group of rich Chinese merchants who were favoured by the British administration also emerged. Some of them were co-opted to be unofficial administrators of the Chinese community or „Kapitan China‟, also known as Justices of the Peace (Hua, 1983). The Indian community also had a group of merchants in the banking, money lending and textile industries, who were generally of higher caste than the Indian labourers (Ibid: 56).

After the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the British proposed the formation of Malayan Union for the entire Malay Peninsula, excluding Singapore. However, the proposal was met with strong resistance from the Malay community, including the rulers. Among the objections were the issuance of automatic citizenships to non-Malays and access to some of the civil service positions to non-Malays (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 27). UMNO established after a Pan-Malayan Malay Congress in 1946 began protesting against the Malayan Union. In response, the British were forced to come up with another agreement, known as the Federation of Malaya Agreement

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1948. A working committee representing all parties, including the government, local rulers and UMNO, together with the non-Malay representatives, was set up to work out the 1948 agreement (Means, 1970: 56-57). The agreement drew up a centralised structure of governance at the federal and state level, the position of rulers in the state, the provision for a conference of rulers and a stricter citizenship provision for non-Malays (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 29-31).

However, another problem emerged when members of the Malayan Communist Party resorted to armed violence to wrest power from the British. The colonialists decided, in 1948, to impose a State of Emergency that lasted for 12 years. To counter the Communist insurgency, the British established new villages, largely inhabited by the Chinese, to cut off food supply to the Communists. About half a million people, including a fifth of the Chinese population, were moved into more than 550 new villages (Ibid: 33), resulting in further separation of the Chinese from the rest of Malayan society.

After the threat of Communists had been successfully contained, the call for independence began with the introduction of national elections. Starting with the 1952 municipal election in Kuala Lumpur, the UMNO and MCA, which was formed by conservative Chinese and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce in 1949, set up an ad-hoc alliance which won nine out of the 12 seats contested in the elections (Hua, 1983: 102). The election result was an indication of the political forces at the time and the successful

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formula of an Alliance was replicated, institutionalising the arrangement (Ibid). By 1955, the Alliance included the MIC. The Alliance formula was deemed successful because communal divisions in Malaya were deep (Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 35). Hua (1983) also pointed out that the federal election campaign in 1955 had a full taste of the communalist politics that was to be a feature in years to come (p. 105). The Alliance (made up of UMNO, MCA and MIC) had a landslide victory in 1955 and two years later, the Federation of Malaya obtained its independence. Tunku Abdul Rahman, brother of the Sultan of Kedah, became the first prime minister. Made up of the three main ethnic-based political parties, the Alliance articulated the concerns of their respective ethnic community as membership into each of the three political parties was accepted based on the ethnicity of a person. In 1974, the Alliance changed its name to the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front which is now a coalition of 14 political parties, including those from Sabah and Sarawak. This is not to say that there are no political parties in the country that attempt to transcend racial lines. Several did base their struggle on class inequalities. For example, the now defunct Labour Party and Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM), which had undergone some changes over the years, were more sympathetic towards concerns of the working class.

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New Economic Policy, rights of bumiputera and political links to businesses

Described by Milne and Mauzy (1978: 36) as the result of a bargain over the positions of Malays and non-Malays, the Federal Constitution came into force on 31 August 1957. Among the provisions enshrined in the Constitution are the fundamental liberties of freedom of movement, speech, assembly and association; citizenship status; Malay as the national language; the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak; the position and power of the rulers; Islam as the official religion; the composition and the election of a national parliament; federalism and the powers of the state (Means, 1970: 175-189; Milne & Mauzy, 1978: 36-43; Federal Constitution, 2008). There are 13 states in the Federation of Malaysia, nine of which are headed by a Sultan. The Constitution also provides for the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) who continues to symbolise Malay dominance (Crouch, 1996: 142) and the protector of Malay rights (Federal Constitution, 2008).

While the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the same cannot be said for the Malays. In Malaysia, a Malay, by constitutional and legal definition, is and must be a Muslim (Means, 1970; Federal Constitution, 2008). Abandoning Islam can mean the act of renouncing the Malay way of life. Article 160 (2) of the Federal Constitution reads: “A Malay is a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay customs.” This further

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sharpens the division between the Malays and non-Malays. According to the Department of Statistics Malaysia (2009: 11), the Malaysian population is made up of 66.2% Malays and other bumiputera (indigenous groups), 25% Chinese, 7.5% Indians and 1.3% other ethnic groups. The Chinese and Indians are not as homogenous as the Malays, with regards to matters concerning religion. The other two ethnic groups are free to subscribe to any religion, with some professing to be Muslims, Christians, Buddhist and Hindu. They also speak various Chinese and Indian dialects, which are generally not understood by the majority of Malays. Misunderstandings in matters of religion, education and language can potentially become contentious among the various ethnic groups.

With this set-up of race-based political parties and policies to protect the special position of a particular community, it is common for some scholars to describe the Malayan society as divided along ethnic lines, including religion and language. Means (1970: 399) describes the configuration of the Malayan society as being based on communal and economic divisions. Milne and Mauzy (1978: 4) are more direct when they argue that considerations of racial arithmetic dominate everything political or economic in Malaysia. The racial arithmetic becomes a crucial calculation at the ballot boxes because of the general appeal of the ethnic- based political parties to the multi-ethnic voters. Giving a class perspective to communalism, Hua (1983: 2) contends that the ruling class political domination has been established through communalism and this is to

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prevent the masses from coming together to be a unified political force. With the formation of Malaysia in 1963, which includes Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore24 (expelled in 1965), the society continues to be divided according to ethnicity, religion and language.

When racial tensions flared up into several riots in 1967 and 1969, communal solutions had been drawn up to address the matter. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated in 1970 to eradicate poverty and to restructure the Malaysian society in a way that would correct the economic imbalance between Malays and the non-Malays (Jesudasan, 1988; Hua, 1983). The NEP was designed to facilitate special privileges of the Malays as provided for under the Constitution, making it the Malaysian version of an Affirmative Action Plan (Mehmet, 1986: 8). Analysing the NEP from the perspective of communalism and class struggle, Hua (1983) argues that the policy is an attempt by the state to institutionalise communalism and thereby maintain its domination.

Although the main beneficiaries of the NEP were bumiputera, the policy had also contributed to a consolidation of political and economic resources in the hands of bumiputera politico-business elites (Ho, 1988; Gomez, 1990). This was in reference to the position of UMNO, which had

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Singapore became a part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965 (Baker, 2008:291). Ethnicity was a pertinent aspect in the proposal to include Sabah and Sarawak in the formation of Malaysia because the two states had a large population of indigenous people that would “offset Singapore‟s Chinese majority” (Ibid: 292). Similarly, Singapore‟s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 was seen as a form of racial arithmetic as the exit saw a decrease in Chinese population in Malaysia (Ibid).

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gained hugely from the government‟s privatisation policy in the 1980s under the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad. One case in point was the country‟s biggest road construction project, the RM3.4 billion North-South Highway, which was awarded to an UMNO-owned company, United Engineers (M) Berhad (Ho, 1988). In 1985, the company was awarded the contract to build the 1,000km stretch of highway although it presented a higher bid than five other companies (Gomez, 1990). Bumiputera businessmen, such as Tajudin Ramli, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Halim Saad and Mohd Razali Mohd Rahman were among some of the close associates of Daim Zainuddin, a former finance minister and close ally of the then prime minister Mahathir Mohamad (Ho, 1988; Gomez & Jomo, 1997). Even close associates of sacked deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim had been awarded lucrative contracts. For instance, Nasaruddin Jalil, a former political secretary of Anwar Ibrahim, was a director of Diversified Resources Berhad which obtained a monopoly of the privatised minibus services in Kuala Lumpur in 1993. The company also received a lucrative commercial vehicle inspection concession (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). Ho (1988), thus, concludes that there is a complex web of connection between bumiputera politicians, businessmen, senior bureaucrats and the aristocracy in the Malaysian political system (p. 248). This complex web of connection does not involve only UMNO politicians (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). The scholars argue that the new rich or upper class includes elites of the Chinese and Indian communities who

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have close ties with the UMNO leaders. Gomez and Jomo (1997) identify non-Malay businessmen, such as Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, Ting Pik Khiing, Eric Chia, Quek Leng Chan and T. Ananda Krishnan as beneficiaries of various trading licences and government contracts due to their close ties with UMNO leaders. Instances of such connections are