Criterios o estrategia para el manejo de resultados

epistemology of testimony once we consider the processes underlying interpretation, and the ways in which they can go wrong. These essays, although connected by a central theme, are independent, and can be read separately.

Many of the problems which seem to arise when we consider the processes underlying our recovery of communicated contents concern the hearer's ability to reliably recover the correct meaning - their ability to gain knowledge of what is said. It is often thought that testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said. If this is the case then it might be thought that an investigation into the consequences of such problems is hardly worth conducting, since the consequences are obvious - we clearly do not gain testimonial knowledge in cases in which miscommunication is an epistemic possibility. In chapter two I argue that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. I lay out a set of assumptions about the conditions on knowledge, and the determination of what is said, and then present a series of cases which, on the given assumptions, constitute cases of testimonial knowledge without knowledge of what is said. I consider a number of responses to these cases, and indicate at the end how analogous cases can be constructed on different assumptions about the conditions for knowledge and the determination of what is said.

In chapter three I begin the investigation into the epistemic impact of possible miscommunication. I start by suggesting that actual minor miscommunications do not always block testimonial knowledge (this is a step beyond the conclusion of chapter two which merely argues that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said), but I spend the majority of the chapter explaining a sense in which they often do block such knowledge. Moreover, I argue that such miscommunications are reasonably widespread and may often go unnoticed. I do this by outlining a form of mismatch argument according to which the factors which give rise to mismatch are common features of many low stakes contexts. I then consider and reject a number of responses. I conclude that a mild scepticism about much low stakes context sensitive testimony may be warranted.

The epistemic significance of miscommunication (or the possibility thereof) does not end with its ability to block testimonial knowledge however. In chapters four, five and six I explore three further types of epistemic problem which are revealed by considering miscommunication (and its sources). In chapter four I argue that the possibility of miscommunication gives speakers plausible deniability about a wide range of assertions, even when miscommunication has not occurred. That is, speakers often have scope to claim that miscommunication has occurred even when it has not.

By doing so they are able to avoid undertaking robust commitments when asserting. I explore the theoretical consequences of this for theories of testimony which place a particular emphasis on the commitments speakers undertake when asserting (for example, Assurance theories, and Elizabeth Fricker's recent development of her reductionist views).

One of the most important recent developments in the epistemology of testimony has been Miranda Fricker's discussion of epistemic injustice. Fricker's approach bears significant similarities to the approach taken in this thesis. This thesis explores the consequences of defects in the processes underlying interpretation. Fricker explores the ethical and epistemic consequences of a particular type of defect in the processes underling our credibility judgements. She argues that these processes rely on heuristics and stereotypes which can encode prejudicial judgements of the speaker. This can lead to certain groups being unfairly assigned a low credibility, and gives rise to a number of harms. For example, such speakers are silenced, and disrespected as knowers. Chapter five explores a similar phenomenon which arises at the level of interpretation. Like our credibility judgements our interpretations are guided by social stereotypes, and this can lead to similar ethical and epistemic problems. That is, they can lead to certain groups being disproportionately subjected to harmful forms of misinterpretation. I explore the causes of this phenomenon, its harms, and its relation to epistemic injustice as characterised by Fricker.

Chapter six explores the implications for cases such as those discussed in chapter five for testimonial anti-reductionism. The chapter begins by outlining a recent argument presented by Susanna Siegel against perceptual dogmatism. Siegel presents cases in which an agent's irrational belief cognitively penetrates (has a causal impact on the content of) their perceptual seemings. She argues that in such cases the agent's beliefs are unjustified, and perhaps even circular. I argue that analogous cases to those given by Siegel can be given for testimonial belief, and that this causes a problem for particular forms of testimonial anti-reductionism (and some conceavable brands of reductionism). Views of testimonial justification are taxonomized according to the particular default rights which are postulated, and the different stances which might be taken on the epistemic rights of agent in cases of misunderstanding. Moreover, two forms of cognitively penetrated linguistic understanding are identified - one in which one's speech perception is penetrated, and one in which irrational background states have an impact on the assignment of meaning to words. It is argued that cases of cognitively penetrated linguistic understanding cause a problem for views of testimonial justification which postulate a default right for agents to trust their own understanding.

Chapter Two: Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What is

Said.

0. Introduction.

In this chapter I discuss the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the contents of assertions (and the fact that those contents have been asserted) in order to gain testimonial knowledge from those assertions? I briefly explain why epistemologists should focus more attention on this question, before providing three counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that audiences must know that a speaker has asserted p in order to gain testimonial knowledge that p. I close by explaining how the argument generalises and can be made to work on different assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.