Criterios para la identificación de experiencias

In order to make sense of the sorts of counterpossibles we’ve discussed, I propose that we extend this picture even further to include grades of modality beyond the metaphysically possible. The plan for the rest of the paper is this: Building on a suggestion of E.J. Lowe’s, I will acknowledge the existence of two additional grades of modality that include the metaphysically possible: strict logical possibility and narrow logical possibility. I will explain this in intuitive terms without defending it in any detail. I will then suggest that we further acknowledge a sphere of worlds that is included within these spheres, and that itself includes the metaphysically possible worlds, viz. the set of worlds where all the essential truths hold. Hence, I will briefly explain how we should think of the essential truths. We will call this set of worlds the essence compatible worlds. My hypothesis is that, with an appropriate understanding of the essential truths, we can use this machinery to make sense of some of the counterpossibles and inference patterns that we looked at earlier. I will call the extended structure on hyperintensional space that I develop the Extended Lowe-Kment Picture of Modality. First, Jonathan Lowe:

“In the previous section I was content to characterize logical possibility somewhat vaguely in terms of compliance with the laws of logic, with logical necessity understood

correspondingly. In fact, one can distinguish three different grades of logical necessity, as follows. First there is the strictly logically necessary – that which is true in virtue of the laws of logic alone. Secondly there is the narrowly logically necessary – that which is true in virtue of the laws of logic together with definitions of non-logical terms. And thirdly there is the

broadly logically necessary … one might very reasonably contend that this last grade of logical

57 _{Assuming this follows from the actual laws of physics; e.g., laws about gravity.} 58 _{Assuming it is a metaphysical law that whatever begins to exist has a cause.}

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necessity is in fact coextensive with metaphysical necessity – indeed, that they are just two different names for the same thing.”59

Though I will not follow Lowe’s discussion exactly, I believe these distinctions are helpful. We can think of the strictly logically possible worlds as those worlds where the laws of logic hold.

Intuitively, this may be broader than the class of metaphysically possible worlds, since there seem to be metaphysical necessities that are not themselves laws of logic or true in virtue of the laws of logic. For instance, even if it is metaphysically necessary that every contingent fact has an explanation,60 _{it is}

presumably not true just as a matter of logic that this is so. Similarly, the class of narrowly logically possible worlds seems to extend more widely than the class of metaphysically possible worlds; for although it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O, it is not true either in virtue of the laws of logic alone, nor is it true by definition.61

I will simply assume this picture is right and that there are grades of modality beyond the metaphysically possible. I will next identify as a sphere included within the narrowly logically possible worlds what I will call the set of essence compatible worlds, i.e., the sphere where all the essential truths hold. The next task then is to briefly lay out what these essential truths are, especially if they are not merely de re metaphysical necessities as the modal account suggested. 3. Real Essence

As we saw earlier, the modal account of essence suffered from a few prominent flaws. Recall what the modal account said:

 (E1**): Ess(F,a) iff ¬◊(a exists & ¬Fa) [iff □(a exists → Fa)]

59 _{E.J. Lowe The Possibility of Metaphysics (1998) at p. 14.}

60 _{This is a version of Leibniz’s famous Principle of Sufficient Reason; it is a candidate for a metaphysical law.}

61 _{If one has doubts about the notion of “truth in virtue of definitions” or “analytic truth,” then most of what I say can}

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 (E2**): Ess(F,K) iff ¬◊∃x(Kx & ¬Fx) [iff □∀x(Kx → Fx)]

One problem with this definition was that it made any logical consequence of “Fx” part of a thing’s essence; hence, on the modal account, it was part of what it is to be Socrates that 2 + 2 = 4. Also, on the modal account, any property of a necessary being is essential to that thing; hence, it is an essential property of the number 2 that God is thinking about it.

Given these problems with the modal account, I do not expect that we will be able to fully reduce essence statements into non-essentialist (e.g., modal) terms. We will likely have to work with the intuitive notion of an essential feature of an object (or kind) as one that is part of what it is to be that object (or kind). Nevertheless, I think we can say a little bit more about the structure of essence statements than we already have.

In the first place, I propose that we think of essential truths as being relative to an object or a given class of objects.62 _{On my view, an essential truth is a truth that holds in virtue of what it is to}

be a given thing or type of thing. So, for instance, “water is H2O” is an essential truth about water. And “if Socrates exists he is human” might be an essential truth about Socrates. These are both essential truths, because it is part of what it is to be water that water is H2O, and it is part of what it is to be Socrates that he is human. Hereafter, I will think of the essential truths as being prefixed by an operator: Where p is an essential truth about X’s, we can say “it is true in virtue of the essence of X that p” or “[E(X)]p”63

Note that some essential truths give necessary conditions and others give sufficient

conditions.64 _{So for instance, plausibly, it is an essential truth about gold that anything with atomic}

number 79 is gold; this is a sufficient condition. On the other hand, it is plausibly an essential truth

62 _{See Kment (2014) ch. 6. See also Fine 1994b.}

63 _{Kment takes a similar approach; see Kment (2014) ch. 6.} 64 _{See Kment (2014) pp. 147 – 159.}

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about cats that anything that is a cat is an animal; this is a necessary condition. Some essential truths may give both necessary and sufficient conditions.65

With this parsing of the language, I will analyze the locutions we have given earlier in these terms. In particular, I will take essence statements of the form “F is essential to a” and “F is essential to K” as follows:

 Ess(F,a) =df [E(a)] (if a exists, a is F)

 Ess(F,K) =df [E(K)] (if Ks exist, they are all F)

Plausibly, essential truths are themselves metaphysically necessary. Moreover, although we cannot define the essential truths in terms of modal facts, it does seem plausible that if something has a feature essentially, then it has it in all metaphysically possible worlds where it exists:66

 (E1***): Ess(F,a) only if ¬◊(a exists & ¬Fa) [only if □(a exists → Fa)]

 (E2***): Ess(F,K) only if ¬◊∃x(Kx & ¬Fx) [only if □∀x(Kx → Fx)]

Because of this, where the antecedents of the relevant counterfactuals are metaphysically possible, Would Below and Not-Might Above are still valid.67 _{Hence, in the case of metaphysically possible}

antecedents, this theory of essence is able to account for the same predictions as the intensional account; in the case of counterpossibles, we hope to do even better.