Sectarian balance in Lebanon means a balance of sects and is not based on geography i.e. where different sects live in every region in Lebanon. However, there is a classical geographical concentration of sects in specific areas. For instance, the Druze are concentrated in Mount Lebanon while Sunnis are in Beirut, Tripoli, Saidoun and Akkra. These are among the biggest cities in Lebanon. Shiites are concentrated in the south, especially Tyre, and Hermel.
In Lebanon, particularistic expenditure is distributed ethno-geographically for three main reasons:
1. To buy loyalty of a sect or sectarian political party.
2. To postpone a public administration problem, by funding short-term programs that cover the problem.
Educational institutions can explain such inequality and sectarian expenditures. In Lebanon, there are more than 50 universities, mostly private. Each university is controlled and managed by a sect or ethnic group. For instance, the Amal Shiite political party controls Sagesse University, while the Lebanese American University is run by Christian Maronites. Therefore, each religious and ethnic sect sees public universities as a budget-consuming entity, and try to dismantle or decrease its budget. This aim is to undermine the public educational institutions, while strengthening private, ethnically run institutions. The Lebanese University is the largest university in Lebanon. Shiites control it as rectors, the student union and the management. It is known as, “The University of the Poor” because it is public and cheaper than private universities. However, most of the youth activists and anti-sectarian movements, such as “Al Shaeb Yourid”, ‘the people demand’, “Bedna Nuhasib”, ‘We want to hold you accountable’ “Tel3it Rehetkum”, ‘you are smelly’, are organized and established by youth from the Lebanese University.
Expenditure distribution affects generalized trust heavily when funds go to the ethno- geographical area that the prime minister/minister originates from. For example, when the prime minister, who is always Sunni, is from Beirut, he usually concentrates the expenditure on his constituency in Beirut. Alhariri and Saniora were from Saidoun and poured huge chunks of the public budget into their cities, leaving most of the country with little public expenditure compared to their cities. As spending becomes particularistic on an ethno- geographical basis, people’s judgment about the area and its inhabitants becomes generalized. For example, Tyre and Saidoun have less trust between them as each city is inhabited by a different sect and is represented independently in the government and the political system. Nabeh Berri, the spokesperson of the Lebanese parliament, comes from the southern Shiite area. He has many private and public companies that run under his sectarian party, while the Druze Walid Junblat controls other private and public companies in his area
too. In 2015, new sectarian tensions arose in governmental and parliamentarian institutions when the government decided to solve the garbage problem by exporting it abroad. Tensions escalated as the sectarian blocs had different interests in which private/public companies should take over the exportation of garbage.
There are some categories of institutions that contribute to distrust among people, such as governmental sectarian institutions with a high budget of particularistic expenditures, e.g. the council of the south for Shiite, the council of development and construction for Sunni, and council of the displaced Lebanese. Each of these semi-governmental institutions usually appoints employees from one sectarian group, where service providing becomes particularistic and public administration becomes arbitrary for other sects. This generates a level of distrust towards the employees from the ethnic sect, and this distrust becomes contagious. As Arab society in general, and Lebanese society in particular, relies on social networks and family ties to get public information, distrust becomes contagious to other members of the sect.
One of the main driving factors of distrust in Lebanon is the distrust of people in the political system and the political elites themselves. In times of crisis or elections, ethnicity and sectarian identity is stronger than national identity in Lebanon, so people follow and support politicians and political elites from the same sect despite the corruption.
There is also a cultural division between sects, based on which have more resources, and connections than others. This is evident in the number of private schools, the unequal access to cultural capital, the dropout rates at all educational levels and in educational opportunities abroad.
The number of students in public schools dropped from 351,000 to 275,000 between 2001 and 2011(R.A.C.E. 2014). This drop in numbers is one result of a new kind of privatization
by providing sect-based/ethnic-based education in private schools managed by the different ethnicities where religious and ethnic curricula are provided as a compulsory subject. Moreover, higher education is not exempt from division since each sect demands to have its own higher education institution. In 1974, there were only five universities, while in 2015, Lebanon had 24 universities and 19 higher education institutions.
The sudden proliferation of higher education institutions originated from the need of each sect to have its own academic institution where privileges go to the sect’s students, and as a source of investment for the leaders of the sect, who in the majority of these institutions are the owners. In 2015, three main universities were established as part of the sectarian division; “Al Hadara University” ‘the Civilization University’, belonging to Hizbullah, the Shia, Phoenicia University owned by Randa Berri, wife of the speak of the parliament and Shia and head of Amal movement, and lastly AZM University, owned by Nagib Meqati, a Sunni leader.
According to Traboulsi, these institutions/policies that facilitate cash-based subsidizing, and educational expenditures on private academic institutions allowed the political sect elite to divide the society, empowering the leaders to control the people and dismantle any efforts by the students unions and university-based social movements to initiate any struggle against the political elites. He argues that such tools are dividing the society and lessening the trust between the people in general (Traboulsi 2016).
In education, there are quotas for different sects and every year a new number of seats are allocated to different sects in some universities or in most universities in an informal way. Rodine Mahmoud claims that in 2003, she was denied a seat at Sagesse as they were admitting only Druze students that year and not Sunni. Moreover, there are proven cases where grades have been manipulated by certain professors to the advantage of the students
from the same sects. In the Lebanese University, Shiites are taking over the faculty of law, while Sunnis dominate other campuses. Therefore, the students who are members or affiliated with the Amal Shiite party can receive high grades or pass, even though they fail general exams. This is because the student union and dominant Shiite parties can interfere in academic promotions and academic employment.
According to Rodine Mahmoud, trust among different sects and ethnicities in Lebanon are not stable because institutions cannot provide the same treatment for all parties. For example, an official document that needs to be obtained can be expedited for a specific person because the general manager or the majority of employees is from same sect. Universities and educational institutions in Lebanon are mirrors of the outer society and state-society relationship. As New York Times wrote in 2009 on Saint Joseph University student elections:
“Once again, the university has become a reflection in miniature of the country’s fiercely divided political scene. [Student council elections] results are seen as crucial indexes of a party’s overall popularity and routinely make the front pages of national newspapers” (Worth 2009).