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The first distinction I will draw is betweenstimulus-responsebehaviour andheuristic-produced

behaviour.26 By stimulus-response behaviour I do not intend to refer to the behaviourist idea that takes the mind to be a black box to remain unanalyzed. Rather, I mean to refer to some unspecified theory that takes a stimulus to be the sole cause, in a course-grained way, of a response. By heuristic-produced behaviour I mean behaviour (including cognitive behaviour) that is brought about or caused by the operation of some heuristic. For example, consider any of the proposed heuristics mentioned above, such as:

26_{It may also be worthwhile to distinguish between stimulus-response (SR) and stimulus-stimulus (SS) theories} of classical conditioning. According to SR, classical conditioning occurs via association and without conceptu- alization. According to SS, conditioning involves a conceptualization of the object of association. On the SS model, Pavolv’s dog salivates because the bell evokes the conceptfood. On the SR model, no such conceptualiza- tion occurs—salivating is simply associated with the ringing of the bell. Whether the SR or SS theory is correct is still debated. I suspect that both may be true, depending on the context and organism in question. To avoid complications, however, my remarks can be understood to refer to the SR theory.

(9) In chess, consider first those moves that remove or protect pieces under attack. (11) Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is

representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness (resemblance) the higher the probability estimation.

These heuristics are not mere stimulus-response operations. Rather, they are relatively more complex operations involving conceptual information. In contrast, stimulus-response behaviour does not implicate any conceptual information, since the stimulus, not anything having to do with concepts, is supposed to be the cause of the response. As a paradigm example, we might take a case of shuttering upon hearing an unexpected loud noise—the loud noise is not concep- tualized, and thus concepts have no role in producing the shutter response; it is simply a brute reaction or reflex.

The distinction between heuristic-produced and stimulus-response behaviour may seem obvious. It is an important distinction nonetheless, especially given some recent work of Gigerenzer’s. Gigerenzer (2007, 2008c) has speculated that some nonhuman animal behaviour can be understood in terms of heuristics. According to Hutchinson and Gigerenzer (2005), behavioural biologists have studied “rules of thumb” since the middle of the twentieth cen- tury. Rules of thumb describe some animal behaviour through simple rules which appear to be largely innate. So, for instance, the manner in which the waspPolistes dominulusconstructs its nest dictates that there are a possible 155 different hexagonal arrangements. However, only 18 arrangements are ever observed. And the 18 arrangements appear to follow a rule of thumb “in which the wasp places each cell at the site where the sum of the ages of the existing walls is greatest” (p. 103). Similarly, if there are two light sources in a copepod’s environment, it will follow “a trajectory as if it were pulled toward each source with a force proportional to source intensity

distance2 ” (ibid.). Yet behavioural biologists explain this seemingly complex behaviour by a simple rule of thumb that says that the copepod “adjusts its orientation so as to max- imise the amount of light falling on [its] flat eye” (ibid.). Hutchinson and Gigerenzer claim that such rules of thumb “correspond roughly” (p. 98) to heuristics, though Gigerenzer (2007, 2008c) appears to make the stronger claim that “rule of thumb” is synonymous with “heuristic”.

Gigerenzer (2007) goes on to explain that many other animal behaviours can be understood as being the result of following rules of thumb or heuristics.27

However, given the distinction made here between stimulus-response and heuristic-produced behaviour, Gigerenzer’s belief that such animal behaviours are the result of following heuristics may be misguided. This certainly appears to be the case with respect to the copepod example— it is more likely that copepods are guided by stimulus-response mechanisms rather than heuris- tics; it is doubtful that they have the wherewithal to possess or develop any concepts.28 _It seems, rather, that stimulus-response behaviour is best characterized as merely satisfying a rule, or conforming behaviour to a rule. As Gigerenzer’s examples illustrate, satisfying a rule may give the appearance that the behaviour is produced by a heuristic, but such stimulus- response behaviours do not involve involve a rule as a causal ingredient. We might say that merely satisfying a rule is not sufficient for heuristic-produced behaviour. (More on satisfying rules below.)

To avoid mere rule-satisfying behaviour as being considered heuristic-produced behaviour, I will offer the following constraint on what heuristics are supposed to be:

C: Heuristics (in some way) utilize conceptual information.29

I do not wish to put any stronger constraints on what heuristics are supposed to be at the mo- ment. Nevertheless, with this weak constraint we can rule out stimulus-response behaviour as being heuristic-produced insofar as the former is an instance of merely satisfying a rule, where rule-satisfying behaviour does not implicate the involvement of any conceptual information. As we shall see presently, however, condition C has a bigger role to play in developing a robust characterization of heuristics.

27_{For example, Gigerenzer believes that birds of paradise mate selection behaviour can be explained as the} females following the heuristicLook over a sample of males, and go for the one with the longest tail; Gigeren- zer also claims that aggressor-assessment of deer stags follow a pattern of sequential reasoning, which can be described by a heuristic to the effect ofUse deepness of roar to estimate the size of rival first; use appearance afterward.

28_{Many of Gigerenzer’s other assertions about animals following heuristics (see previous footnote) are likewise} thrown into doubt, for the behaviour in question is probably the result of stimulus-response.

29_{I hedge by saying “in some way” because, as we shall see in chapter 4, heuristics do not directly utilize} conceptual information but metainformation embodied by relations within and between conceptual content.