The rise of fundamentalism in the major religions has awakened a new awareness of religion as a major factor in intra-cultural, intercultural, intra-national, and international relations, in response to modernist and secular influences (Thomas 2005; Armstrong 2001, 2004; Bouma 1992, 1995, 1999; Castells 1997; Lawrence 1998, Thurow 1996; Barber 1996; Fields 1991). Present-day fundamentalism is understood through stereotypes and generalisations. Some perceive it as a religious backlash of ‘resacralising’ intentions, against the non-religious secular, scientific, and rational discourses, which undermine religious standards, authority,
and hegemony in the private and public spheres of social life (Shupe 2009; Armstrong 2004). Thurow states that people “retreat into religious fundamentalism whenever the uncertainties of the physical world become too great” (1997: 233). Encountering and engaging with difference, then, is as threatening for fundamentalists, as can be the threat of fundamentalism for non- fundamentalists; affiliates privilege their own way as the right way of living. Differing religious perspectives contribute to the many current world conflicts.
Fundamentalism refers then to religious groups which are intensely committed to their world view and are prepared to expend a great deal of energy shaping themselves and their world according to their beliefs. This inevitably brings them into conflict with both those who share their faith orientation but not the same intensity of degree of commitment to that faith and with those of other faiths. When a new fundamentalism emerges, like Islamic or Hindu fundamentalism it disturbs the established order and entrenched vested interests resulting in a loud protest against the ‘insanity’ of these new movements (Bouma 1992: 61).
However, not all religious people with high levels of conviction and commitment become fundamentalist but adapt to the changing social conditions and influences and co-exist peacefully, despite religious differences. Fundamentalists, instead, it is argued, develop a new fervour in order to defend and protect their belief systems and way of life, by either retreating from the world in a mode of isolationist defence, or by militantly attempting to impose, and convert all others to, their own ways (Armstrong 2004; Thurow 1996; Bouma 1992). Based on intentions
regarding their right way to live, they attempt to reinstate traditions, heritage, and rules of behaviour, with a view to the future state of the religion, and to implement the widest possible adherence to God’s Word, as they understand and accept it to be.
Various understandings of the word, ‘fundamentalism’, exist, but it essentially refers to religious interpretations and expectations regarding right living. Yet defining ‘fundamentalism’, as a working concept, is as difficult and elusive as defining other words that are relevant to this research, such as ‘religion’, ‘spirituality’, and ‘culture’. Common mass media usage, which influences the
general population’s perceptions, suggests that fundamentalists are synonymous with extremists, and both are ‘extreme fanatical terrorists’. Part of the problem is the connotations and use of the term pejoratively rather than as description (Bouma 1992; Appleby 1993). Christian fundamentalism began in Protestant U.S.A. where fundamentalism concerned living and worshipping according to the
fundamentals of the religion’s teachings (Shupe 2009; Armstrong 2004; Bouma 1992). Anson Shupe explains:
The thrust of American Protestant fundamentalism aimed at defending the narrower boundaries of conservative Christian orthodoxy. In so doing the fundamentalist movement became associated with the pre-millennial expectation of Jesus Christ’s imminent return to Earth, superpatriotism to the point of xenophobia, rural lifestyles and values, individual piety, a rationalistic suspicion of charismatic (or Holy Spirit-filled) enthusiasm characteristic of the emerging Holiness and Pentecostal movements, and anti-intellectualism (2009: 479).
Such a narrowing of perspectives would result in the rejection of liberal modern developments, such as mass entertainment, medical interventions — including oral contraception and abortion, and permissiveness (Shupe 2009: 479). Echo Fields (1981), who writes about “activist fundamentalists”, describes how Wilcox (1986), in the North American context, suggests two types of fundamentalism. They are “Denominationals...the larger category who attend fundamentalist churches but espouse some political beliefs that are relatively liberal” and “Doctrinals ... [who] may not attend fundamentalist churches but hold political attitudes that are consistently conservative ... tend to be better educated, earn more income from higher prestige jobs, and live in more urban areas” (Fields 1991: 180). Bruce Lawrence offers another perspective by identifying three types of fundamentalism — “literalist, terrorist, and political activist” (1998: 89). Where these theorists converge is in an understanding that fundamentalists have strong convictions regarding the rightness of their own religious beliefs and perspectives — that they each believe they have the only truth — and that many of them want to change and shape the social world according to their way.
The project, Fundamentalisms Observed, that Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby co-ordinated during the 1980s, explores the understandings of fundamentalism across “seven religious traditions” (Appleby 1993: 71), including the three Abrahamic religions. It expands on the definitions, practices, and understandings of fundamentalists, and the interpretations by the many scholars who undertook the challenge of investigating the complexities of fundamentalist groups. Each example in the project is context based; the whole addresses a variety of fundamentalist sources and expressions across various parts of the world. Scholars involved in the project
... discovered that fundamentalisms were not hidebound, but innovative, dynamic, constantly adapting forces. Their essential feature is not that they are reactionary but that they are reactive: They ‘fight back’ — a key element — in the name of God or the sacred, against modernity, relativism, and pluralism (Marty 1993: 6).
Further, they discovered that fundamentalists cannot be simplistically stereotyped, as was common, they argue, in academia prior to the inception of the project. Fundamentalists are not necessarily “the voice of the hopelessly poor, deluded, or power-mad; the refuge of those who cannot live with ambiguity or paradox; the haven for the fearful and the fanatical” (Marty 1993: 6-7). At that level, the findings of this thesis concur with Marty and Appleby’s findings. In his review of the first part of the project, James A. Beckford outlines the project’s findings, including the commonalities shared by most fundamentalisms:
There is clearly a family resemblance among such things as fundamentalist concerns for personal and communal identity, dualistic worldviews, ideological purity, heightened awareness of enemies, sense of urgency about impending crises, aspiration toward a totalizing social system, selective borrowing from both tradition and modernity, and authoritarian leadership (Beckford 1993: 185).
The caution in their work is that fundamentalism scholarship draws conclusions that may not be recognised in all ‘lived fundamentalisms’ (Marty 1995; Appleby 1993). That is, those who peacefully live their fundamentals will not necessarily relate to the descriptions of militancy and other threatening intentions; neither will
‘self-perceiving-as-peaceful’ fundamentalists from one religion appreciate a comparison with ‘Others-perceived-as-threatening’ fundamentalists from a different religion. To this end, “Project participants use the term ‘fundamentalism’ as a comparative construct rather than an essentialist label” (Appleby 1993: 72).