Cuadrante 4: Maestro–infancia–educación

The ability to infer another person’s emotions from his or her intention is shortly acquired around the ability to understand false beliefs, the key ToM ability. False belief understanding is supposed to be an indicator of representational understanding. This thesis was the first extending research on the neural network involved in Theory of Mind (ToM) to intention-based emotion attribution. Based on developmental and neuronal findings, it was assumed that emotions inferred from intention-outcome- relations would be less associated with brain regions implicated in representational operations, particularly the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and the temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ). In contrast, specifically emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions were assumed to be associated with brain regions involved in representational operations, specifically the DMPFC. Two experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 investigated emotion attribution based on intention- outcome-relations, an ability which precedes the ability to understand false beliefs. Experiment 2 was concerned with emotion attribution based on the integration of immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations, an ability which develops shortly after false belief understanding.

First, neither the DMPFC nor the TPJ were observed to be involved in intention- based emotion attribution. This finding indicates that adults may attribute emotions, even mixed emotions in the case of fulfilled immoral intentions, without representational operations. Moreover, a similar neural network was observed when emotions were inferred from intention-outcome-relations and when emotions were inferred by integrating immoral intentions into intention-outcome-relations. This network particularly comprised the medial pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, BA 6) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC, BA 45/47). This network was specifically active during emotion attribution based on unfulfilled intentions and on fulfilled immoral intentions. Regarding the pre-SMA activity, intention-based emotion attribution may be associated with a controlled intention-outcome-matching

strategy. That is, at least in adulthood, emotions may be inferred by a controlled matching of an intention to an outcome situation, rather than by processing the intention independent of reality cues. More specifically, in the case of unfulfilled intentions, participants may have suppressed an automatic intention-outcome- matching response based on an expected intention-outcome-match situation. Instead, subjects may have adjusted the automatic intention-outcome-matching response to an unexpected intention-outcome-mismatch situation. Moreover, in the case of attributing mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, participants may have simultaneously computed a goal-oriented and a morally-oriented intention- outcome-matching strategy. The assumption of a controlled intention-outcome- matching strategy in cases where either an intention mismatches an outcome situation, or where an immoral intention induces a mismatch between a goal-oriented and a morally-oriented intention-outcome-matching response, is further supported by anterior and mid-VLPFC activity. The VLPFC activity suggests that particularly for negative emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions and for mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, it may have been necessary to retrieve scripts in a controlled information processing modus, as indexed by the anterior VLPFC activity (BA 47). Moreover, specifically for the processing of mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, adults may have resolved a conflict between a more goal-oriented and a more morally-oriented script, as indexed by the mid-VLPFC activity (BA 45).

In sum, the functional findings on emotions inferred from intention-outcome- relations indicate that even adult participants may have matched an actor’s intention to an outcome situation rather than processing its intention, even its unfulfilled intention independent of reality cues. Therefore, intention-based emotion attribution, at least for neutral intentions, does not seem to require representational operations. Further, the functional findings on emotion attribution based on the integration of an immoral intention into intention-outcome-relations challenge developmental findings. Developmental evidence indicates that young children’s happy victimizer responses based on fulfilled immoral intentions are a function of an immature representational understanding. The neuronal adult data speak against the assumption

of representational operations underlying emotion attribution for immoral intentions. Instead, at least in adults, the neuronal findings suggest that the processing of mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions may be a function of an increasing ability to simultaneously compute diverging intention-outcome-matching strategies and to simultaneously process diverging intention-based emotion attribution scripts, rather than being a function of representational operations. To further test this assumption, a developmental study should investigate the brain regions associated with intention-based emotion attribution. Further, subsequent research should combine research on false belief understanding and intention-based emotion attribution by exploring the neural network involved in belief-based emotion attribution compared to intention-based emotion attribution.

10. SUMMARY

This thesis extends research on the neural network involved in Theory of Mind (ToM) to intention-based emotion attribution. Children acquire this ability around the ability to understand false beliefs. False belief understanding is the key ToM ability because of indicating representational understanding. Two experiments were conducted. In both experiments cartoon stories with verbal vignettes were presented. The experimental conditions only differed in their verbal vignettes. In experiment 1 fifteen healthy adults reasoned about emotions inferred from intention-outcome- relations, an ability which develops shortly before the acquirement of false belief understanding. In experiment 2 eighteen healthy adults attributed emotions based on integrating an actor’s immoral intention into intention-outcome-relations, an ability that develops shortly after the development of false belief understanding. Based on developmental and neuronal findings, it was assumed that emotions inferred from intention-outcome-relations would be less associated with brain regions implicated in representational operations, in particular the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and the temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ). In contrast, specifically emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions were assumed to be associated with brain regions involved in representational operations, specifically the DMPFC. In Experiment 1 the emotion attribution conditions varied depending on an actor’s intention either matching or mismatching an outcome situation. In Experiment 2, in addition to the factor intention-outcome-relation, an actor either held a neutral or immoral intention (factor intention). In the emotion attribution picture following the story pictures, which depict an actor’s intention and an outcome situation, subjects had to reason about the actor’s emotion based on its intention and the outcome of the intended action. The fMRI analysis focused on the functional activity associated with the emotion attribution cue. The emotion attribution picture was followed by a response picture presenting different emotion dimensions (Experiment 1: neutral, positive, negative; Experiment 2: positive, negative). Besides the emotion attribution

conditions, a non-mental reality judgement condition was used. Following the fMRI session, a rating task with different emotion dimensions was conducted to get more specific emotion attribution results. Neither the DMPFC nor the TPJ was involved in intention-based emotion attribution. Instead, a neuronal network specifically comprising the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) was associated with negative emotions inferred from unfulfilled intentions (experiment 1) and with mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions (experiment 2). These findings indicate that intention-based emotion attribution, including the processing of mixed emotions inferred from fulfilled immoral intentions, may be a function of an increasing ability to simultaneously compute diverging intention-outcome-matching strategies and to simultaneously process diverging intention-based emotion attribution scripts, rather than being a function of representational operations.