The reason for such a lack of progress, Wichit argued, was essentially the result of two factors. The first of these was inequality between the administrative and teaching staff in the Ministry of Education. Under a policy inherited from the absolute monarchy the former group had the opportunity to advance more rapidly within the bureaucracy and earn higher salaries. As a result, Wichit believed teachers had no real incentive to work hard or improve themselves. The second, and more immediate problem confronting the process of educational reform concerned officials who were in charge of implementing government policy. In this area, Wichit singled out Chaophraya Thammasakmontri, the Minister for Education for particulary harsh criticism. He claimed that Thammasakmontri, who had been a leading figure in education under the absolute monarchy, involved himself in every decision made within the ministry, no matter how trivial the matter. 156 Consequently, very little was accomplished. Wichit also accused Thammasakmontri of keeping many of his old cronies on in the ministry with scant regard for their qualifications. While not directly accusing the minister of disloyalty to the government, Wichit claimed many of his appointees were totally opposed to reform and confirmed enemies of the state.157
The suggestions Wichit made for overcoming these problems were straightforward. With regard to the first, he recommended that ministerial regulations be changed to promote equality of opportunity and thereby raise the aspirations of teachers and give the profession hope for the future. He also said that funds should be redirected away from the administrative domain and used to provide pay rises for as many teachers as possible. 158 It was anticipated that if such change took place a superior quality of individual would chose teaching as a career. As for the latter problem, Wichit provided the government with a list of specific individuals whom he felt should be dismissed immediately. He also suggested that Thammasakamontri be required step down. In addition he said that all ministry officials who had served more than twenty- five years in the public service should be relieved of their duties, the only exceptions being individuals for whom suitable replacements could not be found. Furthermore, all 156 During Chulalongkom’s time Thammasakmontri was involved in a number of areas in education such as teacher training, curriculum development and the production of teaching materials. Under Vajiravudh, he became the Minister for Education from 1917 until 1926 when he was relieved of his position by Prajadhipok. Immediately after the 1932 revolution he came back into favour and was made die first President of the National Assembly. He also resumed direct involvement in educational activities and became Minister for Education for a second time in September 1932. In December of the same year, he was appointed as head of a six-man committee on educational reform set up by the government. See Suchitra Sutdieokrai, Bot samruat chiwit lae phon ngan khong Khru Thep [A Survey of the Life and Work of Khru Thep]:l-21, In Khru Thep(Cholthira Klatyu, ed.), The Social Science Association of Thailand, Bangkok. 1983. And Prawat krasuang su'ksathikan, 2435-2507 [History of the Ministry of Education: 1892-1964] JKhurusapha, Bangkok,1964: 309.
157 N A. San. 3.13/16.
158 Ibid. [7-8], Wichit further suggested that the loss in the administrative budget could be made up if the government stopped its support of the 'aristocratic' [aristokhrat] Vajiravudh College which amounted to 45,000 bahtannually.
officials who had served for twenty years and found to have insufficient qualifications were to be dismissed, as was any official, regardless of their length of service, who had shown signs of opposition to the government or its plans for educational reform. A final suggestion was that the education council, a consultative body of officials, take a more active role in decision making. The council, which had been under the jurisdiction of the minister, would instead become responsible to the cabinet as a whole, a move which was designed to prevent the any one individual domininating the ministry as had been the case in the p a st159
Apart from these measures, Wichit also discussed the question of school texts. In conducting his research he had found that there was no uniformity of teaching materials between schools, and that much of this material was very dated, often presenting the students with conflicting, confusing views of the world. Wichit argued the reason for this chaotic situation was that each school appeared to follow the policy
[naiyobaf] of its headmaster rather than that laid down by the Ministry of Education. He said in order to overcome this state of affairs it was necessary for the ministry to assert its authority by overseeing the development of a standardized set of texts which conformed with the values of the new system of government, and have these introduced in the schools.160
In the concluding section of the report,Wichit presented his views on the type of education the country's children should receive. Given his keen interest in personal development it is not surprising that Wichit stressed the idea of character building. In the past, he claimed, schools had only been concerned with providing children with knowledge of manners such as: kindness, honesty, frugality, respectfulness. But they had failed to teach them determination, independence and responsibilty, qualities that Wichit indicated were incompatible with the previous form of administration. Nor did students develop an admiration for progress or learn to 'love the nation'. This latter weakness in the system was of great concern to Wichit, who said it was vital that children from 'the lowest to the very highest [social] class' learn what the nation was, what the value of loving the nation was, and the ways individuals could help the nation.161
While the government's response to the report is not revealed in the available sources, the document itself provides further evidence that Wichit saw an overiding need to transform the consciousness of the population to accord with the new social and political age they were living in.
During October 1933 when the Boworadet rebellion broke out, Wichit's new found commitment to the government became more forcefully expressed. While Phibun 159 Ibid. [6-8].
160 Ibid. [10-11]. 161 Ibid.[ 1,11].
Songkhram, his long-time acquaintance, led the government's forces on the battlefield, Wichit led a radio campaign against the royalists, the first time radio had been used for propaganda purposes in Siam. 162 His role was to prepare offical communiques in the name of the Prime Minister Phahon, and have these broadcast around the country In many of these announcements, Wichit used the simple, yet telling method of branding the opposition as contemptible and beneath respect, while portraying his side in the most positive of terms. For example, one of the announcements which was aired on 14 October read:
During the present conflict, some people have been led to believe that the fighting has simply been a matter of different groups, or cliques struggling for power ... But to say that different groups are struggling for power is incorrect. This conflict, in which Thais are killing each other, has been caused by rebels and bandits [phuak kabot phuak chon]
... The rebellion is against the constitution His Majesty gave to the people, it is a rebellion against the nation ... and it is a rebellion against the leader of the nation, the King, causing him great distress.
...Therefore the government must do whatever it can to suppress these rebels and bandits, and bring peace and happiness to the people.163
From the early stages of the conflict, the government was particulary anxious to prevent uncommitted military forces from siding with the royalists. This was clearly evidenced in one communique broadcast on 13 October, which claimed only four hundred provincial troops had supported the rebellion. 'Other soldiers', the announcement continued, 'respect the government as before, and are ready to sacrifice their lives for the nation.164 Another somewhat more strident communique of 15 October announced:
The rebels have used violent means to seize public monies, killing people in the process. In addition the rebels have attempted to force citizens, from every class including prisoners, to work for them. Those who resisted were punished severely. The things the rebels have done are the actions of true criminals ... Soldiers should be particulary suspicious of the rebels. Men from [the garrison at ] Ayuthaya, were duped into thinking they were going to practice battle manoeuvers [and had no idea of they were being drawn into battle] ... They were treated like animals, if they did not fight they were shot ... Some bodies have been found in civilian clothes, with helmets lying beside them. This indicates that these men were soldiers who had cast off their uniforms and tried to escape.165
162 Nakharin, 1985: 299. 163 NA. S.T. 0701.1/4.
164 NA. S.T. 0701.1/4.
The government's strategy of using radio to wage 'psychological warfare' was particularly effective. Their opponents, who relied on the airforce to deliver orders and distribute anti-government propaganda leaflets around the country, could not contend with the immediacy of radio broadcasts. Nowhere else was this more clearly evidenced than in Nakhon Sawan and other areas in the north of the country where the use of radio played the crucial role in undermining royalist attempts to woo provincial troops to join in the rebellion.166
While suppression of the rebellion can in large measure be attributed to Phibun’s use of artillery against the main concentration of royalist forces on the outskirts of Bangkok, it can also be seen that Wichit's efforts were a not insignificant factor in helping the government to win the conflict. During this time, Wichit had clearly proved himself to be a highly valuable asset to the government, yet his worth was not to become fully apparent until he began working in earnest to create political legitimacy for the new order and win the peace.
4.7 Conclusion
The overthrow of the absolute monarchy on 24 June 1932 did not result in the sudden end of royal influence in the political sphere. As has been argued above, the sixteen- month period following this event was one of intense struggle between the royalists and members of the new order, a struggle which was ultimately decided in favour of the latter group with the suppression of the Boworadet rebellion in October 1933.
It has been shown that during this period, the political allegiance of Luang
Wichit shifted dramatically. Initially he was involved in pro-royalist activity against the government. However, as the political fortunes of the royalists went into decline after the coup against Phraya Manopakon 20 June 1933, Wichit decided to throw his support behind the incoming administration.
In his writing after 20 June, Wichit began addressing one of the major problems confronting Siam's new leaders: the question of establishing political legitimacy. The removal of Phraya Manopakon from office by Phahon and his associates made the existing form of legitimacy based on the throne problematic. The answer to this problem, Wichit suggested, was the development of a nationalist ideology. This is precisely what Vajiravudh had done more than two decades earlier when his government was faced with serious political uncertainty and deep social divisions. However, while Vajiravudh emphasized the central role of the monarchy in his nationalist discourse, that which was articulated by Wichit stressed the supreme importance of 'the nation', the throne being relegated to a secondary position.
In the following chapter we will look more closely at Wichit's nationalism and his attempts to create political legitmacy for the state.
Chapter 5