The likes and dislikes of individuals in human societies selected with respect to reciprocal altruism, for example, are complex indeed according to Trivers*s analysis. Liking persons who are themselves al truistic would be of selective advantage. Disliking those who are not altruistic or who do not reciprocate acts of altruism would also be se lected. Acts of altruism themselves will require the disposition, in
individuals, to commit them. Selection should favour the detection of cheaters and the attempt through punishment or disapprobation to dis courage them, and it will favour the positive valuation of such attempts by other individuals. Those attracted towards cooperation with others in detection and punishment of cheaters will promote the fitness of the whole society by their efforts. Those averse to transgressing rules or norms which embody the recognized duties of each individual to act in altruistic ways will do likewise. All of these traits can be regarded as appetites and aversions without too much difficulty, although they are far removed from the simple somatic appetites and aversions we nor mally associate with the use of those terms. It appears, then, that there are desires which are 'sociable' in that they affect and promote the fitness of idividuals other than the agent, and that these are se lected in evolution along with the somatic appetites.
These complex tendencies can, of course, be in the self-interest of the agent. Where reciprocal altruism occurs, the altruist who rescues a drowning man at some personal risk is merely trading a small risk now for a large gain on some other occasion. Even in those species where the calculation of costs and benefits is impossible, the altruistic behaviour could be selected because of the increase in fitness it be stows on the individual. The difference between these tendencies and the somatic appetites, which we also regard as 'self-interested', becomes steadily more invisible. Those traits which we value most highly can be regarded as no more than the expression of tendencies implanted in us through the long process of natural selection.
We have to be somewhat careful about our use of language, however. There are clearly some actions which are not in the 'self-interest* of an individual as this is commonly understood, even though they are val ued by others, and even though individuals are drawn to their performance by powerful psychological forces that have been shaped by group selec tion, The soldier who, in Urmson's example^, accepts certain death to save his fellows, has not gained as an individual, although it may well be that the inclusive fitness of other individuals who share some of his
genetic endowment is much increased, - Such actions cannot be properly 42
regarded as 'self-interest'; they are moderated by group survival and not individual survival.
The concept that there are groups larger than the individual which are the basic units of altruistic actions is, of course, highly damaging to many social contract psychologies, particularly the egoistic psych ology of Hobbes. To the latter an acceptable excuse for giving alms to a beggar outside St.Paul's was that "it makes him pleas'd, and it pleases me to see him pleas'd." This psychology is esoteric, and was recognized to be extreme in its own time, since other individuals are regarded as mere data to be reckoned with in calculating the welfare of the self. Even this extreme psychology supposes some connexion between the pleas ure of the beggar and the pleasure of Hobbes, so that Hobbes is driven to altruism even for selfish motives. But this hardly stands up to close scrutiny, Hobbes ignores the fact that we pursue our internal drives and motives, follow our values and affections, whatever they are called, simply because they are our drives and motives. We do not pursue them because we derive consequent pleasure or consequent avoidance of pain; pleasure and pain may be consequences of an action, but they are not to be confused with the motive force of the action itself in all circum
stances, I cannot be said to enjoy my visit to the dentist, even though I know that it will spare me future pain; and I do not always act al truistically out of pleasure.
The sociable traits are, then, examples of motives that have been the objects of group selection,^ They are, of course, also those things upon which we place the highest valuation and esteem, and those values are in themselves a functional part of the selection process. -Group fitness would be imperilled if we did not value and strive toward some things and find ourselves repelled by others, including the relatively complex phenomena of social interaction and mutual assistance.
Moral judgements as relative
One question which must be settled (and to do so is the principal aim of this chapter) is whether human appetites, and statements about them, constitute good reasons for action. When appetite is taken in its limited form, then there will indeed be strong objection to any notion
% that appetites can he so employed; it is difficult to see the morality
of following one’s appetite for food when other people are hungry. But
if we extend the term to cover personal valuation not merely of bodily % necessities but also of social and moral actions which promote the wel-
fare of a social group or population, then the case is very different. Here, it seems that personal desires and social welfare could very well, be in complete harmony.
To reduce ethics to a field so dependent on relativistic prin ciples would, of course, be anathema to those who, from Plato's theory of Forms through Moore’s Principia Ethica, have made the mistake that normative terms signify the presence of non-natural qualities in the abstract nature of actions or things, and have busied themselves in at tempts to find out what these qualities are and how we 'perceive' them. We can see, given the theory of group selection, that some agreement on moral questions is highly likely; successful societies will have a high measure of concurrence on moral issues because it is upon the regular ity and"reliability of moral actions that their life, to some extent, depends. If groups are to function smoothly, certain norms of indi vidual behaviour are necessary: societies in which social learning takes place will solidify these norms in the minds of their members through teaching and emulation, for if they did not, the social pattern of actions would be disrupted and the fitness of the society would be
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