CUENCA BINACIONAL PUYANGO GO GO GO TUMBES TUMBES TUMBES TUMBES Bertha Cecilia

The important views of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight on this cultural dimension of great power responsibility and the normative aspect of power balancing are elaborated in detail in Section Two. 60. Arguably the most significant aspect of such processes of

technological change for the modern process of international order formation have been the destablising effects upon the operation of balances of power produced by the arms races which the former have engendered. Important in this context also are the changes in the qualitative nature of war arising from the different types of countervailing force informing successive historical balances of power. On these general themes see William H. Mcneill,

The Pursuit Of Power: Technology. Armed Force and Society since

A.D. 1QQQ. Oxford, 1982 and M. Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution:

Gilpin and the Historical Reproduction of Hegemonic Orders of International Stability

The Neo-realist conception of modern international order formation developed by Robert Gilpin offers a dynamic, transformational view of this process which would appear, on first appraisal, to overcome many of the deficiencies identified in Waltz's structurally oriented perspective in chapter one. Indeed, it will be a major concern of this chapter to determine just how far Gilpin's historicised Neo-Realist perspective actually does transcend the shortcomings associated with Waltz's approach. As we shall see below, Gilpin's theory is wide ranging,

presenting an historical account of the processes of international order formation embracing, not only the modern international system, but also the international systems of premodern times. In this chapter I will first outline the general themes which underlie this sweeping historical conception of international order formation. Here I give attention to Gilpin's account of the general drive to international dominance engendered among states by the transhistorical condition of

international anarchy. Consideration is also given to the systemic process of uneven development which constrains states' opportunities to develop those structures of international dominance which he identifies as the principal source of stable order at the international level.

Hy focus then shifts to the historical level and Gilpin's account of the historical manifestation of these general processes of order formation within the modern international system in the specific form of the cyclical production of hegemonic systems of international stability. In the remaining part of the chapter I will offer a critical assessment of this conception of international order formation, my primary aim being to highlight some of the more significant problems associated with Gilpin's technical-rational approach to the understanding of the nature of international behaviour and historical change in the modern states- system. Here I shall argue that Gilpin's theory either ignores or understates the significance of some crucial dimensions of the modern process of international order formation which, when taken into account, pose major problems for the Neo-realist, naturalistic conception of international relations upon which his theory is predicated. As we shall see, this critique ultimately suggests the need to move beyond the

limited categories of Neo-Realism to a more sophisticated historical view of international order formation within the modern states-system.

I International Anarchy and The Historical Logic of Order Formation

Between States

In War and Change In World Politics. Gilpin contends that "the history

of ... [the! international system is that of the rise and decline of the empires and dominant states that during their periods of reign over international affairs have given order and stability to the system. " 1 Viewed in most general terms Gilpin's work represents an attempt to

outline both the perrenial conditions and the historically specific forces explaining this dynamic, transhistorical process of the formation and reformation of such systems of international order. Before examining his distinctive account of the modern process of international order formation, therefore, we shall need to give some consideration to Gilpin's views concerning the nature of those transhistorical forces

which delimit the process of order formation in every epoch. 2 This will

provide the essential background against which his more specific conception of the nature of order formation within the modern states- system may be understood.

Gilpin identifies two major factors affecting the process of order formation within the international sphere in any historical period. These are, firstly, the role of states as political actors and, secondly, the constraining influence of the structure of the

international system. Like Waltz, he emphasises the importance of the overriding structure of the international system as a central force shaping the ordering process between states. However, in elaborating his distinctive historical perspective Gilpin supplements his views on the influence of the system's structure with an account of the autonomous role of states as rational political actors. In doing so he draws

directly on the resources of rational choice theory. More particularly, Gilpin appropriates, as the informing model for his own theory, the

latter's account of social interaction as an anomic, potentially anarchical condition wherein individuals, as independent, rational actors, are motivated by an exclusive interest in securing their

terms of this rational choice model of political action,the special concern of the theorist is to explain how it is possible for forms of collective action to emerge among such self-oriented actors which make possible the production of those public goods required by all

individuals if they are to be able to successfully realise their own rational ends. The types of public goods referred to here include such basic values as social services and, most notably, those institutional

structures enforcing public order. 3

Translating this rational choice model to the situation of states in the international system, Gilpin proceeds to define the former as rational actors whose political actions are governed by a calculative interest in manipulating international political processes to secure their

rationally defined goals. Thus he notes that these political actors "enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests. " 4

However, once established these structures impose their own autonomous constraints upon the actions of states in pursuing their rationally defined goals. "Once in place, the international system itself has a reciprocal influence on state behaviour; it affects the ways in which individuals, groups and states seek to acheive their goals. The

international system thus provides a set of constraints and

opportunities within which ... states seek to advance their interests. " 5

These different, systemically defined constraints upon, and

opportunities for, significant political action within the international

sphere are manifested most clearly in the effects upon states’ behaviour

as a basic defining characteristic cf international relations in all historical periods.

As was the case with Valtz, the crucial factor identified here

constraining states' behaviour is the inherent insecurity associated with the anarchical structure of the system wherein states must act. Vithin this state of anarchy "each group ... is concerned about being attacked or dominated by other groups... Land] therefore strives to enhance its own security by acquiring more and more power for itself."e The anarchical structure of the system then, dictates a preoccupation among its constituent units with a specific form of action. Citing the views of Cohen, Gilpin concurs that, given the lack of security and the inherent rivalry and competition produced by the anarchical structure of the international system, "the survival of any one unit is ...

[ultimately determined by] the range of strategies open to it... The state with only one strategic option can never feel truly secure: if that strategy fails the state will ... [most likely] be absorbed by others ... or be compelled to abandon certain of its core national values...The rational solution is to broaden its range of options - to maximize its power position, since power sets the limits to the choice of strategy"7 and, hence, to the possibilities for states' survival.

According to Gilpin then, the perrenial condition of international anarchy generates an inherent tendency among states to expand their power in order to enhance their material capabilities and their

consequent capacity for political survival. Moreover, a primary means by which states seek to enhance their power and thereby attain the rational

goal of security is through the extension of their control over the international system. This is because of the enormous benefits which such control potentially confers on those exercising it. The material and political advantages deriving from such systemic control can be used to enhance the state's power and, thereby, to ensure its security within the sphere of international anarchy. More particularly, by attaining dominance over the international system in this way a given state is able to organise the system's operations to suit its own interests and needs. In the process of doing so, Gilpin notes, it also introduces those basic structures of systemic regulation (i.e. those public goods) providing the necessary preconditions for orderly relations among the members of the anarchical international system understood as a single, collective unit.

However, this inherent drive by political units to secure a position of international dominance and the ability of any particular state to successfully achieve such dominance, is itself delimited by another systemically determined process. For, according to Gilpin, the

"structure of the system [which generates this drive to international dominance, also]... imposes a cost on any behaviour that seeks to change the international status quo."e The specific form of this opportunity cost associated with such attempts to attain dominance within the international sphere is identified as the cost involved in waging system-wide war. Before it can succeed in its goal, any potential aspirant to international dominance must first overcome the existing dominant power and the institutionalised system of power relations which support its dominant position. It is in this context that we encounter a

further crucial effect of the anarchical structure constraining states' actions. For the degree of this opportunity cost involved in challenging the status quo, and therefore the likelihood of change in the

international system at any particular historical juncture, is intextricably linked with the relative nature of power within that system.

This relativity of international power identified by Gilpin involves two main aspects. On the one hand it refers to the unequal distribution of power between states at any given time which is responsible for the development of synchronic systems of hegemonic order. On a second level it refers to the process of the uneven diffusion of power between the units of the system over time. It is on this second aspect that I want to focus for the moment. For, a central contention of Gilpin's work is that power within the international system is constantly diffusing and, further, that this diffusion of power always assumes an assymetrical character. Indeed, because of the absence of any overriding sovereign authority capable of regulating the exercise of power between states, the international power relation is necessarily a zero sum game. The loss of power by any particular state inevitably entails an increase in the power of others and, consequent upon this, an increase in the

potential threat posed by these other members of the system to its

security. Thus, according to Gilpin, "because power is a relative matter the rise or decline of one state by definition entails the decline or rise of another. " 3

It is this inherent relativity characterising international power relations and the uneven nature of the historical diffusion of power associated with it which is identified as the primary determinant of change within the international system. "The critical significance of the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of changing the international system and, therefore, the incentives for ... [seeking such change.] As the power of a state increases, the

relative cost of changing the system and of achieving the state's goals

decreases and vice versa. 1 0 Accordingly, Gilpin notes that states will

seek to change the existing international order where they believe the distribution of political power is weighted in their favour. A logical implication of this argument is that only the most powerful states are likely to be in the position to change the system as "a more powerful state can afford to pay a higher cost than a weaker one" 11 in seeking to

secure international dominance. Thus, the possibilities for attaining dominant influence over the system are invariably restricted to the most powerful states of the system possessing the greatest capabilities.

The fundamental point about the relative nature of the historical

diffusion of international power for Gilpin then, is its transformative effect upon the relative capabilities of states and, consequently, upon their capacity to act and assert their dominance at the international level. By increasing the power of particular states relative to others, these shifts in the distribution of international power reduce the cost involved in attempts to transform the system, thereby encouraging the efforts of those advantaged states to create a new international order serving their own needs and interests. Thus we arrive at the pivotal

feature of Gilpin's historical theory of international order formation, namely his notion of the historical law of the uneven development of power within the international system and the cyclical formation of international orders which this generates. According to this law, "as the power of a group increases that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over its environment. In order to increase its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic and territorial control; it will try to change the international system in

accordance with its particular set of interests."12. In terms of this

general transformative process noted here then, the overriding concern of states in their external relations is identified as that of

constantly measuring and assessing their relative power capabilities as the principal determinant of their capacity to impose their dominance over, and to manipulate the international system to serve their own interests. In this respect the differential growth of power among states forms the catalyst stimulating an ongoing, cyclical process of change involving the historical formation and reformation of structures of international order.

For Gilpin then, the history of international relations is characterised by the recurrent formation and transformation of such structures of domination by preponderant states which engender systems of order within an otherwise anarchical international system. Moreover, despite the fact of constant historical change in the nature of the relations between states, the attempts by different political units at different

historical times to institute new orders of international dominance are seen as inevitably governed by an invariable, rationalistic logic of

self interested action and the calculative considerations it engenders. Moreover, given his basic conception of the perrenial nature of

international relations as a quasi-natural sphere of political anarchy, Gilpin discerns little possibility for the emergence of any alternative, more sociable mode of behaviour between states. The anarchical structure of international relations and the condition of political insecurity to which it gives rise ensures that actions at this level are inevitably governed by an instrumentalist, calculative interest in self

preservation as the rationale determining states' behaviour and the process of order formation occurring between them. Let us now turn to consider Gilpin's historical account of this process of the rise and decline of such technical systems of international order as they develop in response to the law of the uneven development of power between

states.

II The Emergence of the Modern Cycle of Hegemonic Order Formation

For Gilpin the broad developmental process described above is universal in its operation. "From the earliest civilizations states and empires have sought to expand and extend their dominion over their neighbours

... However, the precise mechanisms they have employed have differed. " 1 3

He identifies two major types of systemic dominance and corresponding modes of international stability produced by this transhistorical

process of uneven development. These are the premodern imperialist, and the modern hegemonic forms. Before turning to the modern international system I want to briefly outline Gilpin's account of the factors which

are responsible for the breakdown of the former, premodern system of international order formation and which have produced the distinctive anarchical condition giving rise to the modern cycle of hegemonic order formation which is our major concern.

According to Gilpin "the predominant form of political organization before the modern era was the empire... Vorld politics [during this period] was characterised by the rise and decline of powerful empires, each of which in turn unified and ordered its respective international system."14. The prominence of this imperialist mode of order formation in the premodern world is largely explained by the predominantly agrarian character of the socio-economic systems of premodern communities. In this context Gilpin observes that a "fundamental feature of the era of empires was the relatively static nature of wealth ... [Given the prevalence of this agrarian social formation] the growth in the wealth and power of the nation was primarily a function of its control over territory that could generate an economic surplus. " 1 5 Under these

circumstances the ability of a premodern state to expand its power and impose its dominance over the international system was dependent upon the amount of territory and, thus, the size of the economic surplus it commanded. "The greater the territorial extent of an empire and its political control, the greater the taxable surplus and the greater the power of the empire. " 1 5 Consequently, the primary goal of great powers

in the premodern period was to build up systems of political dominance involving direct political control over other communities.17.

According to Gilpin the cyclical formation of such imperialistic systems, generated by the uneven development of international power, formed the major source of stable order in the premodern world. However, this premodern cycle of empires was ultimately broken as a result of profound changes in international political and socio-economic

structures. The outcome of these epochal historical transformations was the emergence of a new, anarchical western international system

involving a fundamentally different mode of international order

formation. Three central factors are identified as responsible for this transformation of the nature of the international system. Most