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Per numerous reports, observations, and lessons from recent operations in Iraq, coordinating and synchronizing contract support in major security force assistance missions can be daunting. In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the multi-agency reconstruction program faced an array of significant challenges, pushing up costs, and leading to many failed projects and wasted dollars. These challenges, which can occur in any such operation, included a deteriorating security situation, conflicting departmental approaches, weak unity of effort, poor sustainment planning, and most importantly, significant ad hoc management arrangements.

These OIF challenges paint a clear need for a much more formal management approach to planning and executing contingency reconstruction programs in any future operation. Key to success of these efforts is to synchronize contract support related efforts among interagency, interorganizational, and multinational partners. In any future reconstruction efforts, specific program objectives, cost controls, and oversight measures must be agreed to up front by all key reconstruction support entities. Only through such an interagency programmatic approach can we realistically expect to achieve long-term success in such challenging operations.

SOURCE: Learning From Iraq:

A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,

Contract Support Integration

provide goods and services in support of the joint force. Planned and executed properly, these contract support actions can indirectly support the key IFO aspects of helping to build the local economy, promote goodwill with the local populace, and contribute to long- term HN economic growth and stability. Done without proper planning and oversight, these actions can lead to potentially serious problems that in some situations may undermine the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives.

(1) As described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, the operational environment includes a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems. In major, long-term stability operations, OCS actions can have a significant impact on all PMESII systems. This point is especially true when conducting COIN and SFA missions. Therefore, it is imperative OCS actions in these types of missions be deliberately planned and closely coordinated with all major multinational and interagency partners, especially with the chief of mission (COM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). When integrating OCS actions into IFO planning and execution, a proper understanding of the operational environment typically requires cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements, supporting contracting organizations, various intelligence organizations, major USG departments and agencies, and possibly nongovernmental centers that possess relevant expertise to ensure these actions support IFO and the JFC’s overall plan.

(2) In COIN and SFA-related missions, all major contract actions must be synchronized, monitored, deconflicted and, most importantly, measured. This ensures that these contracts are properly supported, and are at least not detrimental to, the key IFO-related aspects of providing funds for economic development and infrastructure projects that win the support of a local population and separate the population from an insurgency. Understanding who benefits from contracting actions by thoroughly vetting potential vendors for possible security concerns, encouraging contractors to hire and mentor local firms, and considering local standards and methods (whenever possible and practicable) when building contract support requirements packages will ensure contract actions are properly aligned to campaign objectives. Also understanding the impact of unique contractor-provided services (e.g., use of armed PSCs) and/or general contract behavior that can have a direct impact on the local populace is also a major consideration. Chapter V, “Contractor Management,” of this publication includes more detail on PSCs and other contractor personnel matters.

(3) In some major COIN and SFA focused operations, special processes and organizations may be required to ensure OCS and IFO actions are properly monitored, analyzed, and integrated across the JFC. In these types of operations, consideration must be given to establishing special teams to include, but not limited to, contractor security vetting cells and interagency IFO task forces. All OCS and IFO actions must be compliant with US laws and sanctions. A special team or task force is not always necessary and can be manpower intensive. Regardless of necessity of a special team or task force, compliance and regulatory requirements still apply, and due diligence requirements must be met. These special teams and task forces are pro-active in order to prevent contracting with inappropriate entities. Staff functions should still familiarize, educate, and train on how to terminate already existing contracts if an entity becomes prohibited.

More information on the civil-military aspects of OCS and IFO synchronization challenges can be found in JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

h. Special Program Offices and Officers. Large scale, long-term phase IV missions, especially those with significant SFA requirements, may require the GCC, subordinate JFC and/or Service component commander to establish functionally focused, dedicated special program officers/offices for selected mission critical, large scale, high-dollar service contracts and/or groups of contracts. These ad hoc program offices are in addition to, or may be combined with, subordinate joint force command OCSIC, the IFO-related organizations discussed in the previous section, commonly deployed military program offices such as the Army LOGCAP-Forward and the two military construction agents, the US Army Corps of Engineers and Naval Facilities Command. While these offices are not formal acquisition PM offices, they act in a similar manner by providing trained, dedicated SMEs to advise and assist major requiring activities to plan for and then control the cost, performance, and scheduling of selected major contracted services and/or consolidated SFA-related programs. Functionally focused special program offices may vary in size and scope from a single logistic SME responsible to over watch a single service contract to actual program manager certified staffs responsible to assist the JFC to plan and coordinate multiple SFA-related service and construction contracts. Special program office purpose and functions can be found in Figure III-6.

SPECIAL INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OPERATIONS/CONTRACT SUPPORT