Santos Sr. v. CA
GR# 113054 / MAR. 16, 1995 242 SCRA 407
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Perez v. CA
GR# 118870 / MAR. 29, 1996 255 SCRA 661
Facts:
Ray Perez, private respondent, and Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. She became a resident alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.
After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.
According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
Ray wanted to raise their son near his parents while Nerissa did not want to rely on her in-laws. Despite mediation by a priest, Nerissa and Ray failed to reconcile. Nerissa stayed with her parents and filed a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender their one-year old son to her.
The RTC granted custody to Nerissa. The CA reversed and granted cutody to the father.
Issue: W/N the mother has a better right over the custody of the minor child.
126 Held:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. Since the Code does not qualify the word "separation" to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The provisions of law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child.
Silva vs. CA
GR# 114742 / JULY. 17, 1997 275 SCRA 206
FACTS:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage, and had two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. A rift in their relationship surfaced, which, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over Silva‘s vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
In February 1986, Gonzales refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court rendered judgment directing respondent to allow petitioner visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the RTC's order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales. Citing Article 3 and 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the CA denied visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the father.
The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life.
The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more normal than two separate houses — (one house where one parent lives and another house where the other parent with another woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are supposed to use the surname of and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus important we be careful in rearing the children especially so if they are illegitimates, as in this case.
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
127 The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead,
the case merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have "visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the mother . . . ." The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2) between parents and children; . . . ."
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the
"natural and primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth.
There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships.
Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the children.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vancil v. Belmes
GR# 132223 / JUNE. 19, 2001 358 SCRA 707
Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the RTC in Cebu a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent who were 6 and 2 years old, respectively, claiming that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father‘s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had filed a similar petition for
128 guardianship before the RTC in Pagadian City and asserting that she
is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. Opposition was denied by RTC but was reversed by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the parents should be given preferential right to be appointed as guardian over the persons and estate of the minors?
Held:
Yes.
The respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father‘s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‗the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,‘ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Petitioner‘s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents‘ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."
Laxamana v. Laxamana GR# 144763 / SEPT. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent got married on 1984 and was blessed with 3 children. All went well until the Petitioner became drug dependent.
Petitioner underwent certain therapies and confinements. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent. Thus, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. On December 7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an order granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed to submit the case for resolution after the trial court‘s receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination. On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three children to respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review.
129 ISSUE:
Whether the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent.
HELD:
SC ruled that the instant case be REMANDED to the RTC for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with respondent but subject to petitioner‘s visitation rights.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court‘s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet ―completely cured‖
may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual
training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children.
In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court leave much to be desired. While a remand of this case would mean further delay, the children‘s paramount interest demand that further proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to assume custody of their minor children.
Roehr v. Rodriguez
GR# 142820 / JUNE. 30, 2003 404 SCRA 495
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Viesca v. Gilinsky
GR# 171698 / JULY. 04, 2007 526 SCRA 533
Facts: Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met sometime in January 1999 at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel where the former worked as a hotel manager. On 22 October 2001, their son Louis Maxwell was born. On 30 October 2001, respondent executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity of the child.
Subsequently, the Civil Registrar of Makati City issued a Certification granting the change of Louis Maxwell‘s surname from ―Viesca‖ to
―Gilinsky.‖ Unfortunately, the relationship between petitioner and respondent soured and they parted ways during the early part of 2003. On 6 February 2004, respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell at any time of any
130 given day; he be entitled to enjoy the company of Louis Maxwell
during weekends and on such occasions the child shall be allowed to spend the night with his father; and he be entitled to enjoy a yearly three-week vacation in any destination with his child. During the pendency of respondent‘s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise agreement. Respondent alleged that petitioner had repeatedly refused to abide by the terms of the compromise judgment, particularly the provision allowing Louis Maxwell to spend a night with him at any day of the week. Petitioner asserted that by approving respondent‘s prayer that he be given the right to enjoy Louis Maxwell‘s company ―every Friday of each week starting from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. of the following day,‖ Judge Mariano altered Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which states that ―(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the father once a week.‖ As the Compromise Judgment did not specifically provide for the day and time of the week when Louis Maxwell should be in the company of respondent, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it rendered its 16 June 2005 Order.
Issue: WON the Order should be declared invalid as it violates the compromise agreement of the parties.
Ruling: A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties. Having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and
Ruling: A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties. Having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and