CUESTIONARIO DE EVALUACIÓN DE PATRONES BÁSICOS DE APRENDIZAJE

Strategic alliance theory is most frequently based in the literature on the transaction cost model which claims that alliances are set up and survive when this alliance form of

rganisation represents the lowest level of transaction costs in comparison with other panies (hierarchies), or, at the other extreme, totally

complex and uncertain;

) Operating through the market gives rise to major risks of opportunism; and

hanism is vital for resource allocation and ima

otivation

d to excessive governance cost. o

forms, notably fully integrated com fragmented markets.

In Williamson’s schema (1975) the key driving forces towards hierarchy are that: a) There are major economies of scale and scope;

b) The market is c

d) Operating through the market gives rise to high risk of information loss. He sees these key driving forces towards markets:

a) The efficiency of the market price mec opt l profitability;

b) Only the market system will stimulate entrepreneurship and m adequately;

c) Hierarchies lead to excessive bureaucratic disabilities; and d) Hierarchies lea

Strategic alliances, when viewed as a hybrid organizational form, have some of the characteristics of hierarchies and some of markets, with the following typical profile;

et price mechanism; and

replaced by that is, coordination costs remain potentially high.

m

) The situation seems to call for an organisation displaying characteristics of

h partners very dependent on each other over an

form meets both partners risk profiles; and Their hierarchy characteristics may be:

a) Economies of scale and scope; and

b) Ability to deal with complex and uncertain markets, but there is a high risk of opportunism by one partner or the other, and a high risk of information loss.

Their market characteristics may be: a) The degree of operation of the mark

b) entrepreneurship and motivation, which are more commonly found in alliances than in large corporate hierarchies. But bureaucratic disabilities are often

culture conflict and governance costs,

Fro transaction cost analysis, it appears that the strategic alliance may be an “appropriate” organisational form in certain circumstances (which are not objective as they rely on the perception of the parties to identify, measure and priorities), notably if: a

flexibility and the need for cooperation;

b) The alliance is judged to be the best way to gain access to certain necessary and specialised assets;

c) Neither party alone could market the end product as effectively; d) The market is “thin”, making bot

extended time scale; e) The alliance

f) Opportunities for realising scale/scope economies exist.

The alliance may involve the contribution of assets by one partner which are covered by d, in the absence of an or buy its partner’s whole usiness. The situation may involve the transfer of tacit knowledge or know-how which

stics, such as retention of motivation, entrepreneurship, nd the price mechanism, and some hierarchy characteristics, for example, scale , scope, scope economies, for example, their contribution network, an

alliance, the other partner would need to set up its own network b

is most effectively done on a cooperative basis when overall goals are compatible, that is, in an alliance. In collaboration with third world partners, the alliance form is, it is suggested (Beamish, 1988; Yeung, 1997; Gray and Yan, 1997; Olson and Singsuwan, 1997; Li and Shenkar, 1997; Luo and Chen, 1997; Erden, 1997; Tallman, Sutcliffe and Antonian, 1997; Pearce and Branyiczki, 1997), often the best way to retain local motivation, bridge the organisational cultures, and meet local political needs. Most commonly, the alliance enables partners to limit risk, and gain access to assets they do not have but need.

In addition to the above specific conditions that may give rise to alliances, other conditions are those meeting the “balance of forces” argument, that is, in situations requiring some market characteri

a

and learning economies. The balance of forces argument also requires the minimisation of relevant transaction costs, for example, opportunism or information leakage for markets, and bureaucratic disabilities for hierarchies. In the world of transaction cost

economics two primary forces are commonly believed to operate (Williamson, 1975;1985); First, pressure towards equilibrium; and second, natural selection.

However, in actual as opposed to theoretical situations, these forces are frequently impeded in their operation by four inhibiting forces, namely: friction, immaturity, perfections and time lags. Friction may occur in a market when institutional factors

ost of information impactedness, be calculated and im

prevent immediate adjustment to changed circumstances. Immaturity occurs as new markets develop and, in their evolution, give rise to forms that may not survive in the longer term. Imperfections may occur in all markets save the genuinely uni-locational commodity form, and give rise to a variety of distortions. Time lags may incur costs and, at any one moment, make the precise nature of evolution unpredictable. Thus even if there are underlying forces towards the minimisation of transaction costs, the above inhibiting factors may well prevent the predicted least-cost form emerging. Both Williamson (1975) and Nelson and Winter (1982) retain the concept of “efficiency” in their writings as the key to organisational change, but Hannan and Freeman (1989) doubts its predominance, and believe that it rarely overrides institutional and political considerations. The pressure of “natural selection” and “efficiency”, then, do not necessarily operate smoothly or certainly in the real world. There may, therefore, be organisational forms that survive, even though they do not minimise transaction costs but achieve other desired ends.

Further weaknesses of the transaction cost model are that the relevant costs defy calculation. How for example, the c

added to that of opportunism? Further, it is not a model necessarily known to the

when the cost of governing ehaviour by rules becomes prohibitive, and when a cooperative mechanism emerges as decision-takers setting up alliances and cannot, therefore, as a model, motivate them. The only argument overcoming these weaknesses, namely that forces will drive organisational forms towards the most efficient ones through natural selection, is theoretically attractive to the determinist, but difficult to demonstrate empirically. It is, however, advanced in a sophisticated form by Ghosal and Nohria (1987) in their presentation of a congruence approach to a contingency theory as applied to multinational enterprises of both an- integrated and a federated or network form. They claim that structure will be systematically differentiated so as to “fit” the different environmental and resource contingencies faced by different organisational subunits. Under norms of rationality (Thompson, 1967), organisations facing heterogeneous task environments seek to identify homogeneous segments and establish structural units to deal with each. Perhaps so, but the norm of rationality may be only fitfully observed.

The concept of transaction cost minimisation underlies Ouchi’s (1981) concept of clans or uni-cultural strategic alliances, which are most appropriate

b

an alternative, that is, where both parties to the transaction share a common goal or set of values and loyalties. Strict clan mores, including trust, are important to avoid the need for the governance rules of hierarchy. These elements of trust/bonding will emerge importantly in the later part of this chapter.

The transaction cost model is a somewhat mechanistic one (Miner, 1980; Wood and Bandara, 1989; Donaldson, 1990; Griesinger, 1990). In fact, Griesinger’s (1990) use of e concept of the human motivation of “betterment” introduces a Theory Y (McGregor,

misation of transaction costs, except on a ceteris paribus basis. stead, the aim is to minimise total costs. Thus, if a firm is not able to produce th

1960/1985) element to the predominantly Theory X emphasis of Williamson’s (1975) transaction cost schema.

As Coase, Robertson and Langlois and others have made clear, transaction cost analysis does not push for a mini

In

something at a reasonable cost internally, it may be forced to buy it in the market despite substantial transaction costs because this gives the best total cost outcome. This, in turn, means that there is no inconsistency between transaction cost analyses and various resource based or capabilities approaches. The extent to which a firm can reasonably contemplate internalisation is dependent on its access to the resources and capabilities needed to do something itself. The relevance of transaction cost analysis does not hinge on whether the actors in the story were consciously aware of the existence of transaction costs under that name. Virtually all economic theory is a codification of behaviour that has been important for years, perhaps centuries, before economists got around to telling us what we have been doing. In relation to transaction costs, awareness of opportunism and uncertainty has been known for centuries and appropriate attempts have been made throughout the period to minimise their effects on market activity.

The transaction cost approach, however, sits uneasily alongside the resource dependency perspective as the two theories are based on contrasting views of the economic world. To e transaction cost economist, the “forces” driving towards efficiency will in a given set

turns out, chiefly uropean-Pacific Rim, with their nature and underlying rationale. It is necessary,

hy an organisation from one country would seek th

of environmental circumstances make the organisational form with the lowest transaction costs the surviving form. To the resource dependency perspective theorist, the world is fundamentally perceptual and socially enacted; thus, cooperation will come about from the perception of mutual advantage, of vulnerability and of the need to safeguard power. But the existence of transaction costs do provide economic “forces” that may, in the longer run, impel the enterprise towards the most efficient form and, to that extent, the concept will always have relevance; the transaction cost model provides a useful set of concepts against which to assess organisational form, even though it may rarely be a motivating force since few practitioners may be explicitly aware of it.