A literature review concerning two constructs – human error and emotional awareness in the military aviation paradigm – was carried out and integrated theoretically. The researcher identified deficiencies in previous studies to emphasise the importance of emotional awareness to manage human error, which is neglected in aviation and CRM programmes.
1.18.1.1 Step 1: The independent variable: Emotional Awareness
Emotional awareness was conceptualised in an incident that occurred in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, where a naval officer recognised a threatening radar blip as a silkworm missile. This happened although there was no logical explanation of how he
could detect the difference between an American combat aircraft and the approaching enemy missile on the radar. He had seconds to decide before attacking the fast- approaching threat and ordered his men to fire. His accurate decision had psychologists fascinated. They questioned this incident – how he knew the truth innately, and consequently made the right decision because it felt right, saving many lives with this critical decision. The researcher claimed that he was aware of his emotions and the innate truth upon which he acted, although no visible evidence could explain why he had felt that way.
Similarly, in 1949, a parachute brigade of fire-fighters was dispatched to put out a blaze in the Rocky Mountains. A veteran with nine years’ smoke-jumping experience was in charge when a fire was overwhelming, blowing straight towards them. The veteran ordered his men to retreat, but they ignored him and tried to escape the fire. The veteran intuitively devised a creative escape plan that had never been used before. He lit a match and ignited the ground in front of him and seconds later stepped into the ashes of his own fire, thus being the only survivor. His technique has since become a standard firefighting method. Lehrer (2009) argues that the men were in the grip of stress, which narrowed their thoughts. In contrast, the experience of the veteran and his emotional awareness kept him calm enough to access his inner resources and save his own life.
Decision making is an important element in aviation, and it is considered as subconscious logical analysis. Goleman (1998) explains it as the brain’s calculations to derive at a weighted conclusion. Brown (2003) actually studied emotional awareness and concluded that we instantly know what the right thing is to do, without going through a logical reasoning process.
According to a number of Harvard studies, during the first thirty seconds of an encounter people sense intuitively what basic impression they will have of the other person – even after fifteen minutes or a year. Similarly, people who watched thirty-second snatches of teachers giving a lecture, could assess each teacher’s proficiency with 80% accuracy. According to Goleman (1998), intuition represents the capacity to sense messages from
our internal store of emotional memory and our own reservoir of wisdom and judgment. Thus, emotional awareness suggests that one should acquire all relevant information when a decision is needed; however, one should not analyse the information, but allow your subconscious mind to digest it. In addition, various studies contend that innate knowledge mostly provides the correct choice (Dijksterhuis, Chartrand & Aarts, 2007).
Stein and Book (2011) state that in the emotional intelligence model, emotional awareness refers to the ability to monitor one’s own emotions, and it represents the fundamental skill to be intelligent about our emotional life. Jawer and Micozzi (2011) support this with their wise words, “when we ignore what matters most to us, it will become the matter within us”. Literature indicates that emotional awareness creates a clear mind that makes us aware of and able to manage emotion, resulting in sharpened senses. These discussions argue the importance of a balance between thinking and feeling.
Emotions are innate to human beings, and help us to survive and succeed in life (Izard, 1992). They are evident in young children, and their innocence is always a pleasure to watch, as they express their emotions. They are completely open and honest without any defence mechanisms to mask their intent to help or to disguise their emotions. They are easy to read, and their feelings and needs are clearly displayed. Unfortunately, over time and with experience, emotions become tools driven by cognitive processes and agendas. A sense of movement is reflected in the word “emotion”, which is derived from the Latin word emovere (“to move from”) – it can therefore be argued that emotion acts as an impetus for a need.
For this study, emotional awareness is coined as human factor and defined as the ability to be aware of different emotions. According to Goleman (1998), we have to differentiate between emotions, to know what we are feeling and why (Bar-On, 1997). Importantly, emotion not only influences how reality is perceived, but it also affects our decision making and behaviour (Brown & Moren, 2003). Aircraft accident analyses relate human error to emotion, which is why the researcher formulated the research question of whether emotional awareness can be related to human error.
Guiding this research, emotional intelligence and emotional awareness show many similarities, and originate within the concept of social intelligence identified by Thorndike in 1920. Dr Claude Steiner used the term “emotional literacy,” and adding to this, Salovey and Mayer (1990) were among the first to propose the term “emotional intelligence” to define the ability to deal with emotions. Emotional intelligence refers to the competence required to identify and express emotions, and to assimilate emotions in thought. Accordingly, prior to identifying and expressing emotion, the researcher argues the importance of emotional awareness as the ability to be aware of emotions first. According to the researcher, emotional awareness is the primary condition leading to aircrews’ safe performance.
Supporting this argument, Daniel Goleman (1998) focused on the interface between psychobiology and behaviour, and claimed that emotional awareness matters twice as much as cognitive abilities or technical expertise. Additionally, Goleman, (1998) considers emotional awareness to have a competitive edge, and in his opinion, emotional upsets interfere with one’s mental state, limiting your performance. Related to aviation and situational awareness, accurate perception is integrated with innate messages from the environment. Negative emotion tends to focus attention on our own preoccupations, and interferes with attempts to focus elsewhere. With regard to aircrew, Goleman (1998) commented that out-of-control emotions make smart people stupid.
Tehrani and Molesworth (2016) emphasises the importance of emotional awareness to prevent human error, as emotionally intelligent individuals cope better with life’s challenges and stresses. She argued that individuals with a high emotional awareness would be less likely to err, and more likely to act in a responsible and safe manner. Furthermore, Landman, Groen, van Paassen, Bronkhorst and Mulder (2017) and Matthews, Strater and Endsley (2004) believe that a scientific understanding of emotional awareness will contribute towards the science of applied human factors in aviation and towards safety strategies to enhance safe behaviour and aircrew performance.
1.18.1.2 Step 2: The dependent variable: Human error
To “err” is human, they say, and making mistakes is part of the human condition. In the world of aviation, however, human error has serious consequences. In terms of ICAO and IATA statistics, 95% of all accidents are related to human factor. Kern (2009) claims that all accidents and incidents are attributed to human error. It has been suggested that human factors such as stress, sensory overload, information overload and mistrust adds to a breakdown in human performance. Worldwide, human error is categorised using a modified version of the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) framework of Rasmussen, namely
skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based, and procedure violations. The Swiss cheese
model of accident causation illustrates that, although many layers of defence lie between hazards and accidents, there are flaws in each layer that, if aligned, can allow the accident to occur (ICAO, 2013).
Reason (1990) uses the Swiss cheese model of accident causation to illustrate that if the holes in multiple layers of cheese (flaws in the defences of the human system) are aligned with each other, accidents (human errors) may occur. The metaphor emphasises the significance of casual human factors leading to an accident and explains how latent errors can affect complex systems. Based on the Swiss cheese model and human error classification, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a framework developed and tested within the US military force as a tool for investigating and analysing the human causes of aviation accidents. The HFACS addresses human error at all levels of the aviation system, including the condition of aircrew and organisational factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). An aviation accident or incident is thus not seen in isolation, but investigated as a series of events and various contributing factors in an organisation.
The SHELL model developed by Edwards in 1972 was modified into a 'building block’ structure by Hawkins in 1984 and Hawkins and Orlady (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993), indicating the four components and human interfaces with software, hardware, environment, and live-ware of the aviation system. The SHELL model suggests that the
human is rarely, if ever, the sole cause of an accident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The systems perspective considers a variety of task-related factors that interact with the human operator, thereby affecting performance (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Threat and error management (TEM) is an applied human factor safety concept regarding aircrew performance to enhance aviation safety. It classifies human error into five categories, namely intentional non-compliance errors; procedural errors; communication errors; proficiency errors; and operational decision errors.
Aviation science argues that human error is inevitable. For safe performance, CRM and human factor training aim to reduce error as far as possible. Aviation safety requires defences to mitigate risk, therefore pro-active error detection is required to reduce errors. To date, aviation psychology and applied human factors have been unable to define a safe aviator profile. A taxonomy of behavioural traits is required to guide aircrew selection and CRM training to reduce human error.