Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout history it has served as a strategically significant island providing port access and a transit point for travel and trade. Although the country is a relatively wealthy country due to the discovery of oil in 20th century, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains strategically important for the same historical reasons: an island that provides access to Persian Gulf shipping lanes. For example, the United States 5th Fleet uses Bahrain as its major port and staging area for Naval operations in the Persian Gulf. The 2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa Family presented a major dilemma for the United States and its Arab allies on how to respond to the crisis. Realizing the rising Iranian influence of a Shiite led majority in Bahrain, the United States and its Arab allies under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) effectively provided support to the Sunni minority Al Khalifa Royal Family to quell the uprising.
However, this is not an unusual occurrence in the history of Bahrain. The Al Khalifa Family has ruled the Kingdom of Bahrain for over 200 years because of its willingness to concede to whichever power that could guarantee its security and stability. They have switched alliances repeatedly ranging from
declaration of loyalty to Nasseredin Shah of Iran from British rule in 1860 all the way to the recent 2011 supplication to Saudi Arabia.
My forecast in November of 2011 concluded that Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa Family is stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and the United States as their security guarantors, the Al Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in Bahrain. Shiite led elements such as Al Haq and Al Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their initial support from Iran. Gulf Cooperation Council members (GCC) such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia will maintain strong support for Bahrain’s ruling family in order to counter Iranian led Shiite influence. The opposition element most likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa Family will be Shiite led Al Haq. In the final
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evolution of this uprising I expected the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and even Iran to reduce their anti-ruling family activities and inevitably accept Al Khalifa family as the legitimate authority in Bahrain. This suggests that the Al Khalifa will continue to make a series of deals or concessions that will
strengthen its selectorate and reduce tensions from the opposition. In fact, previous to the forecast there were already signs of such concessions. In August of 2011 Bahrain’s government provided the largest salary increase in the country’s history for state employees and retirees.20 In addition, the Khalifa also created a monthly allowance budget that had not existed before.21
The concessions provided by the Al Khalifa family match the behavior predicted by the private- payoffs and public goods argument described by the standard Selectorate Model. Figure 24 shows that in the final evolution of the Bahrain uprising, Waad Opposition and Al Wifaq Shia acquiesce in short to medium time horizon. Furthermore, the distance between the median stakeholder and Al Khalifa Family’s support for the status quo rule are very closely aligned and do not indicate any volatility. In short, Al Khalifa rule in Bahrain is stable and not likely to change anytime soon.
The standard Selectorate Model does not account for religion. Part of the Al Khalifa’s vale of legitimacy is through the role of religion. The King appoints a Shura Council of forty religious scholars to advise him on governance. In spite of such attempts for religious legitimacy, the majority of citizens in Bahrain are Shia although the Al Khalifa are Sunni. The Al Khalifa Family remains under the Saudi influence and protection because of their Sunni roots, functioning as a defense against Iranian influence over the Shia population. Bahrain is not as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia but its mix of Sunni Wahabbism within its polity and limited representation by Shias place it in the upper bound of the curve as well. If Bahrain were to become more democratic, it is predicted to become less secular. The permitting of parliamentary elections in 2006 displayed the rise of Shia and Sunni Islamists within the elected polity.
20
“Bahrain Approves Public Sector Salary Increase.” by Mohammad al-Jayousi. AlShorfa.com. http://al- shorfa.com/cocoon/meii/xhtml/en_GB/features/meii/features/main/2011/08/04/feature-02.
21 Ibid.
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The standard selectorate model would suggest that if Bahrain were a democracy, the primary calculus for political survival would be a greater proportion of public services given a Democracy’s large selectorate. However, an Islamist dominated polity would include religious preferences into their calculus just as much as any economic benefits.
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Figure 24: Projected Median Stakeholder Position for Extent of Support for Al Khalifa Rule in Bahrain
There were a total of five baseline predictions on Bahrain. Three out of the five predictions were accurate. Of these three, one of the predictions was general and two were moderately detailed. The remaining two predictions are unverified. In such regard, the pacification of the opposition seems to have worked with the increase in allowances to the general Shia population; however, the outcome is still unclear and inconclusive for the purpose of verification. The second unverified prediction is due my lack of access to granular information. In this case, I predicted that Iranian opposition activities will decrease but for the reasons described above I could verify. Nonetheless the overall prediction on Bahrain is accurate. The Al Khalifa rule is highly stable with no expected change in governance. The role of religion remains an indispensible part of the Al Khalifa family’s survival through the appointment of the Shura Council and limited representation of Shiite and Sunni sects in the Parliament. The prospect for Democracy in Bahrain is highly unlikely. A more detailed forecast can be found in the appendix.
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