Metaphorical projection
Inner balance
Metaphorical projection
Sideways force:
Wind
Applied human force –
intentional or
accidental
Weakening of the
stone’s composite
strength
External forces:
Change
Interference
Responsibilities
Illness/fatigue
164 MJ – Exactly. I’m completely on board with what you’re saying. We look at the possibility of creativity as to not simply reproduce these templates or structures but the modest freedom we have to transform them in creative ways. I think that your basic idea is absolutely correct. Dewey says, look, what’s so characteristic of art is the focus on the qualitative dimensions in the structure of materials and relationships of qualities. And the actual working through the possibilities of those. And I think that’s what you are describing here and you are showing how that’s a basis for projection in our, sense of ourselves, and then into a number of abstract, what we think of as abstract, conceptual domains. (Gray, 2007)
The capacity to internalize concrete embodied experience and project it metaphorically on to what we think of as abstract domains, presents itself a fundamental underlying structure of human meaning making. An underlying structure that operates largely unconsciously and it has taken years of data collection, empirical testing and analysis to discover. However, if visual arts practitioners are to benefit from focusing reflection on the underlying experience of practice, as Scrivener (2000: 18 - 19) suggests, then this inherent human capacity cannot be neglected.
This is the key point in the thesis at which I consider the reviewing of theories of reflective practice and theories of embodied mind, are synthesized. This is presented as an original contribution to knowledge in the context of this thesis. The focus of reflective methods on the underlying experience of practice can benefit from the rich account of embodied cognition, deepening understanding of the qualitative dimensions of practice. The development and integration of Embodied Reflective Practice would not, I propose be only useful for visual arts practitioners but for a greater understanding of visual art practice and appreciation.
[…] the value of an artwork lies in the ways it shows the meaning of experience and imaginatively explores how the world is and might be – primarily in a qualitative fashion. Therefore, art can be just as much a form of inquiry as is mathematics or the empirical sciences. The principal difference is that art focuses more intently on the qualitative dimensions of experience that we tend to overlook in our other intellectual activities, which, by the way, are characterized as the activities they are by their distinctive pervasive unifying qualities. The sciences seek to formulate generalizations over groups of phenomena and often need to abstract somewhat from the particular unifying quality of a situation, in order to focus on selected characteristics of a situation that seem salient and explanatorily robust. What distinguishes art proper, on Dewey’s view, is the way it presents the qualitative dimensions of an experience, instead of only abstract features, such as causal relations. The making of artworks is thus an on going exercise – an apprenticeship – in how to remake experience to enhance meaning. (Johnson, 2010: 150)
As stated by Johnson et. al. (1999: 7), this deep understanding cannot be arrived at purely through phenomenological reflection. I consider that the development and
165 application of an Embodied Reflective Practice would have to occur through modifications to andragogy. Certainly the work done by Schön (1983) and Scrivener (2000), has developed rigourous reflective methods that have been successfully applied in an academic andragogical context. The development of Embodied Reflective Practice, is considered supplementary to existing reflective methods with specific benefit to visual arts practitioners. The research agenda proposed for this degree was to review and synthesize existing theories, this I conclude has been achieved. However, as is often the case in research, more questions have been opened than answered. Questions remain as to the most beneficial methods by which theories of embodied mind can be integrated into existing theories of reflective practice. I have offered evidence that the use of image schematic structures can offer insight into the role the qualitative dimension of practice can play in the language used to describe it. However, this might be of most benefit for reflections-on-action. In relation to reflections-in-action developing the inherent human capacity to be attendant to the moment and aware of the pervasiveness qualities of the materials in shaping aspects of the experience and framing conceptual understanding may require further modifications to andragogy. Varela et. al. (1993) saw the need for cognitive science to develop a method for examining experience and proposed the mindfulness/awareness as a means of training the inherent human capacity for being present.
Its purpose [mindfulness awareness practice] is to become mindful, to experience what one's mind is doing as it does it, to be present with one's mind. What relevance does this have for cognitive science? We believe that if cognitive science is to include human experience, it must have some method for exploring and knowing what human experience is. (Varela et. al. 1993: 23) The question as to what relevance mindfulness training could have for cognitive science might also be aimed at reflective methods in visual art practice. Schön’s (1983) conversational model of reflecting-in-action, hearing what the situation is saying, how it talks back to the practitioner, has been shown to be a metaphorical means of simplifying a complex cognitive process that is a useful reflective method for most practice situations. During the video documentation of my own studio practice, for example, I can be heard talking about ‘my dialogue’ with the work. However, when reflections-in-action are focused on the qualitative, embodied dimension of experience in visual art practice the conversational metaphor is inadequate. The notion of experiencing what one’s mind is doing as it does it is alluring. If possible it could be extremely beneficial for supplementing the rigourous structure of existing reflective methods. The following chapter therefore has been included to take the questions developed through this thesis further as a recommendation for future research.
Before moving on to examine mindfulness however, I would like to close this chapter with reference to an interview I conducted with Professor A C Grayling,
166 which focused on contextualising theories of Embodied Mind in relation to a wider humanist debate.
Andrew Gray: I’d like to ask whether you feel they (theories of embodied mind) could contribute to a humanistic debate or whether there's a place for a humanistic account of visual art practice, and whether it would be useful in the humanistic debate.
A C Grayling: Well, so there are three separate things going on in parallel and they will have complex relations to one another. One is that in constituting a sort of an ethical outlook, the humanistic stance brings the body back into focus as the site of our experience and our actual needs and our interests and respecting it and tolerating it and making room for it and even celebrating it, would be an important part of humanistic ethics. […] In that sense humanism is predicated on the idea that we are physical beings in a physical world and that it's the constant relationship that we're in with our environment that makes us what we are - which is why so much of the way that we think about ourselves, certainly emotionally, probably also cognitively, has to do with our being spatial and material creatures. (Gray, 2014)
167 CHAPTER 7 – M INDFULNESS – A M ETHOD FOR EXAM INING EXPERIEN CE?
7.1 Questioning the Relevance of M indfulness Training to the Further Developm ent of a M odel of Em bodied Reflective Practice.
The primary objective of this thesis, as set out in the previous chapters, has been to review and synthesize existing theories of reflective practice and theories of the embodied mind, in specific relation to developing reflective methods in visual art practice. Whilst this objective has been addressed in Chapters 1 to 6, the final conclusions presented in Chapter 8, will clarify how this process constitutes an original contribution to knowledge. Before moving onto the concluding chapter I consider it necessary, on the basis that it may have implications for the direction of future research into the development of reflective methods, to address a speculative suggestion to have emerged out of theories of embodied mind, concerning the potential benefit of mindfulness training in the development of reflective practices.
If the results of mindfulness/awareness practice are to bring one closer to one's ordinary experience rather than further from it, what can be the role of reflection? […] This question brings us to the methodological heart of the interaction between mindfulness/awareness meditation, phenomenology, and cognitive science. What we are suggesting is a change in the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean reflection in which body and mind have been brought together. What this formulation intends to convey is that reflection is not just on experience, but reflection is a form of experience itself - and that reflective form of experience can be performed with mindfulness/ awareness. When reflection is done in that way, it can cut the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions such that it can be an open-ended reflection, open to possibilities other than those contained in one's current representations of the life space. We call this form of reflection mindful, open-ended reflection. (Varela, et. al., 1993: 27)
The Western appropriation of Eastern introspective psychological practices, including what has been termed ‘mindfulness’ is a complex and as yet unresolved issue, and clearly not the main objective of this thesis. The speculative nature of this chapter therefore must be made explicit. However, Varela’s, et. al., (1993: 27), proposal to reframe reflection from being considered an abstract, disembodied activity, to being viewed as an embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection, in which reflection is not ‘on’ experience, but ‘is’ experience, presents itself as a necessary avenue for future enquiry in the context of this thesis. Similarly Varela’s, et. al., (1993: 27) notion that the role reflection plays in our lives brings us to the methodological heart of the interaction between mindfulness/awareness meditation, phenomenology, and cognitive science is clearly of contextual interest to this thesis. Finally, Varela’s, et. al., (1993: 27) claim that if reflection is ‘done’ in that way, it can cut the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions
168 suggests a potentially beneficial method, whose academic rigour has yet been thoroughly tested in the domain of Psychology where it has received the greatest academic examination.
Proving mindfulness training to be unbeneficial would have no negative consequences I can foresee, proving it to be beneficial however, could have significantly positive consequences for modifications to andragogy in visual art practice at a number of levels. It is not my purpose in this chapter to present a recommendation either way. However, I do consider it necessary to close this thesis with a review of some of the developments in mindfulness training across a number of disciplines, which could suggest further research opportunities and potential developments of an Embodied Reflective Practice.
This chapter is composed of four sections. The first theorises mindfulness, by providing a brief historical overview of the origins of mindfulness in Eastern introspective psychological practices and how it has been introduced and adapted by Western science, particularly psychology. The second section examines the development of a means of measuring mindfulness through psychological research in relation to the health benefits of stress reduction. The MAAS scale (Ryan & Brown, 2003) claims to provide evidence that subjects trained in mindfulness techniques score higher in the test. The third section looks at the development of Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice (Korthagen and Vasalos, 2009), in education research, which tries to address superficiality in reflective methods by focusing training on cognitive, emotional, and motivational awareness. This method whilst framed as Mindfulness-Based Reflective Practice may be criticised for making little reference to the tradition of mindfulness as it is understood by either Western psychology or Eastern introspective psychological practices. The final section introduces primary sources and brings the personal perspectives of mindfulness practitioners. Detailed in this section are two interviews conducted specifically for this chapter. The first interview, with Dr. Linda Lehrhaupt, Managing Director of the European based Institute for Mindfulness-Based Approaches (MBA), explores two issues. The first questions whether mindfulness training is worthy of further research as a means for developing reflective methods in visual art practice. The second issue concerns whether for the visual art practitioner, notions of ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 2009) within the practice situation can be considered a form of mindfulness, or rather a state of deep concentration combined with the process of discernment. This leads to the second interview with Professor Michael Rodriguez, an artist and lecturer in New York who made public his views that being attentive to his practice was in its self a kind of mindfulness during a radio broadcast, the
transcript of which is available at:
http://ctl.laguardia.edu/journal/v5/pdf/InTransit_Spring11_v5_fernandez.pdf (last accessed 29.9.14)
169 7.2 The W estern Appropriation of M indfulness
Since the 1970’s in the West, empirical studies have been continuously revising a conceptual definition of what mindfulness is. However, accepted definitions in Western science, largely owe the term mindfulness and the techniques associated with it, to Eastern introspective psychological practices. Buddhist psychology in particularly, first made reference to the concept circa 500BCE (Black, 2011), although many philosophical and psychological traditions have emphasized the importance of the quality of consciousness for the maintenance and enhancement of well-being (Wilber, 2000).
The relationship between the scientific psychology of the West and indigenous systems of psychology can take many forms, ranging from totally independent existence to complete integration. Buddhist psychology, like other indigenous psychologies, is prescientific, but it is so only in the narrow sense that it developed prior to, and outside the context of, modern Western science. It offers clearly testable hypotheses and therefore can be brought within the realm of scientific inquiry. (de Silva, 1997: 93)
The attempt to bring Eastern psychology within the realm of scientific inquiry is a complex issue. Padmal de Silva (1997: 94), writing in The Authority of Experience (Pickering, 1997), considers that the process of evaluating the notions and practices of Buddhist psychology is something that will be consistent with its eminently empiricist stance. Consequently the process of hypothesis testing will not be alien to Buddhism, which encourages enquiry and discourages dogmatic acceptance of theories and claims (de Silva, 1997: 94). de Silva (1997: 94), considering whether integration between Western and Eastern psychological practices is either possible or desirable, explains how Mikulas (1981: 331-342) advocates neither integration nor separation but rather synthesis in the generation of a new form of psychology.
Mikulas, in discussing the issues of integration between Eastern and Western psychologies, has made the point that it is not a matter of whether the Eastern or the Western approach is ‘better’. There are, he stresses, strengths and weaknesses in both; and the combinations of the two can be very powerful. Mikulas has discussed the interrelated domains of (a) biological, (b) behavioural, (c) personal and (d) transpersonal, and argues that any integrative or conjunctive psychology must include all four levels. It is clear that different pre-scientific or indigenous psychologies have different degrees of contribution to make to these domains. The same applies to modern Western psychology. The psychology of Buddhism can certainly contribute significantly to the development of a conjunctive psychology as envisaged by Mikulas. (de Silva, 1997: 94)
The argument that merely bringing Eastern psychology within the realm of Western psychology is turned around here to suggest that each has something valuable to contribute to the development of psychological practices. Mikulas (1981: 331-342) goes on to specify that of the four ingredients of conjunctive psychology Eastern psychology can be considered less advanced in only the domain of biology. With that in mind the introduction of Eastern psychological practices into Western
170 culture must be viewed not as lacking academic rigour but rather as practices whose value is still being assessed and researched. The Eastern psychological practices being promoted by Varela, et. al., (1993: 27) begin with the two main kinds of meditation practices.
Two main kinds of meditation are practised in Buddhism: (1) samathi, mindfulness, bare and deliberate attention to the details of one’s sensations, the resulting calm being an antidote to the evil of craving, and (2) vipassana, insight – attending to the arising, dwelling and ceasing of one’s sensations, and to their interdependence, an antidote to the evil of ignorance. (Valentine, 1997: 249)
The development of a Western translation of these practices can be traced back to 1881 when the Pali Text Society, founded by T. W. Rhys Davids, translated into English the entire canon of Buddhist text, and the majority of the commentaries and expository works. However, is translation is considered to have been beset with problems of translation and interpretation (de Silva, 1997: 80). More recently the German-born Sri-Lanka-ordained Nyanaponika Thera, formerly Siegmund Feniger, who co-founded and was editor-in-chief of the Buddhist Publication Society from the 1950’s until 1984, was a key figure in increasing exposure of mindful meditation in Europe. Nyanaponika (1972) described mindfulness as “the clear and single- minded awareness of what actually happens to us and in us at the successive moments of perception”, a phrase, which taken out of context of Eastern psychological practices appears lacking in rigour. One of the most well-recognized Western definitions of mindfulness comes from Dr. Jon Kabat-Zinn, the founder of MBSR (Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction) from which the term mindfulness science has emerged, which now includes MBCT (Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy). He defined mindfulness as, “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). Again for a text considered to be the landmark definition in regular use in the West, it lacks the rigour of a verifiable academic definition. Part of the problem here is the ambiguity surrounding how both the contexts of Western and Eastern psychological practices are being integrated. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze whether this particular definition can be verifiable and tested for how accurately it describes the human state of being ‘mindful’. The speculative nature of this chapter may proceed however, with this in mind, should mindfulness training be considered an avenue of inquiry for future research in the development of reflective practices in the visual arts, this definition would require detailed scrutiny.
The root of the term Mindfulness is considered to have emerged from the Pali language, whereby Sati when combined with Sampajana, translates to mean awareness, circumspection, discernment, and retention (Shapiro, 2009).
These linguistic renderings have been considered by scholars to suggest that mindfulness means to remember to pay attention to what is occurring in
171 one’s immediate experience with care and discernment. (Shapiro & Carlson, 2009)
Consequently, given the historical context of the mindfulness tradition in Eastern introspective psychological, the introduction of the concept into the realm of Western science was gradual, largely due to the negative association that the