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2.3.2.3 Thompson 2.3.2.3 Thompson 2.3.2.3 Thompson

William Thompson, whose contributions regarding the classification of approaches to structural change have been heavily relied upon in this study, can also been said to belong to the long cycle school (Thompson, 1988:xxii). He also contributed, along with Modelski, to the study of sea power in global politics, and as a result there is great agreement between the works of these two authors.

Thompson (1988:7) sets out by identifying global wars as those contests deciding “who will provide systemic leadership, whose rules will govern, whose policies will shape systemic allocation processes, and whose sense of vision or order will prevail.” Thompson (1988:123) then highlights the economic aspects of both his and Modelski’s work. Thompson explains that hegemonic powers tend to have the lead economies of the time. This means that the location of the ‘active zone’ in the world-economy gives a good indication as to which country will likely be the next hegemon. In short, this active zone is comprised of an area that utilises advanced agriculture and intensive food production, and that has a high concentration of leading sectors (innovative new industries). The active zone is also heavily engaged in world trade, and is a major source of foreign investment. For long cycle theorists however, it is not a matter of economic centrality coming first (like the world-economy school), or political and military centrality (like the structural realism school). Here, both are seen as mutually reinforcing, as the political role of world leadership requires a material

4 Spain is also listed as one of the states with a monopoly of sea power, between 1594 and 1597. As will be argued in the next chapter, Spain was the dominant power in Europe during the second half of the sixteenth century, but it was never a true maritime power. This is reinforced by the brevity of the Spanish monopoly of sea power, lasting a total of three years.

base, and conversely, political and military leadership creates the framework for economic transactions, and act in defence of economic interests (Thompson, 1988:122).

Thompson (1988:133-135) emphasises the concept of the leading sector, since the industries which encompass this sector are one of the keys to achieving hegemony.

Thompson explains that different sectors of the economy grow at different rates, yet some sectors, at critical points in time, introduce major technological breakthroughs that have important implications for the growth of the economy as a whole. Thompson builds upon the study done by Rostow (1978) in this regard, which leads him to identify the following leading sectors since the eighteenth century: cotton textiles, iron, railways, steel, chemicals, electricity, and motor vehicles. When a country has a higher concentration of the leading sectors of the time, its economy benefits greatly; some of the possible implications for the national economy include lower prices and transport costs, population relocations, increased exports and employment, and spin-offs for other sectors of the economy. An excellent example would be the introduction of the railway and its related innovations, which certainly involved all of the implications mentioned above.

Thompson, together with Reuveny (2008), also utilise the concept of leading sectors to account for what they regard as the growing economic gap between the developed North (core states) and the developing South (semi-peripheral and peripheral states) in the world-economy. Since “intermittent upsurges in radical technology [are] generated principally in the system’s lead economy [thus enabling that state to become hegemonic],” and since these

“growth impulses diffuse outwards from the centre of the North unevenly,” it stands to reason that the economies of the North are the “primary beneficiaries of these periodic extensions of the technological frontier” (Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:579). Indeed, when considering the issue of Southern development, Reuveny and Thompson (2008:587) find that “the North-South arena is not necessarily static, but there seem to be limitations in diffusing technology. The international political economic structure seems stacked against a substantial or near-future diminishment of the North-South gap” (emphasis added). Thus, while the core states benefit from the “diffusion of ideas, technologies, and know-how”

brought about by new leading sectors, the periphery remains the recipient of older ‘past-prime’ technology (Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:600). While this may seem to confirm arguments that the periphery does experience “real development,” (such as that of Sanderson {2005:197}), Reuveny and Thompson (emphasis added, 2008:583) soberly conclude that:

the Southern problem is more one of avoiding falling further behind than it is of catching up or evading exploitation. If the South is generally unable to adopt or adapt to successive technological breakthroughs, it will likely fall furtherbehind a frontier that is intermittently advanced in the North.

Some Southern catch-up may be feasible in terms of earlier technological waves, but it is likely to remain too many waves behind to make much progress vis-à-vis convergence.

Since most of the gains in new technology are concentrated in the “pioneer economy” of the time, it is able to benefit disproportionately, at least until other core states “improve on the initial innovations [or] … simply copy [them]” (Reuveny and Thompson, 2008:582).

Moreover, these authors argue that these “ascent and decline patterns in relative technological gains, with late developers challenging early developers” constitute “both an economic foundation and substantial motivation for the world wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 [although, as this study will maintain, the same could be said for the Thirty Years’

War]” (emphasis added, 2008:582). A clear link can thus be said to exist between leading

sectors, Great Power War, and hegemony, and this link will be explored in the following chapter of this study. Indeed, as Reuveny and Thompson (2008:584) succinctly argue:

The key to global ascent is the successful monopolization of radical innovations in leading sectors of commerce and industry … [while] the introduction of leading sectors leads to the growth of the pioneering lead economy and, in turn, the growth of the lead economy stimulates world growth. The monopoly profits [then] finance the buildup of the leader’s military capabilities of global reach. [Thus, that] state emerges as the principle winner or systemic leader [during a Great Power War] thanks in large part to its lead in technological innovation.

Thus, the concept of the leading sector, and more broadly technological innovation, can certainly help to illuminate why some states ascended to hegemony, while others did not, and these are also closely related to Wallerstein’s own arguments concerning hegemony.

Moreover, as the comment above reveals, in order to construct and maintain a superior navy, which is vital for global reach and world leadership, a state must possess an economy that is vibrant enough to support such an enterprise. Even though neither Rostow nor Thompson discusses the concepts of leading sectors and a lead economy in the period before the industrial revolution, it does not preclude the usefulness of applying the concept to earlier eras. For instance, shipbuilding and its related innovations can be considered to be a leading sector in the era of Dutch ascent, as identified by Bousquet (1980) (Goldstein, 1988:139). An investigation of this is thus warranted in the relevant section of this study.

A further account of Great Power War’s impact on the lead economy is also provided by Thompson (1988:149), who explains that wars of such a scale have tended to do much more damage to the economies of the losing side, since much of the fighting has taken place there.

Another factor, which is more beneficial to the lead economy than to its competitors, is the war-induced demand for goods, which the lead economy (with its more efficient industries and leading sectors) is better able to supply. As the comment above also revealed, states that ascend to hegemony after Great Power Wars were in fact already in a strong position before the Wars broke out, and that their relative power was thus enhanced and their leadership solidified by the Wars. In essence, the War therefore helps to push the near-hegemonic state over the top into full hegemony (Thompson, 1988:165). Thus, understanding processes such as changes in relative power before the outbreak of Great Power Wars is crucial when attempting to account for a state’s ascension to hegemony, and reveals the motivation for the inclusion of a second independent variable (the material base) in this study, as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, as Thompson (1988:165) remarks, both economic and military power concentrations are required together to provide the new systemic leader with the underpinnings it needs in order to alter the rules of the system and to promote its new world order.

In conclusion, to tie in with Dehio’s argument that Continental powers tended to be absolutist, while insular powers were more representative, Thompson and Rasler (1989:23) used a study conducted by Mann (1986) in order to explain why insular powers tended to specialise in naval strength, while Continental powers focussed on armies (this is also closely linked to Fox’s societal dichotomy as discussed earlier). The conclusion they reached was that as military costs spiralled in the sixteenth century, states could either learn to mobilise fiscal resources, or manpower, depending on whether they possessed a stable and sizeable wealth base or a large and malleable population. Since sea powers tended to generate more wealth through trade (which was also relatively easy to tax) they could mobilise their fiscal resources to a much greater extent than Continental powers. This would prove decisive, as the costs of war continued to spiral upwards, and would lay the foundations for the

institutionalised access that these insular powers would have to both short- and long-term credit, which helped them to defeat their (often apparently wealthier) opponents (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:103). In a very real sense, this leadership in financial capabilities and public finance systems was decisive for ensuring victory in increasingly expensive Great Power Wars. Other authors have also discussed this issue in detail, which will be addressed below.