D ERECHO A SUSPENSIÓN Y EXCEDENCIAS

TO THE STUDY OF HUMANITARIAN AID EFFECTIVENESS

Many of the criticisms of foreign aid discussed in this chapter have a few common elements. The first is that many of the suggested deficiencies in the humanitarian network could be addressed by increased accountability. Indeed, a current lack of accountability is highlighted as a primary concern among many scholars. The second issue is that while there has been much

theorizing on the possible effects of aid, there is little empirical evidence showing what effects aid actually engenders in crisis situation.

The argument presented here addresses the issue of accountability and effectiveness by applying some of the lessons from the literature on development assistance. As seen from the work of Bearce and Tirone (2010), when donors are willing to enforce accountability – in their work accountability comes in the form of aid conditionality – aid is effective in achieving its goals. When donors are lax in holding recipients accountable, then aid shows little beneficial effect. This logic should also apply to humanitarian organizations – when donors to international NGOs hold the organizations to which they donate accountable for how funds are used, those funds should be used more effectively than if the donors fail to exercise oversight. This argument comports with the logic proposed by Grant and Keohane (2005) who argue that one of the groups which can hold NGOs accountable are donors. The emphasis on donor accountability in humanitarian action is also increased due to the fact that “the field of humanitarian intervention is not overseen by any regulatory body, neither certification nor licensure is required to practice, and there is no formal system of evaluation of either individual or organizational performance” (Waldman 2001, 589). In short, if donors don’t hold NGOs accountable, it’s not clear who else can.

Greater accountability should also have the potential to reduce the negative externalities suggested by aid scholars. As an example, donors could prevent NGOs from engaging in direct aid transfers to rebels. In this manner, greater accountability seems like a beneficial proposition on a number of fronts. What is unique about the theory presented here is that it extends these logics to examine what factors influence donors’ willingness and ability to hold NGOs accountable. The donors in Bearce and Tirone (2010) were a largely homogenous group: state

donors of bilateral economic development aid.13 The world of humanitarian aid donors is, by contrast, a highly diverse group, running the gamut from private individuals to nation states and everything in between. I argue that given such disparate actors there should be significant differences in their ability to hold NGOs accountable, for reasons and by methods detailed in Chapter 3.0 . In so doing, I combine a number of existing literatures while also advancing the theoretical understanding to include considerations of donor variation and how that may affect aid efficacy through differences in accountability.

The second primary contribution of this project is empirically oriented. As discussed previously, scholars and practitioners have shown great concern for the possibility that humanitarian aid may in fact have as great a propensity to make countries worse off as it does to improve their situation. There are numerous arguments suggesting means by which aid can in fact make crises such as civil wars worse, in direct opposition to the intentions of those organizations delivering aid and services. These arguments have also drawn on case study analyses to find situations in which the proposed mechanism appears to have been observed in the relevant circumstances. The final determination about whether aid systematically makes situations worse appears uncertain, however, with numerous competing positions on whether aid is a net good or bad for recipients in crisis.

This is where the studies of foreign aid broadly can help address this fundamental question of humanitarian aid. The question of whether foreign aid makes crises worse is inherently a question of overall trends, and not isolated instances. That aid has possibly on certain occasions contributed to the deterioration of particular crises seems likely based on the existing literature done in this area. What is not clear is whether these are isolated instances or

13

Not all states are the same, of course, but in many ways they share many more similarities than differences, particularly when compared to individuals and other NGOs as discussed later in Chapter 3.0 .

representations of a broader overall trend, a determination which can be best assessed by looking at humanitarian aid more broadly in a similar type of analyses as has been undertaken with development aid. Much of the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between aid and crisis may be due to the qualitative nature of the analysis. Overall, the fact that most of the findings have been inductively formed means that “conclusions regarding the impact must be tentative…the analysis is not one of strict cause and effect but instead lies in the realm of plausibility and informed argument” (MacFarlane 2001, 13). One must address the question of the counterfactual: “whether the local actions fueling the crisis would have been abandoned or modified earlier if only limited humanitarian assistance, or none, had been available to its victims” (Väyrynen 1999, 179). This is the primary benefit of the quantitative analysis; by comparing cases where aid was dispensed with cases sharing similar characteristics, the econometric estimations can get in part to the this question of the counterfactual to determine trends and determine how aid impacted recipient welfare.

It also allows for the examination of the question which has seemingly (and surprisingly) been neglected in much of the humanitarian aid literature: is humanitarian aid effective? The existing studies looking at whether or not aid is bad for crises is tangentially related to this question since it would presumably detract from aid’s efficacy if it did extend conflicts or transfer resources to rebel groups. It is still possible under even these pessimistic scenarios that aid may be effective in increasing welfare despite these occurrences, however. The question is therefore not whether aid can make things worse, but rather does aid do more harm than good? Humanitarian aid practitioners and donors may be willing to accept some negative externalities if on the whole their efforts improve the lives of those they assist. If these negative effects

overwhelm the positive benefit conferred by aid, however, then that would be a serious blow to the humanitarian network overall.

Like many of the theories of development aid effectiveness, this dissertation also assumes that aid’s effect will likely be impacted by particular conditioning factors, including the interests and motivations of aid donors derived from the theoretical discussion. I argue that humanitarian aid from NGOs can be effective, but that this effect will be differ depending on whether the NGO derives its funds from public or private sources. Exactly why this distinction matters, and the means by which I identify exactly how to understand what it means for aid to be effective, are the basis of Chapter 3.0 .

3.0 A THEORY OF DONOR COMPOSITION, NGO POLITICS