El daño alegado.

4.1. Deconstruction as a critical ethics

From the above we see that deconstruction carries both a threat and a promise – and that both are necessary for ethical testimony. However, Derrida’s circumscriptions of deconstruction, and of ethics as an experience of the impossible, have also sparked much criticism. Indeed, one need only take note of the critical obituaries written in the popular press after his death (Kandell, 2004; Mendez-Opale, 2004), or the vehement protests voiced by a number of analytic philosophers at Cambridge, who tried to stop the university from awarding Derrida an honourary degree (Smith, 2005: 4-6), in order to get a feel for the type of reactions that Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy elicits. The following example taken from an article by Stephens (1994), serves to illustrate the malicious nature of these attacks. In this article, Roger Kimball, a conservative critic and author of Tenured Radicals (2008), is quoted as saying: ‘Derrida's influence has been disastrous... He has helped foster a sort of anaemic nihilism, which has given imprimaturs to squads of imitators who no longer feel that what they are engaged in is a search for truth, who would find that notion risible.’

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Whilst some of his ardent followers have, no doubt, missed the point of deconstruction, it would be unfair to equate Derrida’s project with nihilism.

All too often, deconstruction is construed as a negative ethics, intent on destroying rather than building-up. Such criticism confuses a critical ethics with a negative ethics, and is mostly propagated by those who wish to perpetuate the dream of a categorically-binding ethics. Derrida certainly aims to challenge conventional understandings of ethics, and in this sense he is critical of the Western tradition of philosophical thought. However, his criticisms are not intended to steer us towards the abyss of nothingness, but towards assuming a deeper responsibility for our decisions and actions. This also means foregoing the dream of a categorically-binding ethical framework; and, furthermore, necessitates engagement with the undecidable nature of ethical decision-making. To elaborate: a deconstructive ethics necessitates that we turn away from the ‘dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile’ (Derrida, 1978a: 292). In other words, we need to turn away from moral ‘recipes’ that claim to lead us to the heart of ethics, and instead examine the margins, in an attempt to account for that which is excluded from these moral recipes. We cannot get to these exclusions through only applying rational rules and principles. Although necessary, logic needs to be supplemented by imagination and creativity, and the ethical agent must assume an attitude of openness towards risk.

When we make an ethical decision we take a risk, because the product of our deliberations and actions can never be determined in advance, even though we are infinitely responsible for the consequences of our decisions. Derrida (293) concedes that this is a daunting prospect; so daunting, in fact, that we tend to avert our eyes ‘when faced by the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offering, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.’ To reiterate: the risk that we take has to do with the fact that the product of our ethical deliberations is both a baby and a monster, or the unknown for which we have not accounted in our deliberations.

For some, the deconstructionist perspective presents a threat that is too large, and a promise that is too elusive. This interpretation has often gives rise to criticism. In this regard, Derrida (1988a:140) states: ‘I have come to understand that, sometimes, certain bitter and compulsive enemies of deconstruction stand in a more vital relationship, even if not theorized, to what is in effect at stake in it than do certain avowed “deconstructionists.’ It is, ironically, precisely this recognition of what

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is at stake that may lead to the perpetuation of the standard normative tale, in fields such as business ethics. From the viewpoint of a deconstructive ethics, it is no longer possible to distinguish with certainty between good and bad, right and wrong, and what deserves respect and what does not. Taking these insights seriously, therefore, poses a big challenge to the manner in which ethics is understood, practiced, and taught in business.

4.2. Derrida, deconstruction, and business ethics

Despite the controversy unleashed by Derrida’s insights, various authors have, since the early 1980s, sought to incorporate Derrida’s ideas in the field of organisation studies58_{. A perfunctory}

glance at the organisation literature seems to suggest that, although popular in the 1980s and 1990s, Derrida’s reception in the field has been short-lived, as few organisational theorists continue to work with Derridean ideas. This is because it is generally believed that we have moved past postmodernism (and, therefore, past Derrida). Furthermore, in terms of the extant literature, we see that, whereas some of the studies constitute a more careful reading of Derridean philosophy (Cooper, 1989); others show a loose appropriation of Derrida’s insights in a manner that conforms to the author’s intentions (Boje, 1998).

In comparison to organisation studies, Derrida has not enjoyed much of a reception in business ethics. However, contrary to developments in organisation studies, we see that the incorporation of Derridean philosophy in business ethics has been more recent (see Jones 2007, 2004, 2003; Jones, Parker and ten Bos, 2005; Weitzner, 2007; MacKenzie, 2000; Willmott, 1998). Indeed, a special issue of Business Ethics: a European Review (vol. 19; issue 3) on the relation between Derrida, business and ethics appeared in July 2010, following a conference held in 2008 on ‘Derrida and Business Ethics’.

However, as in organisation studies (and philosophy in general), Derrida’s reception in business ethics has been mixed. In this regard, it is not surprising that two recent articles on the importance of Derrida for business ethics (by Weitzner (2007) and Jones (2007)) have met with almost instantaneous critique and dismissal (by Weiss (2007) and De George (2008) respectively). Although the criticisms are not lodged against Derrida as such, but rather against the usefulness of the interpretations given of Derrida, it is, nevertheless, clear that both Weis and De George are

58 _{See Jones (2004: 34-35) for a full list of authors working in the field of organisation studies who have} utilised Derridean ideas in their considerations of various organisational themes.

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sceptical of the purported value that Derrida can bring to the boardroom. De George (85) explicitly conveys this sentiment in the conclusion of his article, in stating that:

The onus is on Jones and other followers of Derrida to show how, by using ‘the categories made available in the writings of Jacques Derrida’ (Jones 2007), those in CSR and business ethics can do, and do more effectively, what they want to do and what they cannot do without these categories.

Given the above analysis of a deconstructive ethics, it is not surprising that many business ethicists (who concern themselves with legitimising the ethics of business, with providing ethical criteria against which organisations can measure their ethical success, or with engaging in business ethics management practices) would react with hostility to an ethics which speaks of deconstruction, supplement, play, trace, and différance.

As already mentioned, one reason for such hostility is that many business ethicists (in espousing codes, rules, norms, and procedures) wish to offer comfort in the name of business ethics, by offering tools to ‘solve’ moral dilemmas. Against this, a deconstructive ethics has as its goal the task of calling into question ‘the self-satisfying rules, excuses and alibis that produce a reassuring sense of comfort’ (Jones, 2003: 237; 238).

Yet, there is a second reason for why many business ethicists are weary of bringing Derrida to business ethics, namely: the problem of application. Indeed, as Jones (234) argues, Derrida’s insights cannot be assimilated into a code, which can then be applied. In this regard, ‘the idea that Derrida could or would need to be applied seems foreign to his thought’ (234); and, more importantly, if deconstruction was reduced to a methodology, or Derridean insights taken up in a formula, ‘it would tend to efface the very idea of responsibility’ (234). This latter reason presents a pitfall to be avoided, and the way in which several business ethicists have tended to circumvent this problem, is by speaking ‘in vague generalities about ‘Derridean ethics’ and ‘poststructuralism’ rather than paying attention to Derrida’s works and the specific arguments he makes there’ (225). These vague generalities have indeed limited the appeal and usefulness of incorporating Derrida’s insights into business ethics. In the next chapter, the possibility of productively applying a deconstructive ethics to business ethics problems will be investigated in more detail.

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5. Conclusion

In this chapter, some of Derrida’s ideas were introduced in explaining deconstruction. Most notably, Derrida’s understanding of meaning as a textual and contextual phenomenon was elaborated upon. It was shown that, meaning is always grounded in a context. This context is defined by both structure and play. In other words, on the one hand, meaning is the product of hierarchy, authority, and structure. On the other hand, however, meaning can never be fixed, due to the logic of supplementarity, différance, and the trace that is always at play in our systems of meaning. Since meaning cannot be fixed, we should guard against the naturalisation of hierarchies. In this sense, the task of deconstruction – as an intervention – is to open up our systems of meaning to differences that have not been accounted for. Herein lies the ethics of deconstruction. What should also be clear from this analysis is that deconstruction addresses the dual challenges of text and context. Normative categories are employed, but these categories are inseparable from the contexts in which they derive their meaning. Not only does this analysis clearly illustrate the dissolution of fixed normative and descriptive categories, but also draws attention to the fact that – in the absence of objective meta-positions – deconstruction is a continual process.

Deconstruction is always undertaken anew in an attempt to do justice to the irreducibility of the singular Other. The ethical moment manifests in the event, which cannot be prepared for in advance. The moment of the event, however, not only carries within it the promise of justice, but also a threat to internal security, or an abandonment of our preconceptions and prejudices, even if this proves impossible (hence, Derrida’s characterisation of ethics as an experience of the impossible). Not only is the ethical experience characterised by this impossibility, but making decisions and undertaking actions also implies a necessary measure of risk. This is because we have to take responsibility for the consequences of our decisions and actions, even though we cannot predict them in advance.

This characterisation has led many to believe that deconstruction presents us with a negative ethics. It this chapter, it has been argued that these interpretations misconstrue the point of deconstruction – deconstruction is critical, not negative, and, moreover, urges us to assume greater responsibility, not abandon our responsibilities. Nevertheless, this negative characterisation of deconstruction is rife in the academic world, and the field of business ethics is no exception. Adding to the problem is the fact that deconstruction does not present us with a substantive theory, nor does the term allow for a fixed definition. These problems limit the appeal of applying Derrida’s ideas in the field of business ethics, and – as stated in the previous section – many of the attempts to outline a ‘Derridean ethics’

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have amounted to vague generalities, or have reduced Derrida’s work to a couple of general formulae.

In order to avoid these pitfalls, the following chapter will not present an outline for a ‘Derridean ethics’. Rather, the strategy that will be followed in this chapter is to pay careful attention to Derrida’s work and arguments, in an attempt to engage with some of the specific ways in which he has been appropriated and criticised in business ethics. This is done in order to show how the categories made available by Derrida, do, indeed, allow for a new understanding of business ethics.

As such, section 3 (in which a deconstructive ethics was presented), and section 4 (in which an overview of Derrida’s reception in the academic, and business ethics, world was given) should be read as a broad introduction to the following chapter. In chapter five, the normative implications of a deconstructive ethics are teased out at the hand of a specific business ethics example, namely the way in which corporate social responsibility should be understood. The discussion will be supplemented with insights gleaned from the complexity literature; and, through the analysis, it will become clear why deconstruction is an example of a complex ethics.

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Chapter 5: