DAÑOS SUJETOS A VIGILANCIA EPIDEMIOLOGICA

PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: Bulgaria vs. Serbia, Greece,

Romania, and Turkey

PRINCIPAL THEATER(S): The Balkans DECLARATION: No formal declaration

MAJOR ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES: As the Great Powers met

in London to hammer out the Treaty of London, Bulgaria,

already at odds with the rest of the Balkan League over plans for dismembering Macedonia, attacked former ally Serbia in June 1913, kicking off a second Balkan war.

OUTCOME: Under the peace imposed by the Great Powers,

Bulgaria was forced to cede Salonika to Greece, northern Dobruja to Romania, much of Macedonia to Serbia, and most of Thrace back to Turkey. The Ottomans retained Adrianople but lost almost all their holdings in Europe. All this left the Balkans politically unstable.

APPROXIMATE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS:

Greece, 121,544; Bulgaria, unknown; Other combatants, unknown

CASUALTIES: Bulgaria, 20,000; Greece, 2,500; Turkey,

2,000; Romania, 1,500; Serbia, 18,500

TREATIES: Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913; and

Treaty of Constantinople, September 29, 1913

The Treaty of London, which concluded the FIRSTBALKAN

WARearlier in the year and by which the Balkan League

acquired Turkey’s Balkan possessions, left questions of just to which victor should go the spoils. While the conference of Great Powers (Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hun- gary, and Russia) continued to meet in London to hammer out the remaining problems, Bulgaria precipitously chal- lenged Greek and Serbian claims to Macedonia. On June 29, 1913, scarcely a month after signing the treaty, Bul- garia, swollen with hubris over its earlier conquests from Turkey, attacked its former allies Serbia and Greece, seized Salonika, and crushed the ill-prepared Serbian army. Bul- garia’s hasty action backfired, however, when Romania, neutral in the last conflict, fell on the Bulgars’ unprotected rear. Romania’s army crossed the Danube and threatened Sofia. Meanwhile, Turkey, too, allied with Greece and Ser- bia against Bulgaria, swiftly recaptured Adrianople on July 10, 1913. When the kaiser backed King Carol I (1881– 1914) of Romania and the Russian czar refused to come to the aid of Bulgaria, its own maverick prince Ferdinand (1861–1948) quickly sued for an armistice. The Great Powers once again intervened with a blend of threats, coercion, and compensatory bribes to impose peace in the Treaty of Bucharest.

The treaty, signed on August 10, 1913, compelled Bul- garia to cede Salonika to Greece, northern Dobruja to Romania, and much of Macedonia to Serbia. In a separate 1913 Treaty of Constantinople, Bulgaria returned most of Thrace to Turkey. This time, the Sublime Porte, as the Ottoman government called itself, retained Adrianople, but overall the Ottoman Empire had lost more than 80 percent of its Balkan territory and more than 70 percent of its European population.

Nobody was foolish enough to think matters in the Balkans had been truly settled. Already, the term Balkanize had been coined for any collapse into petty factions. For the Great Powers, meeting in London, it did not matter so

much who was stabbing who in the back, or which little country got which piece of real estate. What mattered was that they keep talking until they were sure that small wars would not spread naturally through the entangling alliances into general war. But, as Otto von Bismarck (1815–98), chancellor of Germany, had warned, without the Otto- mans to keep in line, the Hapsburgs seemed to have lost their purpose in the European scheme. And since the Great Powers no longer planned to organize the Balkans around the arthritic needs of Austria-Hungary’s Dual Monarchy, nobody could seem to agree on the safest way to handle the Turks’ former holdings in Europe.

Both Balkan Wars and the long London conference left Hapsburg hopes in tatters, too. What to do about the rise of ethnic nationalism, debated by Austrian statesmen for half a century, was a question they could hardly dodge any longer. Most of Europe’s diplomats had come to the opin- ion that some form of federalism, which allowed for politi- cal autonomy, was best, but such measures, even when the Austrians suggested them, had always been vetoed by the Hungarians, who—since the reforms carved up their half of the empire—stood to lose their equal standing in the Dual Monarchy. Conrad Franz (1852–1925), count von Hötzen- dorf, Austria’s chief of the general staff, joined the growing chorus in Germany that favored a preventive war. The heir apparent, Francis Ferdinand (1863–1914), archduke of Austria, however, took the longer, more liberal view, saying that he would live and die a federalist, since federalism was the only thing that could save the monarchy.

For the moment, the Great Powers in London con- gratulated themselves on maintaining peace in a volatile region during precarious times, and 10 days after the sign- ing of the treaty disbanded their conference. But peace was hardly the word for what they had wrought. Although all the Balkan allies—including Bulgaria—had gained ter- ritory at the expense of the Ottomans, Bulgaria refused to become reconciled to its defeat, and the other Balkan states, too, remained restless for yet more land. As Croats and Slovenes, who had long been under Austrian Haps- burg rule, eyed the growth of Serbia, they dreamed of join- ing the Serbs in a union of South Slavs (“Yugoslavia”). Secret societies, many of them workshops for terror, formed in Serbia and began agitation and assassinations across the border. The instability of the Balkans in general was especially dangerous because of the complex alliances with Russia and the powers of central and western Europe. Within a year a Serb national would kill the mod- erate heir apparent to the Austrian throne, and the world would erupt into WORLDWARI.

Further reading: Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail:

Ottoman Army Operations in the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003); Mark Mazower, Balkans:

A Short History (New York: Random House, 2002); Naim

Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and

Ottoman Collapse (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).

Bannockburn, Campaign of

PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: England vs. Scotland PRINCIPAL THEATER(S): Bannockburn, Scotland DECLARATION: None

MAJOR ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES: Scottish independence

from England, which the Scots fought to secure, the English to deny

OUTCOME: Edward II suffered perhaps the worst

defeat in English history, giving Scotland de facto independence.

APPROXIMATE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS:

Scotland, 8,000; England, 24,000

CASUALTIES: Scotland, fewer than 5,000; England, 15,000

or more

TREATIES: None

Driven by personal ambition, Robert the Bruce (1274–1329) had courted both sides in William Wallace’s (c. 1272– 1305) revolt (see WALLACE’S REVOLT) against Edward I

(1239–1307), king of England. Robert had murdered a rival baron while in Edward’s employ, then assumed lead- ership of the rebellion after Wallace had fallen, and had himself crowned king of Scotland at Scone. Forced into exile in Ireland shortly thereafter by Edward’s 1306 inva- sion of Scotland, Bruce returned the following year to launch another revolt (see BRUCE’SREVOLT), intending to

clear the English out of Scotland for good. The Scots ral- lied to his cause, and by 1313 only Stirling, Dunbar, and Berwick remained under English control. Bruce laid siege to the English garrison at Stirling Castle in 1313. Edward I had died during the first year of Bruce’s revolt, at the very beginning of a new campaign to rid his kingdom again of the troublesome and treacherous Scot, and thereafter his son, Edward II (1284–1327), had abandoned for a number of years his father’s fixation on Bruce. Now King Edward II responded differently, assembling a large army, equipping it lavishly, and leading his vastly superior force—he out- numbered Bruce three to one—on a determined march north to Stirling.

Before the English arrived Robert arranged his 8,000 men in a 2,000-foot front outside Stirling at Bannockburn on high ground overlooking a marsh. To his left lay thick woods, to his right a brook. Hiding his left flank among the trees, Bruce had his right flank deployed at a bend in the stream, where the Scots had built defense entrench- ments and set numerous booby traps. Edward had no choice but to charge up the hill, crossing the bog to get there. On June 24, 1314, Edward ordered his troops to advance, and the heavily armored knights splashed ahead, sinking into the bog as Scottish spears and arrows show- ered down on them. Mercilessly cut down, many never cleared the marsh. The English center became so crowded and confused that English archers attempting to shoot

over the melee struck their own troops. Scottish spearmen then drove the archers back.

When Edward attempted a flanking movement through the woods, he was crushed by the Scots’ reserve force who then faked a flanking movement of their own. Edward panicked and fled the field, and those left among his troops followed him. The Scots attacked in pursuit down the hill and slaughtered thousands of trapped and retreating Englishmen. In a battle considered by many to be the greatest defeat ever inflicted on the English army, Edward suffered losses of 15,000 or more while the Scots lost less than a third of that total. Although Edward refused to acknowledge Scotland’s independence, Bannockburn essentially guaranteed the Scots freedom from the English.

See also MARCHES, REBELLION OF THE; SCOTTISHWAR

(1295–1296); SCOTTISHWAR(1314–1328).

Further reading: G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the

Community of the Realm of Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

University Press, 1988); Ronald McNair Scott, Robert the

Bruce: King of Scots (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1988).

Bannock War

PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: Bannocks and Northern Paiute

Indians vs. United States

PRINCIPAL THEATER(S): Idaho and Oregon DECLARATION: None

MAJOR ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES: Resistance to white

incursions and white violations of treaty agreements

OUTCOME: Indians returned to the reservation. APPROXIMATE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS:

Varied, 200 Indian warriors attacked civilians, May 30–June 8, 1878; at battle of Silver Creek (June 23, 1878), Indians, 450; United States, 1,000 in both battles

CASUALTIES: United States, 9 killed, 24 wounded; Indians,

at least 78 killed, 66 wounded, 731 prisoners taken; civilians, 31 killed

TREATIES: None

Buffalo Horn (d. 1878), an important chief among the Bannock of Idaho, had served the U.S. Army as a scout during the NEZ PERCÉ WARof 1877. Now Buffalo Horn

gathered about him a significant following among the Ban- nocks and their neighbors, the Northern Paiutes (whose own best-known leader was Winnemucca [d. 1882]). The expansion of white settlement was depleting game and even camas roots, a staple food that the Indians dug on Camas Prairie, 90 miles southeast of Boise, Idaho. The right to dig for these roots was guaranteed by a solemn treaty, but settlers’ hogs were destroying the roots. The reservation system, inept and corrupt, failed to supply suf- ficient rations to make up for the shortage of food. Indeed, asked what had caused the Bannock War, one army official replied: “Hunger. Nothing but hunger.”

On May 30, 1878, a Bannock shot and wounded two whites. The Bannocks, Shoshonis, and Sheepeaters who lived on the Lemhi Reservation (and who were collectively called the Lemhis) and many of the 600 Bannocks who lived at the Ross Fork, or Fort Hall, Agency in southeastern Idaho submissively reported to their agencies. Buffalo Horn, how- ever, who commanded a following of about 200 warriors, including Northern Paiute and Umatilla in addition to Ban- nock, launched a raid in southern Idaho, killing 10 whites. The attacks continued until June 8, when civilian volun- teers killed Buffalo Horn in a skirmish near Silver City.

Without their leader Buffalo Horn’s warriors rode to Steens Mountain, in Oregon, where they found Northern Paiute followers of a militant medicine man named Oytes and a rebellious chief known as Egan, who had led them off the Malheur Reservation on June 5. They made an alliance, pitting about 450 warriors against a slightly larger number of soldiers led by General O. O. Howard (1830–1909).

Howard pursued the Indians vigorously after an attempt at a negotiated settlement failed. He chased the forces of Oytes and Egan off Steens Mountain and, on June 23, engaged them at Silver Creek. After a daylong, indeci- sive battle, the Indians fled.

Howard mustered an additional 480 troops and resumed the pursuit, seeking to prevent the Bannock-Paiute force from combining with other Indians. From the end of June through the first week of July, the hostiles evaded Howard, laying waste to whatever ranches lay in their path. On July 8 one of Howard’s commanders discovered the Indian position on high bluffs along Birch Creek near Pilot Butte, Idaho. Climbing the steep bluffs, the cavalry attacked, but the Indians were able to make their escape.

After the Battle of Birch Creek, Oytes and Egan moved their followers south, apparently to seek refuge and allies among the Nez Percé. When Howard dispatched troops to block them, they moved north again, toward the Umatillas Reservation. Captain Evan Miles arrived at the reservation on July 12 with infantry, artillery, and cavalry reinforce- ments. To his relieved surprise, the Umatillas chose not to join forces with the Bannocks and Paiutes but set them- selves up only to observe the battle.

The battle began on July 13. By July 15 the Umatilla decided to participate—on the side of the U.S. Army. A party of Umatillas approached the Bannocks and Paiutes on pretense of joining them. They tricked Chief Egan into coming away from his warriors and killed him.

Additional troops arrived, and on July 20 the aug- mented forces pursued the fleeing Bannock-Paiute band, which now split up into small, disorganized, but highly destructive raiding parties. General Howard divided and fanned out elements of his command along a vast front extending from Nevada to Idaho. The tactic proved suc- cessful, and by August the Paiutes began returning to the reservations. On August 12 Oytes himself surrendered. By September most of the Bannocks gave up, fighting a final battle in Wyoming on September 12, 1879.

Like most western Indian wars of this period, the struggle was supremely exhausting yet did not result in heavy casualties. Nine troopers died, 24 were wounded, and at least 78 Indians slain.

Further reading: Alan Axelrod, Chronicle of the Indian

Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded Knee (New York:

Prentice Hall Reference, 1993); Brigham D. Madsen, The

Bannock of Idaho (Moscow: University of Idaho Press,

1958); Frank C. Robertson, The Fall of Buffalo Horn (New York: D. Appleton, 1928).