2.2.1 Enfoque Ecológico de Factores Relacionados con la Violencia
Estrategia 4 Impulsar el empoderamiento de las mujeres de San Pedro Cholula.
2.6 Datos acerca de la Violencia de Género en el Municipio de San Pedro Cholula.
T he view that self-knowledge is not reason-based, is shared by a wide
variety o f positions ranging from strong constitutive views, according to which it is
somehow constitutive of believing that one believes that p that one actually does believe
that p, all the way to purely reliabilist views, according to which our first and second-order
beliefs are both ontologically and conceptually independent, although somehow causally
linked at the sub-personal level. These very different positions share how ever a com mon
commitment to the view that our immediate introspective attitudinal avowals are not based
on reasons, that is, that they are not rationally grounded in any way: they are neither based
on other beliefs, nor on observation (whether of our behaviour or directly o f our conscious
states), nor even on our conscious states th e m s e lv e s .R a th e r, on each of these accounts,
there is something else (if anything at all) in virtue of which our mental self-ascriptions
have their distinctive features of immediacy, authoritativeness, immunity to certain types
of error, etc. Having already discussed pure reliabilism in chapter 2, in this chapter I will
be examining the various lines of ‘constitutive’ non-reason-based approaches to mental
self-ascriptions available, dividing them into tw o categories: (1) artefact o f gram m ar
” T his expression is borrowed from (P eacocke 1998).
In the case o f reliabilism , this is o f course only true o f c erta in ty p e s o f reliabilist positions, in particular not o f those which hold reliabilism across the board for all k now ledge, and therefore according to w hich to be reason-based is just to be produced by a reliable purely causal m echanism .
views or strong constitutive views, according to which it is in one way or other
ontologically constitutive of having a second-order attitude that one actually does have the
corresponding first-order attitude or vice versa, and (2) weak constitutive views, according
to which it is conceptually constitutive of having a first-order conscious attitude that one
will generally tend to form a correct second-order belief about it. In each case, I will
ultimately argue that the position offered is unsatisfactory, and that an epistemological
approach to mental self-ascriptions m ust therefore be returned to, although neither an
inferential nor a perceptual one.
3.1 Artefact o f Grammar Views
In essence, the fundamental claim o f these views is that the immediacy,
authoritativeness and otherwise specialness of our know ledge of our own minds is ju st an
artefact of a grammatical misconstrual, a misconstrual either of expressions of beliefs as
truth-evaluable assertions about them, or of a m ere language gam e as the reflection of a
language-independent reality and special way of know ing it upon which this language
game is consequential, or simply the misconstrual of self-verifying judgem ents as reflecting
a special way of gaining knowledge.
To be m ore specific, according to the first kind o f artefact o f gramm ar
view, which could be called the ‘expressivist view ’, we som etim es, although not always,
‘ouch’ or ‘p ’/^ It is in these cases, according to this view, that our mental self-ascriptions
are immediate, non-inferential, authoritative, and im m une to certain kinds of error. W hen
our mental self-ascriptions are used as actual assertions, on the other hand, they do not,
on this view, have any of the special features we generally associate with first-person
attitudinal avowals, but are just as indirect, and based on exactly the same kind of evidence
as our judgem ents about other people’s attitudes. The problem of how it is that we can
have special, im mediate, and authoritative know ledge o f some of our own m ental states
is, on this view, ju st an illusion which arises from mistaking uses o f I believe that p ’ as
expressions, for uses of them as assertions?'^
A ccording to the second kind of artefact of gram m ar view alluded to
above, there is actually nothing there to be explained about why our first-person avowals
have the distinctive features they have, or nothing there to be said about that in virtue of
which our avowals have these features; they ju st do. T hat is, it is ju st part o f our practices
with the words ‘believe’, ‘desire’, ‘intend’, ‘pain’, etc. that a person’s im m ediate claims
about her own states are taken as correct and authoritative, in all cases in which there are
no strong overriding reasons for rejecting them.^^ That is, on this view, w hat someone
This is sometimes taken to be Wittgenstein’s position (W ittgenstein 1953), and is defended am ongst others by H eal (1994). W right (1998) how ever denies that this is actually W ittgenstein’s view . W hether or not W ittgenstein actually held this position, how ever, is not important for the purposes o f the present discussion. A s far as this discussion goes, it only matters that this is one p ossible ‘n o-reasons’ v iew , and one w hich is not w ithout certain advantages.
T here are many ways in w hich this approach might be m ade to look m ore plausible, such as by saying, following Heal (1994), that these expressions o f b elief are not o n ly expressions, but are at the sam e time to be taken as self-descriptions o f o n eself as satisfying certain behavioural criteria. S ee (H eal 1998, p. 2 1 ). H o w ev er, w hatever the details might be o f any particular account along these lines, what I am interested in here is only the particular strategy that such accounts appeal to in order to explain the distinctive features exhibited by our non-inferential utterances or thoughts o f the form ‘I b elieve that p ’, and whether this strategy works.
believes, desires, intends, feels, etc., is not to be inferred from her avowals (as one m ight
infer from som eone’s screaming that they are in pain), but indeed in part to be identified
by what this person (when sincere) claims to believe, desire, etc.
On the third type of view, held in particular by Burge, although solely with
respect to strict cogito-like judgements, our judgem ents o f the form ‘I am hereby thinking
that p ’ are immediate, non-inferential, first-person authoritative and immune to error
simply in virtue of their self-verifying form. I cannot indeed be thinking to m yself that I am
hereby thinking that there are physical objects, without in fact thereby thinking to m yself
that there are physical objects.
In other words, on one kind o f strong constitutive view, it is constitutive
of someone asserting non-inferentially that they believe that p, that they do actually believe
that p, because asserting this is just another way of expressing their belief. On another such
view, it is a basic unanalysable fact about our practices with the w ord ‘believe’ that if
someone non-inferentially, sincerely, and with understanding asserts that they believe that
p, then they do, in virtue of that very fact, count as believing that p. That is, uttering or
being disposed to utter I believe that p ’ is constitutive o f believing that p. On yet another
strong constitutive approach, thinking a higher-order thought involves quite literally
thinking the corresponding lower-order thought. These being the basic claims underlying
the various types of strong constitutive accounts of self-knowledge, let us now turn to
consider what some of the advantages might be of adopting one or other o f these
positions.
3.1.1
(1) To begin with, strong constitutive views have the advantage of
providing a straightforward account of why it is that our mental self-ascriptions (or at least
som e of them) exhibit the features of non-inferentiality, authoritativeness, a kind o f
transparency, etc. In fact if to assert that one believes that p is also in som e sense to assert
that p, or if to believe that one believes that p constitutes in one at the same time the belief
that p, then obviously no inference from first to second-order belief is needed, nor can one
ever com e out as being wrong or ignorant about o ne’s first-order attitudes, nor can any
third-person judgem ent about the same states equal the authoritativeness of first-person
self-ascriptions of them.
(2) Concerning the expressivist proposal more specifically, this view has
the virtue of providing an appealing solution to one of M o ore’s paradoxes which other
strategies might seem unable to deliver. T hat is, it has the virtue of providing an
explanation of why one seems to contradict oneself when asserting things like T believe
that p, but not p ’ although it is perfectly possible that one m ay believe that p and yet for
it not to be the case that p, and m oreover for there to be nothing w rong or contradictory
about someone e/je’s judging this to be the case.^^ If the expressivist proposal is right in
suggesting that judging T believe that p ’ is in some cases ju st an alternative way of
See (H eal, 1994). M oore’s other paradox concerns statements o f the form ‘p, but I do not b elieve that p ’. This paradox. Heal grants, could be dealt with by appealing to the con sciou sn ess o f our self ascribed thoughts (where a thought’s being ‘co n scio u s’ is taken to consist in, or just to som eh ow in volve, o n e’s being aware o f o n eself having it). In this w ay, the utterance ‘p ’, expressing a con sciou s b e lie f that p, can be expanded into ‘I believe that p ’, thereby generating the contradiction ‘I b elieve that p, but I do not believe that p ’ which is o f the basic form ‘p, but not p ’. U sing this strategy to explain the second paradox ‘I believe that p, but not p ’ however does not work. It only generates ‘I b elieve that p, but I b elieve that not p ’ which is not itself a contradictory statement, but only an acknow ledgem ent o f the fact that one has contradictory beliefs.
asserting ‘p ’, it becomes immediately clear why, in these cases, these M oorean utterances
are contradictory: they am ount to asserting ‘p, but not p ’.
(3) A closely related advantage of this kind of no-reasons view, is that
taking our immediate attitudinal avowals of the form ‘I believe that p ’ to be mere
substitutes for assertions of the form ‘p ’, fits well with the datum pointed out by Evans,
drawing on a rem ark by W ittgenstein, that when asked w hether we believe that p, w hat
we do is not look at ourselves and consider the evidence regarding our beliefs, but rather,
we look out at the w orld and consider w hether or not p /° That is, if I am asked w hether
I believe that it is raining, I will not look at myself but out the window and consider
whether it is or is not raining. And indeed, if, following the expressivist, to say T believe
that it is raining’ is roughly to say Tt is raining’, nothing should seem m ore obvious than
that the evidence appealed to in order to make this avowal should be evidence regarding
the weather.
(4) One final virtue of artefact of grammar views (although there may well
be others which I am overlooking) is that they fit well with the fact that w hen we sincerely
and non-inferentially say things like T believe that this is the right thing to d o ’, we
generally seem to do so with a certain conviction and com m itm ent to the view that this is
indeed the right thing to do, which we do not do when saying things like ‘Jones believes
that this is the right thing to d o ’. On a strong constitutive approach, according to which
asserting ‘I believe that p ’ either constitutes in one the belief that p, or is ju st an expression
o f this belief, there is no difficulty in explaining this. In fact this point links up with the
discussion in chapter 2 above, about our first-order conscious attitudes and our self-
ascriptive judgements being held from the same cognitive perspective. Put in these terms,
adopting a strong constitutive approach to self-know ledge whereby our first and second-
o rd er attitudes are not truly distinct attitudes, w ould again provide us with a simple
account of how both attitudes can be held from the same point of view.
In brief, artefact of gram m ar approaches to avowals seem to have m uch
to recommend themselves. However, having now listed a number o f their virtues, it is time
to re-exam ine these points with a m ore critical eye.
3.1.2
Concerning the first advantage of these views, it should be pointed out
that the mere fact that the strong constitutive approach is able to accom m odate the
distinctive marks of first-person avowals is not enough to tip the balance in its favour. It
only puts it on a par with all other approaches which are also able to provide an
explanation of these distinctive marks.
Concerning the second advantage of this approach, namely that of being
able to provide an explanation of why M oorean utterances of the form ‘I believe that p,
but not p ’ seem to be contradictory, we have here again only a negative advantage if it
turns out that the contradictoriness of such M oorean utterances can also be generated
without appealing to some constitutive link between second and first-order thoughts. Heal
claims that it cannot, and is indeed lead to em bracing an expressivist account of avowals
essentially as a result of her attem pt to solve this M oorean paradox."^^ It seems to me
however, that there is another way in which this paradox could be dealt with, indeed a way
which Heal herself briefly mentions but does not pursue in her pap er/^ The idea is that,
given the datum that the evidence we appeal to in order to self-ascribe our conscious
beliefs is not evidence about our beliefs but essentially evidence about the world, insofar
as we self-ascribe a belief that p on the basis of evidence we have for p, then to say T
believe that p, but not p ’ is in effect to be asserting ‘not p ’ in spite o f the fact that we are
in possession of evidence for p, and have therefore immediate reason to assert ‘p ’. A
certain contradiction would indeed be involved if one were to sincerely assert ‘it is not
raining’ while looking out the window and clearly seeing that it is raining (assuming one
has no reason to m istrust w hat one sees).
B ut now, one might ask, how exactly is this point supposed to count
against the artefact of grammar approach to avowals? In fact another virtue of such
accounts (ie. point (3) above) was precisely that they fitted well with E vans’s datum about
w hat evidence we consult when considering what we currently believe. It was in fact
suggested earlier that this datum seemed to support, rather than count against, the view
that our first-person attitudinal avowals of the form ‘I believe that p ’ are ju st a different
w ay of asserting ‘p ’. Now although this is true, this fact cannot itself decide things one
way or another regarding w hether artefact of gram m ar views are right or not, since, it is
not clear that this is the only approach to avowals which is supported by E vans’s datum.
In fact, there seems to be a possible intermediate position between a perceptual account
and a no-reasons view,^^^ according to which our self-ascriptions o f our occurrent
conscious attitudes are ontologically distinct from the thoughts self-ascribed, and yet
(Ibid, p. 19)
according to which the former are rationally based on the latter, and therefore according
to which looking at the world will also com e out as being the right way to go about
m aking a correct self-ascription, since by looking at the w orld one will com e to form a
conscious belief about the world, which will in turn constitute an immediate reason for
self-ascribing it.
In other words, it seems that neither the fact that artefact o f grammar
views can explain the contradictoriness of M oorean assertions of the form ‘I believe that
p, but not p ’, nor the fact that they also fit the datum about mental self-ascriptions
discussed by Evans, can decide the issue between an artefact of gram m ar strong
constitutive non-reason based approach, and an interm ediate reason-based one.
Finally, concerning point (4), the fact that asserting non-inferentially that
one believes that p tends to involve a certain com m itm ent to the belief self-ascribed, does
not need to be explained be reference to any constitutive principle. In fact, if the belief that
p, which we are self-ascribing, is indeed our belief, then of course we will be com m itted
to the view that p when we assert that this is what we believe, w ithout this com m itm ent