DATOS GENERALES

In his paper “Time and Creation" Castoriadis begins his critique of “inherited” conceptions of tim e by arranging them in the following schema: Time is usually conceived either as objective i.e. as Cosmic time, as a “receptacle and dim ension of w hatever may appear and as an order and m easure of this appearance", or as Subjective, that being time as lived and experienced by a subject, or by collective subjects75 (Castoriadis 1997: 374).

In either case, w hat is postulated is the existence of time as such, which provides the grounding of the two aforem entioned categories of time, and which m akes possible their "m utual adjustm ent, or at least accom m odation and correspondence" (Loc.cit). It should also be noted that Castoriadis in the opening paragraphs of the sam e paper expresses his intention to argue for the inseparability of time from being, and for the actual existence of different 7' Actually the author treats the concept of the subject in the widest possible manner, so as to include individual human beings, distinct historical-societal formations, and different animal species. Thus the “various subjective times" refer to “mine [time], yours, the time of the Antics and the time of the Westerners, the time of the whales and the time of the bees- that is, the varieties of private times or times for a subject" (Castoriadis 1997:374).

categories of tim e (Castoriadis 1997: 375). According to Castoriadis, this multiplicity of tim es is covered u p by philosophy, since from Plato to Heidegger the comm on attitude of philosophers has been to w ont with a "radical separation” between subject an d object, a state of affcors brought to its extrem es with the em ergence of idealist and m aterialist philosophies. More im portantly, w hat gets allegedly m ystified by the positing of the aforem entioned "polarized couple" is the social-historicaL "both as proper dom ain and mode of being and as the de jure and de facto ground and m edium for any thought" and by im plication as the dom ain responsible for the creation of “subjectivity” (Castoriadis 1997: 776-377).

Consequently philosophy finds itself entangled in the

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the postulation of two incom patible m odalities of lim e, namely one reified/identitary mode76, which would account for the totality of physical experience, and another mode, “subjective in the derogatory sense of the word". In an explicit reference to Heidegger this latter mode m akes the existence of both a "public” and a "cosmic” tim es either absurd or the sheer outcom e of D asein's fall into the everydayness and inauthenticity of "the they” and of the subsequent forgetfulness of “Being” in D asein's encounter with particular "beings".

76 In Castoriadis' terminology “identitary”, “enseidic”, and sometimes “ensemblistic/identitary" are used with reference to a certain modality of reason, allegedly dominant in the context of "Greco-Western" thinking, the essence of which is best exemplified in the mathematical logic of “sets” or “ensembles". This modality is itself grounded on one of the dimensions of the social-historical institution, namely on the dimension which makes possible distinction, choice, assembly, counting and speech (see Castoriadis 1987: 221-223). It should be noted that although this modality is according to Castoriadis the product of the self

creation of the social/historical institution, it is still made possible due to the sta.e of affairs described by

the thinker as "society's leaning on nature”. Castoriadis summarises this complex schema in the following manner: “...identitary logic, like [the institution of] legein is equivalent to an ontological decision concerning what is and the manner in which it exists...A decision that is at the same time the expression of a creation, of an ontological genesis...We cannot think of this creation without a relation sui generis of

By m aking the social historical the starting point ftr any philosophical endeavour, Castoriadis w ishes to dissolve one set of aporias generated by the philosophical tradition and at the sam e time to bring to light another set of aporias, presum ably inaccessible to inherited reasoning (Castoriadis, 1997: 378). The first task is then to be perform ed through a cursory discussion of Aristotle and St. Augustine’s theories of time, the former being understood as an "em inent proponent" of the cosm ological/objective definition of time, the latter as the archetypal figure for any subjective theorization on the issue. By way of anticipation it can be said that the basic strategy deployed by Castoriadis in this short discussion of the two thinkers, is to show how each of the two approaches necessarily h a s to adm it elem ents pertaining to the other approach. In the case of Aristotle, Castoriadis. not wishing to address all “the intricacies, richness, subtlety and solidity" of Aristotle’s argum ent, focuses mainly in w hat is usually accepted as Aristotle's definition of tim e77 in the fourth book of Physics, and according to which ‘Tim e is a num ber [num bered num ber, m easure) of m ovem ent according to before and after” (Castoriadis 1997: 379). Now, although tim e for Aristotle is not itself change, but the m easure of change, Castoriadis discerns in the abovem entloned definition not only a certain privileging of the spatial dim ension -despite the fact that in the Aristotelian ontology change pertains also to essence, to quality, to quantity and to place- but also and more im portantly, a belonging together of som e “locally defined” movement and of time.

partial support on what was there before...[which] is the leaning of society on the first stratum, or natural stratum, of the given" (Castoriadis 1987: 227).

77 The relevant passage (Physics, book D, 219al6-219b6) reads: “6xav 6c to iporepov Kai uotcpov, t6te

It is this spatiality of time th a t in Castoriadis' view brings ab o u t the “subjective" elem ent in Aristotle's “cosmological” narrative, since -Casto.-iadis asserts- “any spatial ordering is, of necessity, arbitrary”. Thus inevitable Aristotle is forced to adm it the role of the individual psyche in taking cognisance and in putting into order the experiences generated by spatial alterations (Castoriadis 1997: 379-380).

Now, it has to be rem arked th a t it is by no m eans evidem how clear-cut the distinction between a cosmological and a subjective theorization of tim e is in Aristotle’s thought. Suffice it to say for the time being that Aristotle w ishes to address (Physics 223a20 ff) the aporta concerning the possibility of the existence of time in the absence of the psyche. This aporta is of course pertinent to Aristotle’s definition of tim e as num ber, since it is absurd to think of a m easurem ent in the absence of anyone endowed with th e ability to perform the actual act of m easuring, or for whom m easuring h as a m eaning. Castoriadis treats this aporetic state only cursorily, and in conclusion he form ulates Aristotle’s position in the following m anner: ” (a) the soul itself can produce a natural su bstratu m through its own m ovem ent...and (b) the actualisation of tim e as m easure of the m ovem ent entails the activity of the soul" (Castoriadis. 1997: 384).

In a sim ilar vein, the attem pt is m ade by the philosopher to show the inevitable em ergence of an objective, o r cosmological dim ension in A ugustine's account of time. The central aporia in A ugustine’s thought is traced in the fact that A ugustine has to postulate again a m easurem ent of tim e by its duration, because of a "stretching of th e m ind” [Distentía Animt).

This m easurem ent has two presuppositions, equally significant for Castoriadis' critical position. First, the postulation of tim e as a "created entity, and second the ad hoc conception of the equivalent of the a priori capacity common to all subjects to experience time in the same order as given in the schem a of expectation, attention, and memory (Castoriadis. 1997: 380-32).

The treatm ent of Augustine is revealing with regard to Castoriadis' intentions: It can be clearly seen th a t the real targets of his criticism s are not the thinkers of antiquity. A ugustine provides Castoriadis with an excuse to attack Kant. Husserl and Heidegger, not only -and certain’’, not primarily- on their ideas on time, b ut on the entirety of their philosophical projects* 7«. Similarly, Aristotle's allegedly “cosmological account" serves as a vehicle for Castoriadis' criticism s against m odem m athem atical physics: hence his

aptOptu, Kivi|atv 8c nXcitn x'ai eXXazu) xp6va> aptOpbq dpu t(<; o xpdvoq” ( ApioTotiA.r|^, 1997:168-170). 7* II might even be possible to argue that Castoriadis does not criticise philosophers primarily on the grounds of their being unsuccessful regarding their conceptual labour, but on the grounds of their severing their ties with the body politic and of consequently assuming a role similar to that of the prophet. It should not be incidental that the major criticism raised against Plato by the thinker is that he allegedly wanted to be “above the city" and thereby “betrayed the spirit of his master" more than any other of Socrates’ disciples. Indeed, this criticism informs Castoriadis' ambivalent position towards Plato (Castoriadis. 1991: 5-7). On the one hand the great ancient philosopher is either ridiculed or accused -in what I personally find the least conceptually valid, aesthetically refined and historically informed of Castoriadis' points - as the conscious forger of the Athenian history, the disgraced enemy of Democracy and the lirst inventor of Stalinist methods in history (Ibid: 8), while on the other hand asserting that Plato has to bt regarded as being indeed the greatest philosopher of all times. More importantly though, Castoriadis considers Plato to be the inaugurator of the philosophical school, an innovation allegedly alien to the etfxis of the Greek world as exemplified by the concomitant emergence of democracy and philosophy within ihe polis through the free and public interaction of independent/individual philosophers. Castoriadis is to my knowledge one of the few contemporary thinkers having some insight regarding the importance of the schools, although he mainly draws negative conclusions from this. To my knowledge, Kant (1787/1929: 32) -who speaks with sheer contempt and caution for “the ridiculous despotism of the Schools” meaning both ancient and contemporary ones- is perhaps the modern philosopher who stands closer to Castoriadis with regard to this issue, although with both thinkers one gets the idea that they focus primalily on one aspect of the consequences of the existence of schools, viz. the aspect concerning the lack of criticism in the

development o f their arguments, or what amounts to the same thing their introvert, anti-public character.

It seems to me though that they do not fully explore the consequences logically following their common premise, namely that because of the prominence of the philosophical schools in antiquity, it is possible that we lack the means to adequately interpret the writings of ancient philosophers, not only due to the historical distance that separates us from them, or due to an ambivalence inherent in language, but also because -as products of the thought of schools- those writings might have been intended as r i lies for the non-initiated.

contention that tim e conceived as a “fourth dim ension” indicates nothing more than a spatialization of tim e, an “empty" abstraction which . ould be performed for an infinite num ber (n) of dim ensions w ithout altering anything in our conception of the three-dim ensional space, that being w ithout disrupting the identitary conception of tim e (Castoriadis. 1997: 390-91). Furtherm ore, this critique, in order to be meaningfully carried out has to be socially-historically significant in two interrelated senses. In other words, it has to argue for the possibility of a different conception of tim e and history, while grounding this possibility on the social-historical as such, so as to accoui for the necessary and consequently bounding character of such an innovative conception. It is only in this m anner that C astoriadis’ persistent rem arks concerning the grave im plications following the covering up of the social-historical m ake any sense. In the place of the commonly perceived polarity between an objective time attributed to n ature and its subjective counterpart, C astoriadis w ishes to introduce a third and allegedly overlooked elem ent, thai being the social- historical. From the outset of this introduction Castoriadis em phasizes the need to avoid collapsing the different categories of time, in insisting th at “time is irreducible to society” (385).

The picture becomes more complicated with the introduction of another crucial elem ent, th at of the psyche. We are told that the “true polarity" is not that between society and individual- we m ight also add nol even th at between the philosophical "object" and “subject”- b u t between society and psyche. This displacem ent enables C astoriadis to introduce further distinctions and to To my knowledge, no m.ijor contemporary philosopher has taken such an implication seriously, Castoriadis not being an exception in this respect.

postulate a difference between conscious and unconsciou- psychical tim es79, the plural in this context being crucial for the adm ission of ¡he impossibility to postulate a single time pertaining to every singular hum an p yche.

Additionally, “public tim e” is accounted for in two overlapping ways: First, every social-historical form ation is theorized as a “subject" in its own right, as “a-being-for-itself’ (386), w hich is understood as a precondition for its existence and -possibly- for its subsequent development. In 'h is context, public time is primarily the product of th e social-historical instituting, and this accounts for the internal differentiation between an enseidi • and an imaginary dim ension that public time undergoes, in conformity v/ith the respective “moments" of the institution (387). Secondly, public tim e is m ade possible, in the sense of being both acceptable an d perceptible by the psyche through the process of socialisation, the "product” of which is the "social individual”.

This schem a actually presents u s with a riddle, for the enseidic/identitary dim ension of socio-historical institutions by and large, and hence the identitary m om ent of the instituted public time, is said to have “a m ysterious equivalent” in the world itself (389). In other words, we are here, as in many other instances in the w ork of Castoriadis, introduced to the conception of an enigm atic “leaning on the first natural substratum ” as the necessary, although not also sufficient, precondition for the existence of every social-historical formation. The enigm a does not consist of course in the adm ission that there m ust be som ething in the universe “allowing” hum an life to evolve, but in Castoriadis’ attem pt to exem pt the core im aginary dim ensions 79 It is only regrettable that Castoriadis did not pursue any further his thoughts on unconscious psychical times. As it is, we can only agree with him regarding the importance of further illumination of the issue and the difficulties involved in this effort.

of both the collective and the psychical from this "nature.I determ ination80”. With this exem ption. C astoriadis w ishes to introduce the concept of time as the "emergence of otherness” or of tim e as creation, while securing m eaning as an exclusively hum an attribute81.

If in physics the conception of tim e as the “fourth dim ension" aim ed at a revolutionary conception of the universe th a t would inform a break with the confines of Euclidean geometry, then it could be said of C astoriadis that his conception of time as a sim ultaneous creation and destruction of forms aim s to be a "fourth dim ension” proper with regard to the conceptualisation of history. In a quite illum inating passage Castoriadis em phasises th at ' he fact of creation has nothing to do with the quarrel about determ inism " and that it only defies the "absurd idea of a hom ogeneous universal determ inism that could reduce

811 Castoriadis is thus adamant that “ as for all nuclear social imaginary significations...[the content of imaginary time| is essentially independent of any substantive leaning on the first natural substratum: it is a pure creation of the society considered” (Castoriadis, 1997: 388). Leledakis (199°: 97) rightly underscores another aspect of the aforementioned problem, namely that Castoriadis' emphasi.. on signification “both on the level of the social and on that of the individual unconscious”, the postulation in other words of “ a

determinant - but in itself indeterminate- level of social imaginary significations nehind and beyond social

practice...seems to introduce a kind of underlying essence beyond the realm of social phenomena, while it denies any specificity to the level of social practice, except to the extent that it is reducible to significations”.

81 Having established the multiplicity of social creations as a “fact” Castoriadis asserts that this indicates a