Days, months, and ordinal numbers

“[Civil society] is becoming more and more involved … [but] its impact is not great.

The arm is no match for the thigh [gebo ningbuguo datui]” (HL1P1).

Not only does decentralization increase the involvement of different levels of government, but it can also create space for civil society in the delivery of services like education (see Chapter 2).¹ In China, civil society has become increasingly involved in welfare service provision for marginalized groups including laborers and children since the early 1990s (Howell 2007, 18-20). The case of migrant children’s education in Beijing is, at first glance, no exception. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a local researcher was the first to “discover” the existence of migrant schools in Beijing in 1996, and the local media subsequently played a key role in bringing migrant children’s education to the attention of the government and society. Since then, an increasing number of civil

1 According to Malena and Heinrich (2007, 338): “Despite its varied interpretations, civil society can be broadly understood as the space in society where collective citizen action takes place. This notion, however, of a societal space animated by a complex set of actors, activities, interests, and values has in fact proved extremely difficult to operationalise.” According to Kaldor (2003, 11-20), there are four major categories of civil society actors: 1) social movements, “organizations, groups of people, and individuals, who act together to bring about transformation in society”; 2) non-governmental organizations, which are “voluntary, in contrast to compulsory organizations like the state or some traditional, religious organizations, and they do not make profits, like corporations”; 3) social organizations, “organizations representing particular sectors of society defined in social terms” that include “professional organizations (societies of lawyers, doctors, employers, trades unions or farmers) [and] community groups of women or youth”; and 4) national or religious movements, “organizations based on particular sections of society, defined in terms of culture, kin or religion.”

society actors have become active in mobilizing on behalf of migrant children and their education in the capital city.

In light of the overall lack of support for migrant schools from the Beijing municipal government and the emergence of different district-level policy approaches, important questions arise concerning civil society involvement in this policy area. What role do civil society actors play, and are they able to influence the situations of migrant schools and their students? If so, what are the main channels through which they are able to have an impact, or, if not, what factors are inhibiting them? What are the implications for the understanding of migrant children’s education in Beijing?

Examining these questions will shed further light on the dynamics shaping the situations of migrant schools and their students at the municipal and district levels.

This chapter focuses on the main sets of actors outside the government that have become involved in migrant children’s education in Beijing and operate with the goal of improving the educational situations of migrant children in some way: academics and researchers, the media, university student organizations, NGOs, migrant school principals’ and teachers’ associations, and migrant parent activists. It explores the involvement of these actors, including their interaction with both the government and migrant schools (see Figure 7.1). Evidence shows that their overall capacity to impact migrant children’s education in Beijing has been limited, mainly in terms of their

influence on government and policy, the situations of migrant schools and their students, and the sharing of knowledge and information. Their limited impact has been shaped by a general lack of support for civil society from the municipal government in an area that is, in its view, closely linked to population growth and social instability, as well as low levels of collaboration between key actors involved. Analysis also shows that district-level situations and policy approaches have had an additional impact on where

in the city these actors tend to work, with consequences for the amount of external attention and support migrant schools in different districts receive.

Figure 7.1 General Areas of Interaction between Government, Civil Society, and Migrant Schools in Beijing

Source: Author’s fieldwork (2009-2010).

Civil Society and Social Welfare Provision in China

Since the 1980s, decentralization has created room for civil society involvement in the delivery of services in China (Davis 1989; Teets 2008, 7-8). As Howell (2007, 17-18) describes:

The introduction of economic reforms in China has brought about fundamental changes in the structure of society, including the pluralization and diversification of social interests,

Central

increased social differentiation and stratification, the breakdown of rigid rural-urban barriers and new forms of associational life. Aware of the need for new institutional mechanisms to

“bridge” the Party/state and society, the Chinese Communist Party from the1980s onwards encouraged the development of new forms of association such as professional associations, trades associations, learned societies, cultural and sports clubs. Furthermore, in the context of a more general re-organization and streamlining of the state in the direction of “small government, large society” (xiao zhengfu, da shehui), the Party/state urged these new intermediary bodies to take on former state functions, such as the daily regulation of specific trades and the provision of social welfare.

In particular, the 1990s saw a rise in the number of civil society associations focused on the provision of services for marginalized groups including workers, women, children, the poor, and people with disabilities (Howell 2007, 19). The increase in the number of such organizations was rooted in political and economic developments²:

The deepening of state enterprise reform could not be achieved unless alternative systems of social protection were set in place. The development of a services sector would also provide an additional source of employment, which could absorb the laid-off and unemployed. Furthermore, as market reforms deepened in the 1990s, the negative

dimensions of economic restructuring intensified, reflected in new forms of urban poverty, unemployment and increased income disparities. For the political elite, maintaining social stability in a context of minimal political reform was paramount. Hence, the creation of a new architecture of intermediary organizations to deal with welfare issues was one way of alleviating poverty and reducing discontent. (Howell 2007, 20)

The nature of the relationship between government and civil society in social welfare provision in China varies. In some areas, government control over these actors has loosened. Shang (2002, 204), for instance, points to a shift from “welfare statism”

to “welfare pluralism” in the case of care for orphaned or abandoned children,

indicating that civil society has become more influential in the policy process. In most cases, however, the relationship is complex, and government actors adopt differing

2 According to Shang (2002, 206), the increase in the number of such actors was due in large part to the government’s limited capacity to provide social welfare: “During economic reform, the Chinese economy developed at high speed. However, because conventional welfare beneficiaries lack political voice and there are few independent forces in Chinese society to form a voice for them (Shang 1998), the [Ministry of Civil Affairs] found that it was at a great disadvantage in attracting more state appropriation.

The urban social welfare and social relief systems faced policy neglect (Wong 1998; Shang 2001). The government’s budget for social welfare (services) and social relief was reduced from 0.58 percent of gross domestic product in 1979 to 0.19 in 1997 (State Statistical Bureau 1998, pp. 20, 280). State investment fell behind what is needed to maintain welfare provision at existing levels today, and civil affairs departments are unable to meet the demand.”

strategies towards civil society depending on the context. As Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang (2010, 1104) contend:

[M]any uncertainties exist in the informal politics between the Chinese authorities and civic groups. Official agencies have strong interest orientations of their own, and it is difficult for them to have a consensus on the issue of civic groups. The respective positions of various levels of government are not only unclear, but also shifting. In general, they have to respond to increasing demand for various types of social services. But their considerations of social stability and definitions of their respective baselines are complicated and may even be contradictory, with mixed elements coexisting: detachment, neglect, tolerance, support, and sanction.

Indeed, a range of government approaches have emerged. Officials may tolerate those actors that restrict their size and act in line with policy goals. In other cases, they may adopt strategies to retain control, either formally (e.g., by increasing management through policy) or informally (e.g., by trying to limit the development of such actors).

They may also adopt a strategy of “absorption” as a regulatory mechanism, which could involve presenting awards or titles of a political nature, building relationships between the actors and local government departments, and appointing actors to political positions (cited by Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 2010, pp. 1095-1096, 1098-1102).

Ultimately, the role of civil society in welfare provision in China is complicated and varies across both contexts and policy areas (Chamberlain 1993, 212; Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 2010, 1104). Issues involving gender, for example, are generally

considered to be less sensitive than those involving labor; as a result, “just as attempts to organize around labour point to the boundaries of Party-state tolerance for civil society, organizing around gender can indicate how wide the space for organizing can be pushed” (Howell 2003, 207). Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang (2010, 1089-1090) argue the following for the case of many labor NGOs in China:

In the eyes of local governments, it appears rational and advantageous to provide these labor NGOs with a certain degree of political support to promote social harmony and justice; ….

However, these labor NGOs do not have legal status and supporting them openly carries political risk. This is why local governments tend to ignore them and maintain a wait-and-see attitude. In other words, local governments avoid political risk, adopting a neutral and defensible position while trying to take advantage of the NGOs’ help.

The extent to which civil society actors are able to build relationships with government actors has become a major factor shaping their role in social welfare provision. Those actors that do not interact with the government may struggle to survive or flourish, while those that have closer relationships with government actors may be less likely to face such difficulties, though they may eventually be absorbed into the government’s sphere of control (Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 2010, 1095). All of this has consequences for the services and amount of support available to the groups these actors serve, making closer examinations of their involvement in different policy areas crucial.

Despite growing interest in the role of civil society in areas like gender and labor, few studies have explored such dynamics for migrant children’s education. Perhaps the only exception is Kwong (2004), which focuses on state-civil society relations in migrant children’s education; it, however, does not analyze district-level variations in detail and was also written prior to the emergence of actors including many of the NGOs now involved. Important questions then arise concerning the impact of civil society in this policy area. As Howell (2007, 21) puts it: “Have societal actors begun to carve out a public sphere that allows critical debate around issues that were otherwise regarded as only a matter for the Party/state? Is governance becoming more plural, more democratic, more negotiated than before?”

The rest of this chapter examines the civil society actors involved in migrant children’s education in Beijing, including their structure (who the key actors are and what activities they are engaged in), their motives for being involved and their

relationship to the policy environment in which they operate (the extent to which they are able to interact with and attain recognition and support from the government), and

their capacity to impact the situations of migrant schools and their students.³ Evidence shows that, due largely to the perception of migrant children’s education as a policy area with potential implications for social instability, government actors in Beijing have, for the most part, chosen to either ignore or tolerate the civil society actors involved.

The result has been a low level of state-civil society interaction in the policy area, and the role of these actors has been heavily defined by the views and concerns of the municipal and district governments, ultimately limiting their capacity to have a large-scale impact on migrant children’s education in the city.

The Role of Civil Society in Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing Not only is there a continued demand for migrant schools in Beijing (as established in Chapter 6), but the visibility of these schools has also increased, due in large part to the work of civil society. As previously discussed, during the mid- to late 1990s, the Chinese government saw migrant schools as illegal entities and had little knowledge about them. Though still vulnerable to being shut down, most migrant schools in Beijing no longer operate as “underground” schools. This section illustrates that migrant children’s education – and migrant schools in particular – has attracted attention from an increasing number of civil society actors in Beijing since the mid-1990s. They include academics and researchers, the media, university student organizations, and NGOs, as well as actors within the migrant community that often lack government recognition (including migrant school principals’ and teachers’

associations and parent activists).⁴ Evidence shows that the involvement of these

3 These characteristics are primarily adapted from a framework discussed by Malena and Heinrich (2007, 341).

4 While the principals’ and teachers’ associations might be considered as being a part of migrant schools, they have become largely independent actors in their own right. They can be seen as what Kaldor (2003) refers to as “social organizations” and are therefore included in this discussion.

various actors is driven by a combination of three key motives: to provide support directly to migrant schools and their students and teachers, to raise awareness about the problems of migrant schools and their students, and to influence government and policy (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 The Primary Motives among Civil Society Actors Involved in Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing

In light of the differing district-level policy approaches and the general lack of support for migrant schools from the municipal government, evidence is used to evaluate the extent to which these actors have been able to – through their work and relationships – achieve these objectives and ultimately improve the situations of migrant schools and their students and why. In conducting this evaluation, emphasis is placed on the fact that civil society actors typically seek out the migrant communities and schools they work with (rather than the other way around). As one principal explained, each migrant school’s relationships “have a lot to do with the reputations of the school and the principal” (SU1P1), and actors like researchers and NGOs often recommend schools to others based on these reputations. These actors can therefore significantly

affect the amount of external attention and support migrant schools in different districts receive, making a closer examination of their role critical.

The Key Actors Involved

Academics and researchers. Although government and society were first made aware of migrant schools in Beijing through the efforts of a local researcher in 1996, few studies were conducted on the subject in Beijing during the late 1990s, key exceptions being Lu (2007) and Han (2001). Very few have researched the subject continuously since the 1990s; based on fieldwork, many study the topic for a short period of time before moving on to other subjects, while others have only recently begun to study it. This overall lack of sustained interest – due in part to the basic difficulties of conducting research on the subject and the resulting perception that there is little room for ongoing exploration – has contributed to a lack of extensive research on migrant children’s education.

The role of academics and researchers in the area revolves primarily around research, usually with the goal of raising awareness about the problems of migrant schools and their students. Some local researchers collaborate with researchers from outside of China, helping to increase awareness about the subject abroad. Their work can also include organizing discussion forums with other scholars, government-based researchers, migrant school principals, and NGOs, as well as creating programs or organizations to support migrant schools and their students (e.g., by teaching migrant children about self-esteem or, in one case, subsidizing teachers’ salaries). In addition, research may serve as a channel through which to influence policy. Not only do many of the academics and researchers involved exchange information and ideas with

government-based researchers at the central and municipal levels, but some also submit their research findings to the government. The latter, however, depends on the nature of

the relationship between their institutions and the various government departments.

Within the sample, for instance, only one institute submitted policy briefs based on their research to the central government several times a year. According to an established researcher in the field, the government consulted academics and researchers more frequently in the early to mid-2000s, given its lack of knowledge about the subject at the time, but the level of interaction has somewhat declined, and their impact in the policy area is unclear.

Moreover, there was a tendency among academics and researchers in the sample to focus their research on schools in districts like Chaoyang and Haidian (both of which have high concentrations of academic and research institutes), and to a lesser extent Shijingshan, Changping, and Daxing. The focus on schools in less controversial districts has contributed to a general trend among many of them to disregard or

downplay the importance of district-level variations in the policy area. This has greatly shaped the existing body of research, as studies on the subject often provide evidence based on particular schools in these districts, rather than comparing district-level situations (e.g., Kwong 2004; Goodburn 2009).

Migrant schools in different districts therefore receive differing amounts of attention and support from academics and researchers. For example, four of the six schools visited in Haidian had regular contact with academics and researchers,

compared to three of the seven schools visited in Shijingshan. All four schools visited in Fengtai, however, had little to no previous contact with academics and researchers; at one of the district’s unlicensed schools, the principal noted that I was the first to visit the school since its creation in 2005 (FU1P1). Interestingly, one of the existing contact lists of migrant schools in the city, compiled by a team of researchers, did not include any of the licensed or unlicensed schools in Fengtai that were visited during fieldwork

or mentioned by the officials and principals interviewed, further evidence that the district’s schools are isolated from the academic sphere. The result has been a general lack of knowledge about Fengtai’s situation. One prominent researcher, for instance, was unaware that the district had licensed three migrant schools.⁵ All of this is especially significant in light of their potential capacity to influence policy through research.

The media. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the media played a key role in bringing migrant children’s education to the attention of the government and society in the mid-1990s. Based on fieldwork, the earliest newspapers to report on the obstacles faced by migrant children in attaining education included Zhongguo jiaoyubao (China Education Daily), under the Ministry of Education; Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), under the Propaganda Department of the CPC; and Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily), under

The media. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the media played a key role in bringing migrant children’s education to the attention of the government and society in the mid-1990s. Based on fieldwork, the earliest newspapers to report on the obstacles faced by migrant children in attaining education included Zhongguo jiaoyubao (China Education Daily), under the Ministry of Education; Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), under the Propaganda Department of the CPC; and Nongmin ribao (Peasants’ Daily), under