Some scholars argue that social capital relates to long-enduring CPR management (for example, Agrawal 2002; Ahn and Ostrom 2001; Ostrom 1994). Others have attempted to analyse the functions o f social capital in CPR management (for example, Grafton 2005;
Plummer and FitzGibbon 2006; Rudd 2000). However, there have been only a few studies on the CPR-social capital relationship that have considered bonding and bridging social capital. In particular, empirical studies in this topic are rare. This section will provide a review of existing major CPR research in order to understand how it has used the idea of social capital.
Many academic CPR studies have focused on the investigation of conditions under which CPR institutions are viable. In his comprehensive studies, Arun Agrawal (2001; 2002) compiled a list of conditions for sustainable CPR management (Table 2.4), based on the work of Robert Wade (1988), Elinor Ostrom (1990) and Jean-Marie Baland and Jean- Philippe Platteau (1996). Agrawal chose these three studies because they have made significant academic contributions to CPR theory development based on empirical investigation of specific cases. He categorised critical conditions for sustainability of the commons into the following four groups (2002: 54-5):
(1) physical attributes o f the resource, such as size, boundaries and mobility; (2) characteristics o f the appropriator group, such as size, past experience and
heterogeneity;
(3) institutional arrangements, such as resource use rules and decision-making systems; and
(4) external environment, such as market influence and assistance from government agencies.
Table 2.4 Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons (1) Resource system characteristics
1. Small size (RW )
2. Well-defined boundaries (RW, EO) 3. Low levels o f m obility
4. Possibilities o f storage o f benefits from the resource 5. Predictability
(2) Group characteristics 1. Small size (RW, B&P)
2. Clearly defined boundaries (RW, EO) 3. Shared norms (B&P)
4. Past successful experiences - social capital (RW, B&P)
5. Appropriate leadership - young, familiar with changing external environments, connected to local traditional elite (B&P)
6. Interdependence among group members (RW, B&P)
7. Heterogeneity o f endowments, homogeneity o f identities and interests (B&P) 8. Low levels o f poverty
Combination of (1) and (2) Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics
1. Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (RW, B&P) 2. High levels o f dependence by group members on resource system (RW)
3. Fairness in allocation o f benefits from common resources (B&P) 4. Low levels o f user demand
(3) Institutional arrangements
1. Rules are simple and easy to understand (B&P)
2. Locally devised access and management rules (RW, EO, B&P) 3. Ease in enforcement o f rules (RW, EO, B&P)
4. Graduated sanctions (RW, EO)
5. A vailability o f low-cost adjudication (EO)
6. Accountability o f monitors and other official to users (EO, B&P)
Combination of (1) and (3) Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements 1. Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration o f resources (RW, EO)
(4) External environment 2. Technology:
i. Low-cost exclusion technology (RW)
ii. Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the commons 3. Low levels o f articulation with external markets
4. Graduated change in articulation with external markets 5. State:
i. Central government should not undermine local authority (RW, EO) ii. Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P)
iii. Appropriate levels o f external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities (B&P) iv. Nested levels o f appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance (EO)___________________ Adapted from A graw al (2002: 62-3)
RW, W ade (1990); EO, Ostrom (1996); B&P, Baland and Platteau (1996).
While the list o f these variables does not provide a blueprint to be imposed on resource management regimes, it can provide a framework to understand the factors that enhance or
reduce the capabilities o f individuals collaborating in group management so as to organise long-enduring institutions. As Ostrom states, listing CPR conditions is important because:
‘...they can affect incentives in such a way that appropriators will be willing to commit themselves to conform to operational rules devised in such systems, to monitor each other’s conformance, and to replicate the CPR institutions across generational boundaries’ (1990: 91).
As Table 2.4 shows, the list of CPR conditions suggests social capital as one of the variables that affects sustainability o f CPRs. However, in this list, social capital seems to suggest a narrow meaning. Following Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996), Agrawal (2002: 54) uses the term ‘social capital’ to refer only to ‘a community’s past successful experiences in collective action.’ He does not discuss social capital regarding its definition or function. As explained above, in accordance with other major social capital studies, social capital in this study is defined as a set of values such as the norms of reciprocity and social relations, embedded in the social structure o f society that enables people to act collectively and achieve desired goals. Although past experience of successful collective action can be part o f the common knowledge that encourages people to take further collective action, shared norms are also relevant to social capital or considered an even more important form of social capital. In short, Agrawal’s definition of social capital does not include the key feature o f shared norms that is so important in collective action due to their function in reducing the cost of monitoring and sanctions (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1998a; Ostrom 2000).
Other research has attempted to analyse how social capital works to solve collective action problems and how it relates to CPR management. Using the concept of bargaining found in game theory, Ostrom (1994) theoretically explores social capital. She finds that
appropriators engage in collective action by investing their time, effort and resources to build physical capital such as an irrigation system. The social capital she is concerned with only refers to institutions as rules of resource use. Although she notes the presence o f other forms of social capital, such as networks, norms and social beliefs, social capital in that study seems to be quite unusually defined. We have discussed this point whether social capital should include ‘institution’ or not in section 2.3.2 o f this chapter. In fact, in her later work with Ahn (2001) she identifies trustworthiness, networks and institutions as three basic forms of social capital. What is more, she states that ‘whether or not to include institutions as a form of social capital is a matter under debate (Ostrom 1994).’ While it is necessary to point out that her definition of the term ‘social capital’ is not comprehensive, Ostrom (1994) theoretically demonstrates how trust among the appropriators, the core idea of social capital, can be developed both among homogenous and heterogeneous appropriators in their process of rule making. Since locally crafted institutions that make collective action possible are one of the keys in long-term CPR management (Agrawal 2001; Agrawal 2002; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988), Ostrom’s work (1994) is important in understanding the mechanisms of local rule-making. She emphasises the importance o f common understandings among the appropriators regarding rules in resource use and lists seven assumptions that they need to share.
Ostrom’s theory (1998a) of behavioural rational choice is based on the idea that trust, reputation and norms of reciprocity interact with each other and thus can lead to higher levels of cooperation and outcomes that are ‘better than rational.’ According to her, although individuals are boundedly rational, meaning that they are not given complete information regarding all potential actions and strategies available to them, they can use
experience they have learnt from their interactions with others and also learn to adopt and use norms and rules as they communicate with others. Although Ostrom (1998a) did not explicitly use the term ‘ social capital,’ her experimental method is useful because it helps explain the role o f trust in leading to greater cooperation necessary for resolving social dilemmas. Although the generalisability to the real world o f any controlled experimental study must be treated with caution, she does demonstrate the basis o f how social capital can function in creating new structural arrangements that may be used to solve CPR problems. The study theoretically supports the significance o f social capital in empirical CPR settings.
Rudd (2000: 132) used a social capital framework ‘ to develop theories o f the effects o f institutional structure on sustainability and to articulate the links between social interaction, collective action and social vision.’ He sees social capital as ‘ an input factor in the production o f environmental quality’ because it facilitates norms o f reciprocity, trust and those which matter to produce and maintain public goods, such as natural resources (Rudd 2000). In order to connect structural variables in the creation o f social capital (for example, group size, sim ilarity o f interests, and info availability) with collective action, he combines a framework for conceptualising social capital based on social indicators proposed by C ollier (1998) with a theory o f rational choice behaviour developed by Ostrom (1998a). However, while he demonstrated the u tility o f a social capital theory, his framework still lacks strong evidence and, therefore, needs to be em pirically tested.