The time of the data collection for this study coincided with the partial and fragile ceasefire that went into effect on 27 February 2016 (Reuters, April 22, 2016). Despite breaches of the truce from the early hours, the ceasefire reduced the level of violence in the studied areas and helped getting urgently needed humanitarian aid to hard-to-reach areas (Al-Jazeera, February 28, 2016; int. 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12). The truce covered all areas in Syria that are not under control of ‘terrorist’ groups. Mainly Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra45 are excluded from the truce
and civilians living under their control continue to suffer from aerial bombardments. However, in areas covered by the truce, it had a relative impact. Respondents stated that children play in the streets, people are going out, there is a feeling of relief and relaxation, and people try to return to a 'normal' life. This is like a breath of fresh air for many in the midst of protracted violence. In some areas, people take again to the streets and organize new protests to revive the revolution. However, the ceasefire was never stable and changes from day to day. It was from the beginning a false ceasefire, because it excluded two important players: Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra. But, against the odds, the ceasefire was perceived as a positive impact on the people’s
lives.
When asked about the monitoring of the ceasefire, some respondents said that armed groups are responsible, others mentioned the media, journalists, civil society and the
45 Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as the Al-Qaeda of the Levant, changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham on 28
international community to be responsible for monitoring. All of these actors are involved in documenting breaches, however, it is not clear to whom they are supposed to report.
Another big problem is that even though the UN is present in Syria, UN agencies are often far away from the affected regions and frontlines. The weakness in reporting and monitoring the ceasefire and the breaches can be explained by a general perception of or lack of political will to find a political solution in Syria. Even if reports of breaches reach the UN, international media and the international community little has come to action.
For some Syrians, local ceasefires could be part of a solution for Syria. There have been many examples of locally negotiated ceasefires between various armed groups. However, more critical voices fear that ceasefires, particularly if government forces are part of it, intend to empty the areas in order to impose demographic changes (Al-Monitor, January 13, 2016; Middle East Eye, December 31, 2015; int. 20). Displacement and mass migration as a method of warfare has been studied by Kelly Greenhill (2010) in her book Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Greenhill shows how states used the tool
of migration, often successfully, to change the political game or impose their interests.
In Syria, the government is accused of using displacement as a tool in order to change the realities on the ground by negotiating ceasefires, evacuate civilians and offer armed groups safe passage to leave the area. Many civilians, however, decide to stay in besieged areas, exactly out of fear that they might never be able to return if they would leave.
3.4.2 Gender
Even though it is out of scope of this thesis to analyze in detail the role of gender in conflict transformation and civilian protection, gender needs to be taken into consideration as argued in sub-section 1.4.4. Conflict needs to be seen through a gender lens because of the
enormous significance gender plays in conflicts46. Moreover, the previous section showed the exceptionalism of women’s groups in conflict transformation and protection, and raises the question of what role of gender in conflict transformation and protection. Hence, this sub- section highlights some concerns related to gender, protection and conflict transformation.
A) Different Roles in Protection?
Even though the question was asked if there was a difference in the roles of men and women in protection, most respondents stressed the different role for women, as if the role of men corresponded to the norm. This highlights a deeply held belief within society as to the normalcy of gender roles and beliefs. More than 60% of respondents said that there are different roles and only 30% said that women and men have the same role in protection.
Respondents who supported the view that men and women had the same role, either stressed that women can do everything men can do (rescue work, going to the frontlines, physically hard work), or that there is a need to include more women in the work that men do, particularly in health care and first aid.
The respondents who affirm that there is a difference in the role of women and men tend towards two understandings of this difference: on the one hand, respondents attribute to men and women different gender roles in protection which attach to women a role in education, and child rearing, and to men physical protection and livelihood. On the other hand, respondents acknowledge a de facto difference, but support a change and to give women a more diverse role in protection, particularly in health care.
B) Gendered Conflict Transformation?
Figure 18 and 23 above (see sub-section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4) demonstrate a certain of exceptionalism within the listed women’s groups. Women seem to have an exceptional impact
46 For details see: Cilja Harders (2011) Gender Relations, Violence and Conflict Transformation; Joshua S
Goldstein (2001) War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, Cambridge University Press.
in the areas of conflict transformation and protection. Nonetheless their participation in civil society still remains weak and their voices only rarely attract media attention.
The two other segments of civil society with significant impacts on protection and conflict transformation are both dominated by men: religious leaders and community leaders. Whereas other CSOs are increasingly encouraging female participation, women’s groups address more diverse types of violence and engage manifold with conflicts.
One possible explanation why women address more types of violence can be found in the argument made by Cilja Harders, in her article on gender relations, violence and conflict transformation (Harders, 2011). Harders argues that violence should be seen as a continuum and affects individuals, particularly women, on the household level, community level, national and international level (Harders, 2011: 147). Hence, this manifold exposure and experience of violence may lead women to be more aware of the different manifestations of violence. Syrian women activists also express their motivation of joining or founding women’s groups due to personal experiences (Ghazzawi, Mohammad and Ramadan, 2015: 5). These findings are in line with the findings of this research. As an example representing many experiences, the report of a nursing trainer illustrates very well how experiences of violence may encourage individuals to act: when asked about the motivations to participate in a nursing course in rural Idlib, many female participants recounted their personal experience of air strikes and how they were unable to help their family members and as a result many of them died (int. 5). However, apart from the direct military violence, women often face restrictions and discrimination by extremists and the patriarchal structures. This might lead to the awareness of women about the diverse manifestations of violence and the need to address them.
In order to find answers to the question why women are more active on all four levels of conflict transformation, the study conducted by Ghazzawi, Mohammad and Ramadan may give some ideas for possible answers (2015). However, further research needs to be done in order to understand the impact and potential of women’s participation in conflict
transformation. In the study, the authors found some interesting points to explain the exceptionalism of women’s groups in conflict transformation in Idlib.
Firstly, women seem more aware of the inefficiency of violence. Violence only created an endless cycle of violence is a common perception among women activists according to the study (Ghazzawi, Mohammad and Ramadan, 2015: 14). This can be partly explained by the fact that women are less involved in violent struggles and armed groups. It is possible that women find it easier to view violence from the outside because they are not primarily recruited and indoctrinated by the dominant system of conflict resolution. Hence, it might be easier for women to admit that the violent path of the uprising has failed. However, more research needs to be done to reach conclusions.
Secondly, women often include cultural aspects in their peacebuilding activities (Ghazzawi, Mohammad and Ramadan, 2015: 14) and therefore address often neglected cultural patterns perpetuating violence. Moreover, many women invoked the rise in ethnic tensions for their activism. Hence, they engaged in peacebuilding because of a general solidarity and feeling of responsibility towards others and future generations (Ibid.: 14).
Thirdly, women’s groups link peacebuilding to the initial uprising in 2011. Thanks to this link, women’s concerns do not remain simple ‘women’s issues’ but are taken more seriously (Sharoni, 2012: 114). Women’s groups also include economic empowerment of women as an essential element to bring about change (Ghazzawi, Mohammad and Ramadan, 2015: 15). However, the achieved empowerment during armed conflict might be lost after the conflict. Often, there has been a ‘post-war regression’ of achieved economic and political empowerment (Harders, 2011: 149). And often, economic and political empowerment is not able to change family structures and family roles (Ibid.).
Conclusion
Chapter Three explored the main threats and conflicts faced by the civilian population in Idlib and how different actors on the ground engage with them. The data collected in this research shows that the underlying causes of the conflict received considerable attention and were stated as preconditions for peace. That supports in general the need for conflict transformation as opposed to conflict resolution. However, protection is more depending on the immediate situation and is perceived more narrowly during a very violent phase of the conflict. The main actors in protecting civilians are the people themselves, as well as civil society and local councils which play an important supporting role for civilians. Despite the high level of violence, conflicts are mostly approached in a nonviolent way through negotiation and mediation. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are well-respected and efficient. Nevertheless, these mechanisms inhibit weaknesses due to their short term approach and their failure of representing women and the youth. The chapter also elicits a certain exceptionalism of women’s groups in both addressing violence and conflicts in the communities. The next chapter applies the data presented in this chapter and draws final conclusions to answer the research question.
Chapter Four – No Peace without Protection? No Protection
without Peace?
Image: Graffiti at a damaged building in Binnish, Idlib countryside, saying ‘We’re steadfast’47. Source: Shahba
Press
Chapter Four discusses the key findings and relates them to the academic debates. The first part analyzes the protection efforts of CSOs regarding their potential to transform conflicts and proposes an analytical framework to link protection to conflict transformation. The second part tests the theories of nonviolence and nonviolent resistance in the case of Idlib and how civil society uses nonviolent tools to engage with non-state armed actors. The third part evaluates the impact the concept of imperfect peace can have in the context of armed conflict in Syria.