De la liquidación Artículo 99. Liquidación

In the final chapter of Inclusion and Democracy, Young analyzes three popular arguments, the positivist, nationalist (assimilationist and separationist), and associative, that have framed how nation- states have conceptualized their responsibility to justice as limited to its own citizenry. She criticizes

63 _{Associative democratic theorists such as Paul Hirst (1993) and Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers}

(1992) have sought to address the division between civil deliberation and the state through models of associative democracy. These theories attempt to integrate civil society with the state in a less contentious way. The problem, according to Young (2000a), is the potential imbalance that can occur in the process of balancing state authority with civic deliberation. In her analysis of leading theorists on associative democracy, Young argues that analyses tend to highlight the tension rather than resolve it. Inevitably, theorists succumb to the domination of one power over the other. Although the two spheres overlap each other in a complex society, their functions are separate and must remain distinct.

these three arguments for assuming a limited state-centered justice rather than arguing in favour of it. She contends, “Obligations of justice extend globally in today’s world” (2000a, 246). Natural

resources, land, and environmental protection are among the points of interdependence across borders and jurisdictions. Just as with the “relational autonomy” of self-determining citizens in a state, that supports the self-development of all, deliberative politics can extend to international and multi- jurisdictional relations. With respect to the latter relationship, “Many peoples [who] suffer at the hands of nation-building efforts to suppress or assimilate culturally distinct peoples ... claim a right of self-determination as a means to throw off the yoke of cultural imperialism and gain some control over resources as a base for the life and development of their people” (255). These aspirations for self-government within existing state jurisdictions, notably made by indigenous peoples across the world, provide a unique challenge to modern conceptions of state sovereignty. “Despite unjust conquest and continued oppression, however, few indigenous peoples seek to establish an independent, internationally recognized state with ultimate authority over matters within a

determinately bounded territory. For the most part indigenous peoples seek greater and more secure autonomy within the framework of a wider polity” (Young 2000a, 255–6).64 _{Young contends that one}

should understand these claims as non-domination rather than non-interference. On one hand, the distinct peoples have the right to self-determination through their own governance in which they can determine their own goals and ways of life. On the other hand, interdependence is an undeniable reality of the modern world and distinct political institutions must be accountable to each other. Just as regulations are required for the deliberative operation of civil society, regulations are also required to guide the procedures of deliberation among multiple jurisdictions and states. Just as in the case of civil society and the regulations of the political sphere, those involved in international or multi- jurisdictional relations must also be involved in the creation of those regulations. Young stipulates:

Understood as non-domination, self-determination must be detached from territory. Given that a plurality of peoples inhabits most territories, and given the hybridity of peoples and places that

characterizes many territories, institutions of governance ought not to be defined as exclusive control over territory and what takes place within it. On the contrary, jurisdictions can be spatially overlapping or shared, or even lack spatial reference entirely (2000a, 261).

64_{This statement holds true for Canada with the notable exception of indigenous philosopher Taiaiake}

Young correctly notes that sovereignty and self-government are not entirely necessary where rights of land use and access have been determined such as in Canada. Deliberative processes can be extended to global relationships both within and outside of a nation’s borders.

However, there are certain limitations with this theory of global relationships. The root of this problem is the difficulty “of trying to apply a principle of self-determination as non-domination in a world where state sovereignty remains and where its hegemonic interpretation remains non-

interference” (263). If nations move into the periphery in international relations, what will enforce the formal regulations instituted to promote self-development among a differentiated global community? Ideally, strong global institutions would be the proper adjudicator of human rights and self-

development, but when one understands self-determination as non-interference, the state has typically retained the dual role of self-interested party and decision maker. Young proposes international and overlapping regulatory bodies to determine the standards of engagement between citizens,

organizations and governments to deterritorialize “some aspects of sovereignty” and reposition them within the deliberative process (267).65

Democracy requires deliberation to be just. Justice requires that affected peoples possess the ability for both self-determination and self-development. The tension and separation of the self-determining peoples, on the one hand, and the regulatory institutions, on the other, are required so that a diverse society can be reasonably just (i.e., relational autonomy). Domestically, internationally, or within overlapping jurisdictions, democratic legitimacy rests in the deliberations of the plural publics only in that they may deliberate upon the regulations that guide those deliberations, and, in that an external mediator formally institutes those regulations. Domestically, the state carries out the role of mediation and leaves deliberation to civil society. In international or domestic nation-to-nation relationships, the mediator ought to be a third party to maintain separation between the periphery and the nucleus. In a world where most states understand sovereignty as non-interference, deliberative processes often fail at the regulatory level.

65 _{Young (2000a) proposes seven international regulatory bodies, but admits that her list is only a few}

examples of the potential mediators of international politics. Her seven regulatory bodies include “(1) peace and security, (2) environment, (3) trade and finance, (4) direct investment and capital

utilization, (5) communications and transportation, (6) human rights, including labour standards and welfare rights, [and] (7) citizenship and migration” (267).