By the start of 1857, the Crimean War in Europe leaves British army units in India at their lowest numbers ever. Most of the units are stationed in the Punjab, where the conquest of the Sikhs is in its final hours. In the 800 miles between Patna, west of Calcutta, and the Punjabi border, there are only five British Regiments. This lack of stabilizing forces in the area allows paranoia among the Sepoys to build, reaching a new high with rumors that the British are issuing new ammunition greased with pig or cow fat. There’s even a “prophecy” that British rule will collapse on the 100th anniversary of the British victory at Plassey (the battle that ended the Mughals once and for all).
The Sepoys’ discontent bubbles to the surface time and again, but the British ignore the problems as isolated incidents. First at Berhampur in February, then Barrackpore in March, then Lucknow and Barrackpore at the beginning of May, Sepoy regiments refuse to handle the new ammunition and are disbanded. Still the British do nothing. Finally, on May 10th at Meerut (north of Delhi), a major mutiny breaks out, more than British officers and loyal Sepoys can handle. The mutineers quickly gain control of the town and massacre the Europeans. The Meerut Sepoys, intent on restoring the Mughal Empire and thus Muslim primacy over their Hindu neighbors, march south to Delhi.
Delhi’s general population supports the revolt, instigating another massacre of Westerners. Fortunately, British officers manage to blow up the arsenal, denying their adversaries a huge supply cache. The mutineers proclaim the Mughal Empire’s restoration, bringing the aging emperor, Bahadur Shah II, out of retirement. News of the rebellion spreads quickly across northern India via telegraph and dispatch riders. In some cities, like Lucknow, Peshawar and Agra, the British disarm potentially disloyal Sepoys before the mutiny spreads. Elsewhere, though, Sepoys in fifty barracks join the revolt. The main centers are in the Ganges districts, but portions of Rajputana, Central India and Bengal are also affected… and where there is mutiny, massacres of Europeans and British sympathizers quickly follow.
Outside the Ganges Districts, loyal Sepoy regiments and the few British troops remaining quell the disorganized mutineers, but a number of rebellious units fall under the control of several Muslim nobles. Central command under the nobles remains loose and banditry is rampant, while in Cawnpore and Lucknow, small white garrisons and loyal Sepoys are under siege. Believing the Mughal Court is orchestrating the mutiny, the British decide that capturing Delhi is central to crushing the insurrection. Upon seizing nominal control of the Ganges Districts, the British march loyal troops south from the Punjab to besiege Delhi. In a strange turn of events, three British Commanders-in-Chief die of disease during their fight against the mutineers, two of them during the siege on Delhi itself.
The siege at Cawnpore ends in negotiations in late June, but mutineers under Muslim noble Nana Sahib break the truce, massacring the British troops and taking Caucasian women and children as hostages. At Lucknow, the small garrison holds out against as many as one hundred thousand mutineers (with many locals joining the mutineers). That the revolt did not spread further is mainly thanks to many central and southern Hindu princes who wanted nothing to do with restoring the Muslim Mughal. As a result, Sepoy troops from the south and most of central India remain loyal to the British and help to restore control in the north. Additionally, the British raise divisions of newly conquered Sikhs to fight, bringing them into the siege at Delhi.
On September 14, the British launch their assault on Delhi and capture it after six days of fighting. Large numbers of mutineers escape southeast toward Lucknow. Delhi and its inhabitants are the first victims of Britain’s ire and desire for revenge. Troops burn large tracts of the city, loot the rest and massacre huge numbers of locals. Massacres are hardly unusual in traditional Indian warfare following a siege, but the British traditionally kept their troops under tighter reign. In Delhi, however, enraged white regiments instigate the burning, murdering and looting. The British capture Bahadur Shah II fleeing the city and exile him, ending the last vestiges of the Mughal Empire and heralding a new British one.
In the south, the British work furiously to raise the siege at Lucknow. The first relief column approaches by way of Cawnpore, but the mutineers massacre the hostage women and children upon its approach. The British continue against growing opposition and, on September 25th, reinforce Lucknow with more troops and supplies. It isn’t until November 17th that the siege finally ends and the army evacuates the civilians. In March 1858, the British move to secure the Ganges Districts in a bitter three month campaign of atrocity on both sides. Tantia Topi, the mutineers’ leading commander, retreats into the jungles to fight a guerrilla war after the British decisively defeat the rebels. This jungle war continues until April 1859, when the British capture and execute Tantia Topi, ending the mutiny.
THE BRITISH RAJ (1859-1914)
Even before the Great Mutiny ends, Britain rebuilds and strengthens its position. In 1858, the Government of India Act replaces the EIC with formal British rule, eliminating any pretense of Britain’s place in India. Reformation and imparting civilization to the benighted savages falls before Imperial domination where only Britain’s needs matter. There are now three clear goals; to ensure no further revolts happen and that the Indian people “know their place,” to ensure the British government profits from its rule of India and to ensure British industry profits via access to India’s massive markets. British Parliament ratifies this new imperial policy in 1876 by appointing Queen Victoria Empress of India,
ending reformation of Indian society in favor of total domination and economic exploitation, and replacing the notion of superior civilization for superior race. Thus, Indians can never aspire to British superiority, for they are “inferior” by virtue of color. Such justifications and the engines of industry make British colonialists even more arrogant and contemptuous of local customs than before the Great Mutiny.
Assessing the problems leading to the Great Mutiny, the British finalize the Indian army reforms. By 1870, they operate as British military units, dismantling the last vestiges of the feudal mercenary system the EIC had inherited. Officers now hail directly from the British army. Other reforms include disbanding Indian artillery units, making it impossible for future rebellions to attack fortifications. Another innovation is units with Sepoys of mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds, making cooperation unlikely except under British command. The British also recruit light units from martial cultures like the Rajputs, Sikhs, Ghurkhas, Jats and Pathans. Most believe the majority of other Indian communities to be their traditional enemies, suiting them perfectly to their secondary role of ensuring Sepoy loyalty. The British Colonial Army, however, only secures all these reforms in the 1890s.
The EIC’s old, cumbersome and anarchic administration also undergoes vigorous and urgent reforms, many already underway before the Great Mutiny. The administration becomes streamlined and bureaucratic, run to the same unflinching standards as in Britain. Patronage, corruption, nepotism and the other traditional vices of Indian governance are weeded out. British interference also extends much deeper into Indian life, including the creation of a complete body of Indian law, mirroring British law, which imposes uniform regulations across all Indian castes, cultures and religions.
Such “reformations” were motivating factors in the Great Mutiny. To ensure it does not happen again, Britain moves to ensure their acceptance by both aristocrat and peasant alike. The acquiescence of the Sultans and Rajas is especially important, since many peasants only joined the Mutiny because their traditional rulers did.
To ensure loyalty and enforce modern standards, British appointees are to “assist” the princes in running their states. Yet, Britain also acknowledges their power and importance, offering significant public respect and generous economic incentives for their cooperation. Few object, except along the northwest peripheries, and even then only sporadically. The local princes lend British rule great legitimacy across India, at least initially.
Slowly, however, this cooperation costs the princes the respect and obedience they traditionally receive. This partially stems from the rise of an Indian middle-class and the concept of Indian nationalism that brands the princes as traitors. The fading respect for the nobility is also due to the princes’ betrayal of their traditional roles. Educated and worldly, the nobility takes advantage of British legal
T
HEC
ASTESHinduism is perhaps best known for implementing a seemingly rigid caste system dictating one’s social and religious standing in society. The caste system isn’t a cruel socio- political tool to oppress the masses, but rather, a system of conduct and behavior to protect the purity of the higher castes and keep them from life’s inherent impurities. In fact, the high castes have greater eating and living restrictions, and rely on the castes below them to handle the necessities they cannot.
The castes originally consisted of four basic groups called varna, which exist to this day. They are, in descending order of importance: Brahmins (priests), kshatriyas (rulers and warriors), vaisyas (traders and merchants) and sudras (serfs and farmers). The vaisyas, kshatriyas and brahmins are also dvija or twice-born; they distinguish themselves with a sacred thread worn over the right shoulder. The brahmins are closest to the gods and must remain the purest, while sudras are furthest from the gods and thus less restricted in their diets and actions. In relation to food, for example, raw food is immune to pollution, and thus acceptable to all. The pollution occurs during the preparation and handling of the food, meaning that only certain castes can share certain meals (brahmins, for example, may or may not eat meat according to region, but almost all do not eat cattle). This distinction also applies to occupation, death and marriage, which created the necessity for so-called “Untouchable” caste, a strata of society who handle the really polluted jobs like tanning leather, cremations, scavenging, etc.
Two important distinctions to bear in mind are: 1) Caste is not an indication of wealth and 2) The varna are the tip of the sociological iceberg. In the former distinction’s case, land is an indication of one’s wealth, and while the brahmins are often land owners, many may also live in poverty on par with sudras. For the latter’s case, the varna are broad definitions given further form through jati (also caste) distinctions. This translates into thousands of sub castes according to regions and language groups. Thus, in one area, vegetarians of a caste may receive greater respect than meat-eaters. In another region, shepherds, farmers and cattle tenders may all constitute different jati within the same varna (sudra in this case). On this level, movement within a jati is possible, but movement within a varna (a hereditary position) is far more difficult.
reforms to exploit peasants in manners unacceptable to traditional feudal systems. With military service now in British hands, great landowners ignore the peasant’s needs (who once constituted the local armies) and grow rich off the impoverished villagers farming their lands. Peasants feel betrayed, breeding a simmering resentment that greatly undermines — and eventually destroys — rural India’s traditional social system.
The British remain unaware of the injustices of rural life, or that peasants constitute the majority of the Indian population. Their lack of understanding of the backward and traditional nature of village life hampers their attempts at improving the lives of peasants. Despite numerous British reforms and programs, for example, most peasants do not understand or take advantage of the provided opportunities, leaving only the wealthier and better educated peasants (such as village headmen) to benefit. Thus, the new economic reforms only compound the old social inequities in rural villages, and the new class of small landowners is even more avaricious than the former feudal overlords. This, in turn, perverts what remains of traditional Indian rural society.
The effort to modernize India requires far more officials than Britain can provide, thus creating a vast army of Indian bureaucrats to carry the white-collar burden. In the 1850s, English universities were founded in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras to address this problem. Their graduates now fill the junior and provincial ranks of British administration and business, creating an affluent, educated, and English-speaking middle-class. Indeed, English is the common language allowing Indians of all ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds to communicate. An Indian national consciousness appears, distilling many traditional elements into a new unified form.
British administration and business also requires infrastructure for efficient communication and transportation. Side by side, telegraphs and railways penetrate India’s heart, becoming a key part of the new imperial structure tying the country together. In 1857, there are only 200 miles of railways tracks in India; by 1869 there were 4,255 miles; in 1880, 8,494 miles and by 1905 there will be 28,054 miles. Along with the telegraph and innumerable all-weather roads, these railways open the most backward and isolated areas for travel, trade and British rule. Only the northeast and northwest mountains and deepest recesses of the southern jungles remain isolated from the new modern India. Thanks to these reforms, British power increases throughout the second half of the 19th century, reaching its zenith between 1899 and 1905, a golden time of imperial prosperity, superiority and strength.
All is not good for the Indians, however. Throughout the late 19th century, the Indian population grows strong, with a drop in disease-related deaths and bandit depredations. In 1855, India is 175 million strong, but by 1911, it soars to 303 million. Rural areas suffer from over
population, slums grow on the outskirts of big cities and many poor Indians are disaffected with their lot and the traditional roles society demands of them. Overpopulation exacerbates the famines regularly sweeping across India, a situation worsened by Britain’s disinterest in agriculture aside from the collection of land taxes.
There are few new irrigation projects, while penny pinching undermines attempts to staunch the effects of famines. Combined with the population surge, this lack of investment leads to worsening famines that move from year to year, depending on the monsoons. Thus, it is always possible for some people to flee famine-struck areas. Between 1860 and 1879, there are eight famines, including the 1876-78 famine that kills five million people. For the next 15 years, the monsoons hold, but then, from 1896 to 1908, there are three major famines that spark massive and unprecedented population migrations and changes to India’s ethnic balance.
As their rule grows more secure, Britain takes advantage of the opportunity to drain more and more money out of India, some of it indirectly by using Indian troops overseas or Indian money to pay for imperial rule. Instead of attempting to build the Indian economy to support their needs, however, the British government sabotages the local economy. British business interests receive preferential treatment, impoverishing India and distorting the entire country’s economic growth. British “improvements” favor projects that strengthen their rule and trade (like railways and ports), rather than projects to benefit the average Indian (like irrigation canals, schools and hospitals) exacerbating the problem further.
This economic imbalance forces India’s middle-class, who suffer directly from the economic hardship, to question British rule from the 1870s onward, a catalyst which eventually mixes with the new cultural/national drive to fuel the Indian nationalist movement. The middle class’ growing disenchantment leads to formalized resistance against British rule with the first meeting of the Indian National Congress in 1885. It isn’t until 1929, however, that Indian independence formally becomes the Congress’ goal; it takes Indian nationalists (divided by ethnicity, religion and caste) that long to overcome their belief that British rule is necessary for keeping India whole. The rise of Indian nationalism takes Britain by surprise, but by the 1890s they have a well-developed secret police already in place.
Before the Great Mutiny, Britain’s pre-eminence in the world is unquestioned. In the century’s last five decades, however, other European powers rise up to challenge it. Britain has no intention of losing its place as the strongest nation in the world, and thus is determined to keep India under its thumb. Another rebellion will invite the intervention of other European nations. This risk grows when Russia expands into Central Asia and initiates a shadowy conflict of espionage, intrigue, corruption and border wars. Its proponents call this conflict the Great Game, which also encompasses spying on
various Indian Princely states and ensuring that no foreign power foments rebellion or subverts British subjects. This secret police mechanism easily focuses on the growing Indian Nationalist movement, but the campaign does not truly become vicious until well into the 20th century.