The 104th Division had been continuously in action since it was committed on 23 October 1944, the 4l5th Infantry having been in the front line for twenty- nine days. Attachments to the division included the 555th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Bn. (Mobile), 692d Tank Destroyer Bn., 750th Tank Bn., 188th Field Artillery Bn., Battery A of the 987th FA Bn. (self-propelled), and the Eighty-seventh Armored FA Bn.
Detailed plans and preparations for the attack on Lucherberg had been laid down between 28 November and 2 December while the 413th Infantry was com- pleting the seizure of the towns of Inden and Lamersdorf. All the men were thor- oughly briefed on the part they were to play in the operation. Prior to the attack the 104th's unit commanders, including those at platoon level, conducted inten- sive studies of maps and aerial photos, even to the point of taking part in recon- naissance in artillery liaison and spotter planes.
To supply and support the units assaulting Lucherberg, Company A, 329th Engineer Combat Battalion, was ordered to construct a Bailey bridge at Lamers- dorf. Meanwhile, Company C, 329th, was directed to forge a ford-crossing before daylight on 3 December, then a footbridge during the day, and finally a floating footbridge on 4 December.
On 29 November the Third Bn., 415th Infantry, moved from Weisweiler to Frenz, relieving elements of the 4l4th Infantry. The next day the Third Bn. moved into Lamersdorf, relieving the Second Bn., 4l3th Infantry. The battalion mopped
up isolated German strongholds in the vicinity of both towns. In the afternoon of 1 December a reinforced platoon of Love Company (Company L) advanced to the north of Lamersdorf, seizing the large factory at the south end of Inden in an effort to facilitate its crossing that night. At 1700 it made contact with elements of the 413th Infantry in Inden. The 415th Infantry was disposed before Lucher- berg with its First Battalion at Eschweiler, Second Bn. (less Company G) at Dur- wiss, Company G detached at Lohn, Third Bn.'s Company I at Weisweiler, Com- pany K at Frenz, and Company L at Lamersdorf.
Colonel Cochran directed two companies of the Second Battalion to cross abreast at sites at Frenz and Lamersdorf at 2300—one company to seize the fac- tory complex between the river and Lucherberg, the other to provide flank pro- tection by taking a chateau (known as Lutzeber Chateau) south of the factories— plan objectives B and C, respectively. An hour after these companies had begun to move, the Third Bn. was to send two companies across the river from the vicin- ity of Inden, further north, using the debris of a damaged spur railroad bridge between Lamersdorf and Inden. These two companies, in column, were to take advantage of rough terrain north of the coal factory, avoiding the woods, and, hoping to catch the Germans unawares, assault the town from the cliff side. In addition, it was important that the initial attack be made at night so as to negate possible German observation. Each company received a detailed map on which artillery concentrations were plotted at every conceivable point of trouble.
The 104th Division artillery was to provide a heavy concentration of fire sup- port starting one hour before H-Hour and lasting until five minutes before the jump-off, augmented by fire from the VII Corps, First and Thirtieth Infantry Divi- sion artillery, in addition to support from attached tanks, tank destroyers, and the 555th AAA (AW) Bn. The guns were to continue at intervals until the infantry requested a concentration of white phosphorus—a signal that friendly troops had entered the town.
Intelligence from an American officer who had recently escaped from the Germans indicated that they were keeping all tanks, trucks, and artillery under cover in sheds in small villages two to five miles behind the lines during clear weather but tended to move about freely on rainy days. Their motor vehicle move- ment usually commenced about dusk on clear days and continued all night.
An assessment of German capabilities indicated that they would make a deter- mined effort to hold the towns in the division's sector, that the Germans would probably launch local counterattacks in company strength supported by tanks or self-propelled (SP) guns, and that they could be expected to launch a coordinated attack with up to two battalions of infantry, with tanks or SPs, in an effort to regain Lucherberg if necessary.
Interrogation of prisoners late in the afternoon of 2 December determined that there were 500 to 600 German infantry (landsers) with tanks garrisoned in and around Lucherberg. It was also revealed that a German panzer division, pos- sibly the Twelfth SS Panzer Division, was east of the Roer River with plans to attack in the direction of Aachen. Despite these reports, the assault was to be launched as planned.
Company G, Second Battalion, was given the key assignment of seizing the coal factory between Lamersdorf and Lucherberg, from which further attacks on Lucherberg would be launched. Company I, Third Bn., would conduct the ini- tial assault on the town with support from companies F, L, and K.
Company E, assembling at Weisweiler, on the right flank of the assault, was given the mission of capturing the chateau and establishing flank support posi- tions on the eastern bank of the creek running past the chateau. The CO and the platoon officers of Company E went to Frenz and made a reconnaissance of the area the company would have to pass through. Each platoon was given its mission for the night and the route it was to follow. The company moved up to Frenz at about 2100; the attack was to start at 2300 with the line of departure being the railroad track to the east of Frenz. The Third Platoon was given the mission of securing the chateau and establishing a position on the east bank of the stream; while the Second Platoon was to move north up the railroad track, taking up posi- tions on the bank of the stream, making contact with Company G on the left flank, and tying in with the Third Platoon on the right. The First Platoon was to follow behind the Third Platoon by approximately 150 yards, then swing to the south and occupy the trench system in that area, put a roadblock on the autobahn, and establish contact with the Third Platoon at the chateau. The company HQ was to follow the Third Platoon while still maintaining a rear CP in Frenz, which would move up when ordered.
Company F, in battalion reserve at Weisweiler, was to move north to Lamers- dorf, occupy the trench system there, and clear any pockets of resistance in the area through which Company G would pass before reaching the river. The mor- tar platoon of Company H, the battalion's heavy weapons company, was to sup- port the attack from positions in Frenz, the company providing a platoon of machine guns to each assault company.
At this time Company I, the assault company of the Third Bn., was located in the factory on the southern outskirts of Inden, from which it was possible to make a visual reconnaissance of the route to Lucherberg. Using field glasses, a route was selected that crossed the Inde at the damaged railroad bridge, turned south along the banks of the stream for 500 yards, and then east toward the objec- tive. The route led across a railroad, which paralleled the stream, then north of the coal factory along the edge of the woods, and up the steep slope to the town. One platoon of Company L was to protect the crossing of Company I from positions near the Inden factory. The balance of the company was to follow the assault company across and move directly to the objective. Company M was to support the attack with its mortar platoon from positions in Lamersdorf and have a platoon of machine guns ready to support the attack from the vicinity of the factory. Company K ("King"), the battalion reserve, was to move from Frenz to Lamersdorf after the attack had jumped off in order to be ready to cross just east of the town as soon as the engineers had completed putting in a bridge.