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In this section I make the necessary connections between the literature and research in order to discuss the results as well as their implications on both civil society literature, civil society under authoritarian rule and specifically Egyptian civil society. It is important to gather all of these thoughts, the literature, and research to discuss the recurring themes of this complex sector.

What does the literature show?

The literature provides a necessary background for the principles, purpose and role of the state and civil society. Without reviewing the classical definitions and

interpretations of the state and civil society, let’s first discuss the transformation of state and civil society from the “nation-building” to the “state-society” paradigm. The “nation- building” process understands the state as being the ultimate constructor of the modern nation state. The “state” is seen as a modern, highly rational, system of territorial organization while “society” is backwards, unorganized, and incapable. The “state” on the national level is a centralized authority that rules its citizens within the state,

emphasizing the importance of requiring citizenship throughout society. The “state” is an enabler of democracy and can develop their nation with the help of aid from the

international community. In the state-society paradigm the roles are reversed. The image now depicts the “state” as backwards, unorganized, and incapable of providing the space for society to flourish and ultimately develop the nation. “Society” on the other hand is seen as a place for investment or new possibilities because of the overbearing rule of the state in the socio-economic and political spheres. The “local”, once understood as backward and rural, are now seen as enablers, dynamic, and held back by “state” power.

It is at this point where civil society officially becomes relevant, as a “buzz” word, for describing various social movements and the societal struggle against authoritarian regimes towards the end of the Cold War era. Civil society has since become nearly synonymous with “democracy” and has taken on the role of being an enabler for democratic principles.

The previous decades show that the Western academic world is certainly content with the simplistic understanding that civil society is solely a voluntary, grassroots, and dynamic sector of society that is needed to challenge and apply pressure on the state. Research has since been dedicated towards the work of civic organizations with the rise in social movements proving that the state needed to be rolled back. In terms of funding with “development” and “aid”, these dynamics have also changed along with the

evolution of state and civil society. “Development” is seen in both paradigms, going from being the project of the state to a natural social process that is actually thwarted by the overbearing rule of the state. The belief that the state disables development along with the growing support for civil society by academia and transnational organizations (UN, WB, and IMF) is made evident by the creation of pro-civil society policies and the allocation of funds towards these policies. Development has now become an industry, made up of a network of international non-governmental organizations, transnational organizations and corporations that work to implement development projects in nations willing to undergo the neoliberal process (structural adjustment programs). Civil society has since become a major focal point for development agencies and is generally the target audience for the industry to fund and ultimately empower. Civil society has been funded and supported for years in nations worldwide, using the key terms of civic engagement and NGO

capacity building, and it is clearly seen as a key to democratization and applying pressure on the state. However, how close is civil society in reality to the civil society that is so actively discussed and written about in Western academia and government policy?

The following section will highlight and discuss the research findings for my questioning of Egyptian civil society in an attempt to provide the reality of state-society relations for Egypt and other authoritarian states in the “developing” world.

What did the research find?

Research consisted of interviews conducted with the major social forces of society. These social forces were namely, local NGOs, international NGOs, USAID and development contractors, as well as activists that work on the “street” level. The

interview process consisted of several questions regarding civil society, with a few key questions wondering what each interviewee thought of civil society in Egypt, their definition, and their organization’s interaction with government. While civil society is often understood as a dynamic network of grassroots, voluntary, actors only the activists and their informal organizations function as the civil society as we have come to

understand. My research has therefore concluded that civil society in Egypt is not what it seems in Western academia and government policy.

Local NGOs are heavily regulated by government and therefore are mostly involved in the socio-economic sphere, avoiding the political realm altogether in fear of receiving negative attention from government. Their attention is focused on health, educational services, and charity, mostly in the form of short-term humanitarian aid. These organizations receive funding from both government and foreign aid sources in the form of transnational organizations and foreign government aid. Not only are all funds

regulated and accounted for, projects are also subject to regulation and therefore have to compliment the agenda of both national government and other donors. Still, not all local NGOs are lucky enough to receive enough funding to sustain themselves and ultimately are forced to alter their work according to the agendas of donors or, they cease to exist. These organizations are at the helm of government and are unable to inspire long-term development that can roll government back.

International NGOs are not subjected to quite as much government control

although funding and development projects are still regulated. Their work is also focused in the socio-economic sphere although projects may indirectly affect their constituent’s political development. INGOs work closely with certain local NGOs however the local organizations must be legitimate according to the government and therefore are heavily regulated. The government must approve of projects and funding as well as which local organizations are involved. Some of the interviewees believed INGOs to be a part of Egyptian civil society while others believed they were catalysts for civil society; certainly there was an overall confusion. INGOs work with a long-term development agenda but ultimately are forced to work within the limitations of government. Both local and international NGOs work outside the political realm and are unable to create enough space for civil society to have a broad effect on society, no thanks to government control.

USAID and development contractors, who clearly are not members of Egyptian civil society still fund CSO’s and have an effect on Egyptian society. USAID is

American foreign aid paid to developing nations by American taxpayers and brought to national governments and organizations by way of the State Department. Millions of dollars are allocated for civil society in Egypt as the U.S. government hopes to support

democratization in the Arab Republic. However, funding is either delivered to the

Egyptian government who therefore can decide which organizations to provide funds, or, to INGOs that will ultimately utilize funding for their project partnerships with local NGOs. In both scenarios funding is provided to organizations that are highly regulated, that will not use the funds for challenging governance, and that are seen as legitimate by government. Additionally, USAID projects are bilateral nearly seventy percent of the time, as they work hand in hand with the Egyptian government. The U.S. ultimately is interested in Egypt’s stability as their interests in the region depend on it. Stability in Egypt means supporting organizations that will rarely or never question governance or the status quo.

Activists on the other hand serve a much different purpose than the previously mentioned forces of society. Of the four individuals that were interviewed, all of them are involved in informal organizations, work voluntarily, occasionally involve themselves with local NGOs but are weary of their capabilities, have limited to zero contact with INGOs or foreign governmental aid, and consider themselves to be affiliated with social justice issues focused on improving governance. One woman is involved in an informal organization called an “initiative” that voluntarily brings together young leaders with likeminded beliefs who want to develop society’s awareness and activity but specifically want to avoid government controlled NGOs and development agencies. Even receiving funding from abroad, whether it be from USAID, the EU, or Qatar, is looked down upon for fear that their image will be tainted in the eyes of the people. Most of these

individuals met during the Egyptian Revolution on January 25th 2011 and believe the government to be a roadblock to their efforts. The work these individuals take part in is

“pure civil society”, the definition seen in contemporary literature, which is a grassroots effort to rally and organize large numbers of the population to put pressure and challenge government’s overbearing authority.

What the results prove is that there is a dominant, formal, public, official, and legitimatized civil society that is promoted by transnational organizations, a dense network of INGOs, Western academics and government policy, that has turned out to the opposite purpose of what civil society should strive for. This civil society is not the dynamic, bustling, innovative and grass root sector of society that will push forward efforts for democratization in Egypt. This civil society is regulated by an authoritarian regime, often works closely with government, and still receives millions of dollars specifically geared towards various elements of democratization. Using the funds of external governments and affiliate transnational organizations like the WB and IMF, this public imposter we know as civil society cooperates with the national government of Egypt to impose Western development and neoliberal policies. While this paper does not specifically question the intentions of the neoliberal agenda, it is astonishing that the Egyptian government pre and post revolution comfortably receives funding though there are is no indication that governance has improved domestically. In fact, the country has slowly worsened due to the lethal combination of structural adjustment programs and unemployment that culminated with an uprising that dethroned the former president in 2011. With the current President Morsi the same domestic problems linger and yet there seems to lack the necessary inner questioning by transnational organizations of their own funding and appear willing to continue the same development practices as was agreed with the previous regime.

The research also proves is that there is an underground, informal civil society that is dynamic, organized, and grassroots, similar to the civil society described by academics and government policy. It turns out that informal civil society is not weak, small or incapable, only weakened by the fact that they are not legitimate due to the nature of their work and therefore receive little in funding or support from national or foreign governments. Furthermore, they are considered by government sympathizers to be “the opposition”, the “tyrants of the revolution” the backwards “other” that is destabilizing the nation. With all of this applied pressure, the proof of their strength is clearly evident by the results of the revolution, with turnouts of over a million strong, the use of well-practiced nonviolent tactics against an armed and equipped security force and the current mobilizing activity on the ground against the new Morsi regime.

The research is consistent with the domestic issues that have plagued the Arab Republic over the past decades. There has been a visible “public” civil society promoting policies that were government regulated within the same timeframe that have not resulted in democratizing the state, in fact, the military dictatorship had been hardly impenetrable up until the uprising that saw millions of Egyptians call for an end to despotic,

aristocratic rule. “Informal” civil society instead decided to take development into their hands, as the revolution may be the greatest attempt at a social and political revolution in modern Egyptian history, without the help of ‘formal’ civil society.