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discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

This is an application of the Tijam Doctrine in our present Rules. So, we still have laches or estoppel as a defense against the non-waivable defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In other cases, the SC also used another kind of estoppel in order to bar the party from raising the issue of jurisdiction, although the trial court REALLY DID NOT HAVE jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Soliven vs. Fast Forms 2004(Estoppel in pais is a good defense although there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter)

The aggregate sum to be recovered was 800k. A complaint for collection of money was filed in the RTC. The amount to be actually collected was less than the jurisdictional amount of the RTC based on BP 129 (exclude interest, damages, cost and Attorney’s fees). There was an answer by defendant with a counterclaim. The court, unaware it lacked jurisdiction over the case, as nobody brought it up. The court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The counsel for the defendant found that the court had no jurisdiction. The defendant filed motion for reconsideration and raised lack of jurisdiction, praying for dismissal of the case. RTC denied the motion, as the defendant was in estoppel to challenge the court’s

jurisdiction just because an adverse result was had. It reached the SC. SC held that the defendant cannot challenge any more the jurisdiction of the court. SC stated that there is estoppel in pais, the act of the defendant in actively participating in the case and seeking affirmative relief via a

counterclaim renders defendant in estoppel to contest the jurisdiction of the RTC, although the court may not really have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Facts: Marie Antoinette R. Soliven, petitioner, filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Fast-Forms

Philippines, Inc., respondent. The complaint alleges that respondent, through its president Dr. Eduardo Escobar, obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount of PhP

170,000.00 payable within a period of 21 days, with an interest of 3%. On the same day, respondent issued a post-dated check in favor of petitioner in the amount of PhP 175,000.00. About three weeks later, respondent, through Dr. Escobar, advised petitioner not to deposit the postdated check as the account from where it was drawn has insufficient funds. Instead,

respondent proposed to petitioner that the PhP 175,000.00 be “rolled-over,” with a monthly interest of 5% which petitioner agreed. Subsequently, respondent issued several checks in the total of PhP 76,250.00 in favor of petitioner as payment for interests corresponding to the months of June, August,

September, October and December. Later, despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent refused to pay its principal obligation and interests due.

Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim, denied that it obtained a loan from petitioner, and that it did not authorize its then president, Dr. Eduardo Escobar, to secure any loan from petitioner or issue various checks as payment for interests. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration questioning for the first time the trial court’s jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioner’s principal demand (PhP 195,155.00) does not exceed PhP 200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed with the MTC pursuant to R.A. 7691.

Held: YES. While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened.” The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a

litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from

challenging the court’s jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Is the Soliven case applicable to criminal cases? No.

Figueroa vs. People 2009

The accused was arraigned for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. This was filed in the RTC instead of MTC. The prosecutor was not aware of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. The counsel of the accused also assumed the same. Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction in the RTC, so the case went on. Trial was had, where both parties presented their respective evidence. The accused was found guilty. On appeal, the accused

interposed the defense of lack of jurisdiction. The solicitor general cited Soliven vs. Fast Forms as defense. Active participation means that the litigant is in estoppel from challenging the validity of the proceedings. The CA agreed with the solicitor general.

SC held that the judgment is void as estoppel in pais is inapplicable in a criminal case. Lack of jurisdiction in a criminal case can be cited as a defense even on appeal. The rights of the accused being at stake, estoppel in pais is inapplicable.

When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.

*******

On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision,

considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s

conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.

**********

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the

landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the

factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety

almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the

adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for

Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be

considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a

person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.

This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the

petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case. We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely— only from necessity, and only in extraordinary

circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no

jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover,

estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of

action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to

dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the

subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its

decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.

Note from Dean Jara:

If you are confronted with a problem on lack of jurisdiction in a civil case, apply Soliven case. If it is a criminal case, adopt Figueroa.

NAPOCOR vs. Province of Quezon 2010 reiterated the validity of Soliven in civil cases.

The NPC is estopped from

The assailed CTA en banc decision brushed aside the NPC’s sin perjuicio arguments by declaring that:

The court finds merit in [NPC’s] claim that the Order of the LBAA of the Province of Quezon is a sin perjuicio decision. A perusal thereof shows that the assailed Order does not contain findings of facts in support of the dismissal of the case. It merely stated a finding of merit in the contention of the Municipality of Pagbilao xxx.

However, on appeal before the CBAA, [NPC] assigned several errors, both in fact and in law, pertaining to the LBAA’s decision. Thus, petitioner is bound by the appellate jurisdiction of the CBAA under the principle of equitable estoppel. In this regard, [NPC] is in no position to question the appellate jurisdiction of the CBAA as it is the same party which sought its jurisdiction and participated in the proceedings therein. [Emphasis supplied.]

We agree that the NPC can no longer divest the

CBAA of the power to decide the appeal after invoking and submitting itself to the board’s jurisdiction. We note that even the NPC itself found nothing objectionable in the LBAA’s sin perjuicio decision when it filed its appeal

before the CBAA; the NPC did not cite this ground as basis for its appeal. What it cited were grounds that went into the merits of its case. In fact, its appeal contained no prayer for the remand of the case to the LBAA.

A basic jurisdictional rule, essentially based on fairness, is that a party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain the requested relief , repudiate or question that same

jurisdiction. Moreover, a remand would be unnecessary, as we find the CBAA’s and the CTA en banc’s denial of NPC’s claims entirely in accord with the law and with jurisprudence.

The defendant has a problem when a court issues a service of

summons in violation of Rule 14. The defendant must file a Motion to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over person of the

defendant. If he does file such motion, does not the defendant admit that the court has jurisdiction over his person?

No. The filing of a motion to dismiss on that ground is the only remedy available to him to tell the court that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. In court cases, what the defendant can do is to tell that court right away that his appearance before the court in filing the motion to dismiss should be considered as a special appearance only for the purpose of telling the court that the court has no jurisdiction over his person.

Problem: Defendant must file a motion to tell the court of this defense. Solution: Inform the court that his appearance is a Special appearance only.

This Special Appearance Rule stems from another principle in the past that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss on ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person, when he adds another ground found in Rule 16 by virtue of the application of the Omnibus Motion Rule, the

decisions of the SC then was then when another ground is added in the motion to dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, he waives the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. This has been changed in the present Rules.

Under Omnibus Motion Rule, defendant who files motion to dismiss plus any other ground in rule 16 is NOW deemed not to be a person over whom the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. A defendant is free to file a motion to dismiss, citing as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction over his person, he is not deemed to have waived his argument that the court has not gained jurisdiction over his person.

Let us say that the defendant who claims that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person does not respond to the summons, as filing of an answer is a waiver of his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He received a copy of the order of the court, and then following the Rules, the defaulting defendant files a motion to lift the order of default. The filing

of a motion to lift the order of default is acceptance by the defendant of jurisdiction of the court over his person. In another instance, the defendant receives the copy of the judgment of default, the defendant files a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial. The motion for

reconsideration or new trial is a submission of the defendant to the

jurisdiction of the court over his person. This is the reason why in Palma vs. Galvez, the defendant claims that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person, and filed a motion for new trial, he must qualify the motion must not be treated as a voluntary submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. He must always qualify his motion with that ground.

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