Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, flying a round and enjoying my
self I had no idea I was Chuang Tzu. Then sud
denly I woke up and was Chuang Tzu again.
But I could not tell, had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming that I was now Chuang Tzu ? How
�ver, there must be some sort of difference be
tween Chuang Tzu and a butterfly! We call this the transformation of things.
The Book of Chuang Tzu
One of the few certain things about a game of chess is that the game position wiJJ change.
Paradoxical though it may be, the position is constantly changing. If you want to play chess, and have no particular fetish for threefold repe
titions, then you cannot avoid this fact. How
ever, 'change' has many faces and the most striking of all is transformation. Most strong players are strong partly because of the variety of positions they can play. This not only gives them flexibility in the opening but widens their horizons for the whole game. So if a promising attack must lead to a technical endgame, then
so be it. If you have to give away your material
advantage and instead sacrifice material for the initiative then so be it. You just have to accept that the position will transform from one thing into another. The key question is whether the transformation will be favourable. In the con
text of Blinking, we often fail to act on the key moments because we don't take responsibility for making the necessary transformation or at the key moment we unwittingly make a big transformation when we just needed to keep the position more or Jess as it was. So, another way to become more sensitive towards key moments is to be aware of the centrality of transformations in chess. These take the form of things like piece exchanges, changes in pawn-structure, or a movement from one phase of the game into another. Look out for them in the games below.
One final pointer before the fun starts is that although nobody will tell you when you are looking at a key moment, there are certain signs rela�ing to the features of the position and the amount of choice you have. There are often sig·
nals too, which usuaJJy relate to your oppo
nent's previous move(s). However, above all else you need to be sensitive to the changing trends of the position.
Farrell - Redpath Edinburgh 2000
1 d4 /Df6 2 c4 e6 3 /Df3 b6 4 e3!? (D)
B
An under-rated system that is not so easy to play against, especiaJJy if you are seeing it for the first time.
4 . . . i.b7 5 i.d3 c5 6 0-0 i.e7
6 ... g6! ?.
7 lbc3 0-0?!
7 ... cxd4 8 exd4 d5 is one of the main lines. w
8 d5!
Now Black is forced into a dodgy Benoni where both his bishops are passive.
8 .•• exd5 9 cxd5 d6
After 9 .. . lbxd5 10 lbxd5 �xd5 1 1 �xh7+
�xh7 12 'ij'xd5 lbc6 13 �d2 Black's king is vulnerable and White has good central control.
10 e4 lbbd7
This is not such a bad move, but Joe didn't consider any alternatives. It can be dangerous to play the opening in first gear, even if you know the moves quite well, because your constitution will not be prepared for serious concentration when you need it, and you are less likely to be sensitive to the key moments when they arise. I am not suggesting that you 'dither' over your opening moves or play deliberately slowly but it is very important to build up your concentra
tion, and for this purpose it can be useful to ponder fairly obvious moves at the opening stage, especially if you are unfamiliar with the opening at hand. Even better of course, is to be fully 'tuned in' before the game starts, but cir
cumstances don't always allow this.
After 10 ... �a6!? 1 1 �xa6 lbxa6 1 2 e5 White is better as it turns out, but just considering this variation can help enliven your sense of danger.
ll lbd2 a6 12 a4 lbe5 13 �e2 lbfd7?!
There are traces of Egoism here. Joe could think of nothing but getting his bishop to the a1-h8 diagonal but in doing so overlooks the strength of White's natural build-up. After White plays f4 it's good to have pressure against e4 so it would have been better to anticipate this and make use of some other pieces.
13 ... :e8 ! ? 14 f4 lbg6 15 lbc4 (15 g3! is better) 15 ... �f8 16 �f3 lbh4 involves some co
operative play by White, but is not such an im
plausible line. Black is comfortable here because it will be difficult for White to force through e4-e5.
14 f4 lbg6 15 llJc4 'ii'b8 (D)
Here we have all the classic symptoms of a
key moment:
1) Signs. Black has some clumsy pieces and vulnerable squares (knight on g6, bishop on b7, pawns on b6 and d6).
2) Signal. His last move looked somewhat awkward (rooks still not connected, queen de
centralized).
3) Sensitivity. Counterplay is threatened:
... b5 is pending because after the pawns are ex
changed on b5 White's a1-rook has to capture on a8 and Black can recapture with the bishop, thus defending b5. Moreover, by protecting d6, Black has introduced the idea of ... �f6-d4.
4) Sensitivity/Sign. There is no 'obvious continuation' (compared with lbd2 when li:k4 was the obvious follow-up) and thus the favour
able trend beginning with 8 d5 ! has reached its natural end. Something significant is called for.
16 g3?
Insensitivity. The moment passes and Black gets into the game. While White may have been enjoying the upward trend that began on move 8, he doesn't appreciate that this particular trend has 'dried up' and that Black now threat
ens to change the direction of the trend in his fa
vour. White needs to see that this is a 'gateway position', which links two periods of the game.
To keep it simple we could say that the opening has ended and the middlegame is about to be
gin. In the rniddlegame the players will have roughly equal chances, but White has reached the middlegame a move before Black and for just one moment he has the chance to punish
Black for loitering in the opening.
16 �g4 ! is a surprisingly strong move, which is almost decisive. It's not especially 'normal' and therefore easy to overlook or un
derestimate. Most players have learned a set-up based on �f3, with g3 if necessary and it's hard to 'jump out' of this pattern when you need to. In this case the necessity arises from
the unique importance of the moment. Just for one move, Black's forces are fatally uncoordi
nated. 1 6 .. . i.c8 (the only move; there' s no other way to defend b6 and protect d7) 17
£xd7 ! (given the light-squared weaknesses in White's position this is also not such a 'normal' move) 1 7 ... i.xd7 1 8 f5 ! . Normally you break through with e5 but in the given instance Black's lack of control over e5 gives White a strong attack. Now:
a) 18 ... lfih8 loses to 19 i.f4 f6 20 'ii'b3.
b) 18 .. .c�:Je5 is more to the point: 19 lfixe5 dxe5 20 d6! (20 'ii'h5 intending l:tf3-h3 also looks good) 20 ... i.xd6 (20 .. .'i'xd6 21 'ii'xd6 i.xd6 22 l:td 1) 2 1 l:tf3 1. It can be fun using computers for such positions. Fritz doesn't get it of course; Black is a pawn up with two bish
ops after all. Still, most humans will see that White's kingside attack is imminent and over
whelming. White will have the f5-pawn, a rook on g3 or h3, a queen on h5 or g4, a knight com
ing to d5, a bishop ready to sacrifice on h6, a rook coming to d1 or fl. It's way too much fire
power for the black king to survive. 2 1 . . .c4 is the most active way to deal with the threat of l:td3. Then 22 :h3 i.c5+ 23 �h1 'ii'd6 24 'ii'h.5
h6 25 l:tg3 ! gives White a fearsome attack. All of White's pieces have a chance to get involved while too much is being asked of the black queen, e.g. 25 ... i.f2 26 i.xh6 i.xg3 27 i.xg7
�xg7 28 'ii'g5+ �h7 29 f6 and wins.
c) 18 ... b5 ! is the most tenacious defence.
Then White's most obvious Jines seem to fall short but there is still a path to what looks like a clear advantage: 1 9 axb5 i.xb5 (19 ... axb5 20 l:txa8 'ii'xa8 21 lfib6) 20 fxg6!? (20 �xb5 axb5
{ 20 .. .'i'xb5 21 ltla3 } 21 l:txa8 'ii'xa8 22 fxg6 bxc4 23 l:txf7 l:txf7 24 gxf7 + �xf7 25 'iffl + i.f6 26 'ii'xc4 'ii'a1) 20 ... i.xc4 21 gxh7+ �h8 22 l:tf3 and now ... i.f6 is always met by l:txf6 and White will endeavour to bring his c1-bishop to the a1-h8 diagonal. White is not quite winning here but if we compare this to the game, White clearly missed quite an appealing boat.
16 . . • b5! 17 lba5 b4 18 lfib1 i.f6 19 ltld2
i.d4+ 20 �g2 f51 (D)
This is typical of the mess that can occur when you miss your moment. The position is unclear.
21 �dc4 l:ta7 22 �xb7 l:txb7 23 �5 fxe4!
w
A combative offer of the exchange which White does well to decline.
24 lbc6 'ii'e8??
A bad blunder. After 24 ... 'ii'a8 25 �xd4 cxd4 26 'ii'xd4 lbc5 it's anybody's game.
25 i.xa6 l:tb6 26 i.c4 i.f6 27 a5 l:tb8 28
�xb8 'ii'xb8 29 l:te1 l:te8 30 'ii'a4 1-0 Emms - Webster British Ch, Scarborough 1999
1 e4 g6 2 d4 i.g7 3 �c3 c6 4 i.e3 d6 5 'ii'd2 b5 6 �f3 lfid7 7 i.d3 ifc7!? 8 0-0 �gf6! 9 a4!?
Since Black has not played ... a6 he doesn't lose a tempo when he protects the b-pawn with
... a5 so perhaps there was something to be said for the immediate 9 i.h6!?.
9 ... b4 10 �e2 a5 11 c3 i.a6
1 l ...bxc3 12 bxc3 �g4!?.
12 i.xa6 :Xa6 13 �g3 bxc3 14 bxc3 0-0 15 i.h6 c5 16 i.xg7 �xg7 17 1i'g5 e6! 18 e5 (D)
B
18 ... tt:lg8
18 ... lLld5 1 9 lLlh5+ �h8 20 'fi'h6 l:g8 21 lLlg5 lLlfB 22 c4 is a perilous continuation for
Black. W
Key moment:
1) White has many options but no obvious continuation; the 'flow' of the game has stopped (sign/sensitivity).
2) Black's counterplay is pending and in general the future belongs to Black because of weaknesses on e5 and a4 (sensitivity).
3) Black's last move was peculiar and places him behind in 'time' That White can force such a move suggests that the position could be favourable for him if he can persist with the pressure (signal).
4) White's advantages are somewhat tem
porary and so this suggests White needs to strike quickly (sensitivity).
19 :ret?!
A lazy move, after which the trend begins to turn against White. John had lost a long game the previous day and doesn't play with his usual energy. Until now the trend has been in his fa
vour but he needs to see this position as sepa
rate from the trend (position sensitivity) and initiate a new trend in which his slight advantage might assume more significant proportions.
19 h4 ! is crying out to be played. Then 19 ... h6 20 ft'e3 ! (so that ... l:tc4 isn't so effective and so that ... g5 isn't with tempo, as would be the case after 20 il'f4; this move also gives White cer
tain 1i'e2, 1i'd3 options and doesn't block the f
pawn) 20 ... cxd4 (20 .. . d5? is a strategic error;
with no pressure on the centre there is no real answer to White's kingside attack: 21 h5 g5 22 lLlh2!) 2 1 cxd4 dxe5 22 dxe5 lL!e7 23 h5 tt:Jd5 (23 . . . g5 24 lLlxg5) 24 1i'e2 ! l:c6 25 hxg6 fxg6 26 lLld4 l:b6 27 1i'g4 tt:Jc5 28 .Uac l .Uf4?? 29 lDh5+ was Rowson-Redpath, practice blitz game, Edinburgh 2000.
19 •.• h6 20 1i'f4?!
20 1i'e3 still seems better, although it makes 1 9 l:fe1 look even more redundant.
20 . . . cxd4 21 cxd4 dxe5 22 dxe5 l:.c6! (D)
Black may be better already. There are lots of potentially good squares for the knights and e5 is a long-term weakness. A slightly more subtle point, revealed in the variations, is that because of the pawn-structure and the position of the pieces, a4 is weaker than a5.
23 h4?!
This move suggests that White was oblivi
ous to the unfavourable trend that has been evi-dent for three moves - poor 'trend sensitivity' . The advance of the h-pawn, although generally a good idea, giving some 'luff to the king and planning h5, doesn't meet the more immediate demands of the position. We have already seen that White has some potential problems but this is the moment before they become real. White has to see that his advantage has gone, and look for a way to keep the balance. Possible ideas:
a) 23 l:ad 1 lDe7 24 lLld4 l:c4 25 tDxe6+?
fxe6 26 l:xd7 l:fxf4 -+.
b) 23 l:ac 1 !? 0.e7 still looks good for Black.
c) 23 lDd4 l:c4 24 lDb5 l:xf4 25 lLlxc7 l:b8 is also no comfort; a4 and e5 remain weak.
These three lines suggest that White's prob
lems are related to one piece in particular. Talk with your pieces; which is the most obvious un
der-performer?
d) 23 lDe4 ! ? (all the other pieces can con
tribute to the struggle at a moment's notice but this knight has to be forcibly involved; a bit like the shy guy who can't find the courage to grace the dance floor) 23 ... l:c4 24 llec l (the queen on f4 and knight on e4 want rid of the pressure on the fourth rank and the a1-rook is needed to protect the a-pawn) 24 ... l:c8 25 llxc4 'i'xc4 26 1i'e3 1i'd5 still leaves Black's position easier to play and e5 continues to be a problem. My first impression of this position was that White has good drawing chances if he can keep his forces coordinated and perhaps distract Black with a few suggestive knight hops. However, I think this position is even better for Black than it looks. Indeed it is a good example of a 'space disadvantage'. It's not just that e5 is weak but
also because there are so many vulnerable squares in White' s camp that it is extremely dif
ficult for him to hold all of the territory. What matters is not space but capacity. Black has less space but plenty of capacity for his pieces while White has lots of space and not enough pieces to cover it all. We might say that White bas a huge castle but only a few soldiers while Black has the same number of soldiers and uses all the empty spaces in the castle as posts to at
tack the white army. However, the primary sig
nificance of this structure, in my view, is that whereas the most natural square for a white knight is e4, there is no 'anchorage' (pawn sup
port) there, whereas a black knight on d5 is not only extremely effective, but also invulnerable.
Knights, because they can 't easily run away, often need pawn support to ensure their sur
vival. Play could continue 27 lZJc3 (27 tlJed2!?
Ac2 doesn't look like the answer and after 27
�6 :c5 28 llel tlJe7 it's not at all clear what White should do next) 27 ... Wb3 28 tt:Jb5 (28 Ac l tDe7 and Black is firmly in control) 28 ... 'ii'xe3 29 fxe3 :.C5 30 lLlfd4 tlJb6 3 1 lLlb3 .C.xe5 32 tlJxa5 t0xa4 ! 33 .rtxa4 .rtxb5 with a probably lost endgame for White.
So in looking at all these moves you may feel that the trend is turning inexorably against White and yet looking at the position after move 22 strongly suggests that White should at least be no more than slightly worse. These are the moments where you have to plunge espe
cially deeply to find a way for White to buck the unfavourable trend. Given that all the normal
looking moves do little to change this, we have to step back and look at this position afresh. We bave already established that we need to in
volve the g3-knight but it seems that it is vul
nerable on e4 and c3 and unsupported on d6. Is there another way?
e) 23 tlJe2 !? is a rather strange move but on reflection it makes good sense. On d4 this knight will be influential and also protected; it con
II'Ols f5, prevents Black from attacking e5 with _Ji:Je7-c6 and contains the possibilities of ()b5-d6 and tlJb3 where desirable. I think that Ibis may be the only solution to White's prob
lems but it's the sort of move you'll only appre
ciate if you are sensitive to the trends of a position. White had to dig deeply in this posi
tion. It is here that things begin to go steadily
downhill, and once the trend has set in, it can be extremely hard to reverse. Now 23 ... tlJe7 (there are other moves, but the nature of the position doesn't seem to change fundamentally) 24 tt:Jed4 tt:Jd5 25 'fid2 llc4 leads to a fairly bal
anced position. I think I still prefer Black but White has promising ideas based on h4, lle4-h4, tlJb3 or .b5. In any case White has halted the unfavourable trend and is no longer playing in a purely reactive role.
23 ... 1lc4 24 :e4 lieS 25 lldl :c1 26 lleel llxdl 27 llxdl tt:Jb6 28 h5 'ii'c2 29 .C.el
29 lld4 may have been a more tenacious defence.
29 ... 1lc4 (D)
w
Now Black is firmly in control. Note how ef
fective the knight has been on g8. In some ways it is 'better' than the knight on g3 because it performs a useful function of protecting f6 and has excellent prospects on c6, d5 or f5. Mean
while, White's g3-knight does very little to contribute to the struggle and largely because of the ineffectiveness of this piece, White finds it difficult to coordinate the army as a whole.
30 'ii'e3 tlJd5 31 'ii'a7 .rtxa4 32 hxg6 \i'xg6 33 llcl h5 34 \i'd7 .C.b4 35 li'd8 tlJge7 36
'ii'xa5 h4 37 tt:Jn llg4 38 tt:Jel 'ii'g5
Alternatively, 38 . . . tlJf4 39 tlJe3 (39 \i'a8 tt:Je2+) 39 ... lLle2+ 40 �fl lLlxc1 4 1 'ii'a3 h3 is also very good for Black.
39 \i'd2 'ibe5 40 tt:Jf3 'ii'f6
Black is a safe pawn up and White's king is vulnerable. The rest of the game is a technical matter but White never managed to reverse the unfavourable trend that began with 19 llfel and was compounded by 23 h4.
41 tlJ1b2 :r4 42 'ife2 ltlc3 43 'it'd3 tt:Jcd5 44 g3 hxg3 45 fxg3 :a4 46 :n ltlrs 47 lbh4 :xb4 48 gxh4?
48 l:[xf5 offers White better drawing pros
pects.
48 ... tlJde3! 49 'i'xe3 ltlxe3 50 .=.xr6 �xf6 (D)
w
White is totally lost because the h-pawn must fall. Even if White could somehow hold this pawn in the short term, he could only do so by placing his knight on a square where it could ultimately be harassed by a black pawn. Black won on move 85.
Botvinnik -Tal
World Ch match (game I), Moscow 1961 1 c4 ltlf6 2 ltlc3 e6 3 d4 i.b4 4 e3 0-0 5 i.d3 d5
Key moment:
1) White's last move was 'peculiar' (sig
nal).
2) White has counterplay pending in that if he can complete his development the two bish
ops will give him a long-term advantage (sensi
tivity).
3) As is often the case with such moments;
one side has short-term promise and the other has long-term potential (sensitivity).
4) Black has many plausible continuations but none that is self-evidently correct (sign/sen
sitivity).
Tal failed to sense the urgency of the task and played a routine move, after which the trends begin to change.
16 ••• :ad8?!
16 ... f5 ! was called for; trying to 'develop' the rook from f8. This move would give Black extra control over e4, the possibility of a timely ... f4 and pressure against e3 if White ever plays f3. Botvinnik suggests that Black would have maintained the initiative after this move but he still has to play vigorously to prevent White from consolidating. A plausible variation is 17 i.c2 l:ad8 1 8 b3 l:[d5 ! ? 19 h3 :cs 20 :a2 lllf6 2 1 l:[d1 ltld5 22 tlJbl liJc3+ 23 ltlxc3 :lxc3 24 i.d2 :lxc2 25 llxc2 .i.xb3.
17 h3 lLlf6 18 i.c2 :ld7 19 b3 :Cd8 20 l:[d1 ttJd3 21 i.xd3 :m3 22 i.b2 (D)
6 a3 dxc4 7 .i.xc4 .i.d6 8 liJf3 lbc6 9 lbb5 e5 B 10 lbxd6 'i'xd6 11 dxe5 'it'xd1+ 12 �xd1 ltlg4 13 �e2 ltlcxe5 14 i.dS c6 15 .i.e4 i.e6 16 lbd2 (D)
B
Now the trends are beginning to change. If you've watched attentively you'll have sensed that Black's initiative has been squashed and that he is beginning to run out of ideas. It is cru
cially important that Black 'wakes up' to this turn of events but it seems that Tal didn't sense
any danger and seemingly considered this posi
tion no different from any other.
22 ... l:t3d7?
22 . .. c5 ! was needed. By fixing the weakness on b3 Black can keep the white pieces some
what bottled up and if White proceeds to capture on f6 he won't be able to unravel his position.
I suppose it's about equal after 22 ... c5 then, with l:tac 1-c3 looking like a reasonable idea for White.
23 .ixf6! gxf6 24 b4! (D)
B
Now Black is worse and the fact he was re
Now Black is worse and the fact he was re