Definición de Base de Datos y Conceptos Básicos

Thus far we have been talking in terms of external controls on behaviour, controls out there in the environment. An alternative is provided by the internal control of 'rule-following'. Rules may be described as statements of contingencies. For example the rule "do not overtake on a blind corner" may be translated as a statement of the contingency "if there is a blind corner (discriminative stimulus) and you overtake (response) you may crash into an oncoming vehicle (punishing consequence)". Rules of the road and rules of good driving practice in a road-user's head may be thought of as internalised statements of contingencies. When made explicit, they not only provide a useful method for transmitting knowledge about contingencies, but they do so without the learner having to experience them directly. They are also of particular use in those situations in which the naturally occurring contingency, i.e. what actually happens, is not very effective at maintaining the desired behaviour. An example would be in the control of slow speeds through a built-up area. Seeing a clear

Obeying rules Decision point

_{Freely riding}

Risks

Get stuck

run ahead, drivers may drive over the speed limit without experiencing any punishing consequence such as a collision. But just so long as the road user follows the correct rule for the conditions, even if on many occasions following the rule is experienced to be unnecessary, a safe outcome is more likely to occur. As amply demonstrated in the commercial aviation sector, in which rules are expressed as Standard Operating Procedures for most routine actions performed by air, ground and maintenance personnel, control by rules is a strategy with a remarkably safe record. Unfortunately there is evidence that where rule-following is not supported by the natural contingencies, the control of behaviour may transfer from the rule to those contingencies. If a driver sees that s/he can break the speed limit without punishing consequences, and is motivated to go faster, then the control of behaviour by the rule may be suspended. Because of this problem, Skinner (1988) emphasised the role of enforcement

in the maintenance of rule-following behaviour that is the addition of consequences other than naturally occurring ones to the behaviour in question. Although rewards for rule-following have been tried out successfully in only a few contexts, punishment for failure to follow a rule has been the more prevalent procedure. This is exemplified by police speed-traps and more generally the detection and penalisation of traffic law violations (see review by Evans 1991). Creating a perception amongst road users of an enhanced enforcement of traffic regulations can produce remarkable changes in behaviour leading to significant decreases in accident statistics (see Epperlein 1987).

In the report of project funded by the European commission with the topic of ―Traffic enforcement in Europe: effects, measures, needs and future‖ (Escape Project, 2003), they released a model of describing compliance of traffic laws based on research into the effects of legislation and enforcement.

According to the model, legislation forms a framework for traffic enforcement. Legislation may influence drivers in three ways. First, enforcement including surveillance, catching the offender, possible prosecution and adjudication creates an objective risk of detection for traffic offences. This, again, has an impact on drivers' perceptions of possibilities of getting caught for infringements. Subjective risk of detection is the drivers' own more or less conscious and less explicit judgment on possibilities of getting caught for violations. Moreover, supportive measures such as media or word of mouth (e.g. communication among professional drivers) may either increase or decrease the subjective risk of detection. Thirdly, the effects of legislation and other sources of information often directly influence behaviour just by making road users aware of the norms or the codes of correct behaviour. This is simply because usually the majority of road users want to comply with the rules, not in order to avoid fines, but simply to behave as prescribed by law. For some road users, however, it is their concepts and experiences of the enforcement system in the last phase that create the deterrence effect of enforcement and make them comply with regulations.

As a guide to TLE policy the model is, however, fairly general and explains only a part of driver behaviour. As the model suggests, there is a direct 'line' from legislation to compliance, suggesting that for some road users the mere existence of a traffic code reinforced by observations of the behaviour of others is sufficient for compliance. Moreover, it is unlikely that compliance is determined mainly by what police do about detection and on the private translation of these actions into subjective risk of detection. The model does not consider other likely determinants of compliance such as how sensible or how fair a regulation may seem to people.

Compliance

Deterrence

Subjective risk

Objective risk

Enforcement

Legislation

Support measures

Figure 38. Model of the mechanism of traffic law enforcements

There is an example in enforcement effectiveness in traffic flow in Table 11.

Table 11. Effects of conventional and fixed camera enforcement on speeds

Type of enforcement Effect in space Effect in time

Conventional = the police monitoring the same site at intervals

Speeds decrease in the vicinity of the surveillance source

Speeds increase after the removal of a surveillance source

Fixed camera = surveillance facilities continuously monitoring at the same site

Speeds decrease in the vicinity of the surveillance source

Speeds do not essentially increase over time