DEFINICIÓN DE CARGOS, PERFILES Y FUNCIONES

and (iii) he believes that, given i) and ii), it is appropriate to spray the roses,

and (iv) there is nothing else he thinks more important, then (v) Fred will spray the roses, (etc.)

m fact, this is only one determinate of the determinable disposition. If one condition is changed, others may have to be revised as well. The difficulty is that all the clauses i) - iii) are themselves are dispositional, and so need to be rewritten in their eaqpanded forms. If they refer to Fred's spraying the roses, the definition is circular. But even if they do not, the word "believes" will re-appear in the new version, leading to yet more eaqpansion, ad infinitum.

Is this conclusive? The dispositionalist can retreat again to "what Fred will do on other occasions" as a way of finding out about these second-order dispositions. But this move now looks like a cloak for vacuity. Dispositions are tendencies for things to hapxm under certain circumstances. But no circumstances for the actions to happen under are, or can be, specified. I

mentioned this piling up of dispositions as a difficulty earlier on, and suggested tdiat we could find harmless parallels for it. (See p.%) But there is a crucial difference that is now clear. In those cases, the dispositions could readily be broken down to the events that satisfy them and the circumstances in idiich they are said to occur. But we cannot see how to do this in the case of belief.

There is one other move open to the

dispositionalist. He can acknowledge the points made above, and say that any characterisation of the circumstances in which an agent acts

must be qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. The agent, on this view, will act in a certain way, if otlmr things are equal. This is a qualification that must be written in to the story about other dispositions, and it must be added to many hypothetical statements. One example where this is true is "If you strike this match, it will

light, " This is a true statement but there are many circumstances under vdiich the striking of the match will not be followed by its lighting. Not many matches will light if th^ are struck in a bucket of water, or in an atmosphere that contains no oxygen. The attempt to state all the exceptions would be an endless one. 3o we qualify the hypothetical with "ceteris paribus."

The necessity of qualifying hypotheticals in this way is a complication of a different kind and a different order from the quandary that the disposition theory creates. In the case of hypotheticals, we can specify some circumstances in which we expect the relevant events to occur. On this account of belief, we cannot do that. We find in hypotheticals that we must bear in mind the many exceptions. we do not find the indefinitely ramifying structure of dispositions that we face if we accept the dispositions theory of belief. W.W. Mellor in "Knowing, Believing, Bfehaving" in Mind 1967 offers a version of the theory that might avoid some of these difficulties. Mellor*s strategy is to develop a legitimate sense of "disposed to act appropriately to p." % starts by talking of knowledge and of behaviour's being appropriate to the facts. Thwi he weakens what he says about knowledge to fit the case of belief. Knowledge is to be explicated by means of certain of the terms that we use to appraise action. "A knows that p" means that "A is disposed to act in some way in which in the light of the fact that p, together with other relevant factors, he would do well to act."

The main other relevant factors are other facts known to A, his beliefs and his motives. Knowledge is an aW.lity to do what is recomnendable in the light of that knowledge. The ability that knowledge brings is a "minimal" one. It is an ability in the sense that anyone is able to play chess, or make chess moves, as opposed to the abilities that a skilled chess­ player has. Any strong sense of "ability" will be vulnerable to counter-examples in «diich the agent fails to do What is appropriate either because of some strong emotion (e.g. panic) or because of a mistake or lapse due to stupidity or even made because of knowledge

that he possesses.

Mellor emgdiasises two features of the appraisal vocabulary to which this account refers. First, it is purely permissive, and has no prescriptive words in it; the strongest words it has are "Justifiable" and "allowable." It applies to behaviour that is not deliberate as well as behaviour that is, as long as it is controllable. It is rich in excuse-words. Second, the basic question underlying these appraisals is "To what extent is the agent's behaviour warranted or justified by the situation which provokes it, or excusable or understandable in the

light of that situation?"

Mellor avoids saying that "Knowledge is a capacity to adjust behaviour in some systematic way to the facts of one's environment." The difficulties that I have been discussing sprang from trying to do this or something very like it. Mellor gives two reasons. "Systematic," he says, implies that there are rules or

laws relating situations, knowledge and behaviour. But if this were so, there would be no distinction between a causal story of action and a story in terms of knowledge. Second, mistakes and lack of knowledge will always invalidate any non-causal rules. It is at this

stage that the crucial point is made. Mellor sayst-

"H%e point is that the concept of knowledge, in its relations to behaviour, cannot be explained without some normative concept of what it is proper, desirable, or at least permissible to do if such and such is the case. For without introducing the notion of a set of standards of some kind, %#e have no general way of saying what it is that knowledge enables us to do. It is perfectly right to say

'knowledge is %#hat enables us to vary out behaviour systematically according to the facts'; but the system must be described as one which %#e ought to follow, not merely as one which we do in fact follow.

"By supplementing the notion of the

recosm endable with that of the permissible, or, more idiomatically, that of 'b^iavlour for which man has good cause, ' we can broatei the relevant standards sufficiently to cover the difficult cases, idiile keeping within the same logical framework."

The analysis that comes out of all this isi-

"'A knows that p' implies that A is likely to behave in some %#ay which is either recowmendable, or at least permissible, in the light of the fact that p, and,

if A does in fact behave in some way of this kind, he probably would not have behaved in that particular way had it not been

reoommendable or at least permissible in the light of the fact that p, unless there %Mre some other reason for doing so, and,

this only applies if A holds no relevant beliefs which are both unreasonable and false."

"Believes" is accommodated by saying "that would be recommendable, or at least permissible, if p %#ere true."

At least one philosopher who opposes the dispositional view of belief has advanced a description of

eiq>lanations of action that is reauudcably like this one. Dray first stated this view in "lews and Explanation in Histery.” and a later restatement is to be found in an article by him in "Philoswhy and History" edited by

s.

"Understanding is achieved when the historian can see the reasonableness of a man's doing what the ag#mt did, givwn the beliefs and purpose referred to; his action can then be explained as having been an 'appropriate' one*

"What it (sc. the action explanation) aims to show is that the sort of thing he did made perfectly good sense from his point of view."

Mellor started his article by saying that a belief was more like a set of possible dispositions than a

disposition. He contrasts belief with motives, which are more like dispositions in ordinary language. They signify a positive likelihood that the events will occur, rather than the single fact that they will or would occur. This is an interesting, if slightly puss ling, remark. It is a pity that by the end of the article he is saying that a belief is like a policy, namely a policy of

conducting oneself as if p were true. For this seems to me a return to the view that belief is a disposition simpliciter. Another thing that is to be regretted in this analysis is the "likely to do..." in it. For in the early stages of the article, Mellor says that he does not think it an adequate characterisation of the belief-disposition if "probably occurs in it. For then the criterion of belief will give no guidance in those cases where the agwt does not act in the way the characterixaticxn specifies. His analysis is different in that it talks of "likelihood" in the

'ordinary language' way, and in that the vord "ought" occurfin it. But I do not see that these differwiees evade the probl<m, that raises himself.

The difficulties that I have raised before can still be found here. Mellor has not avoided reference to what the kgent wants. For it is written in by the reference to "what is recommendable or at least permissible. " The officer who is pinned

down by snipers in a wood will find one sort of action recoswwndable, namely, destroying them, because of his desire to win the battle* But one of his privates, with the same knowledg# of the situation, will find recommendable an action that is not even permissible from the officer's point of view, namely, a prompt retreat, if he wishes to preserve his skin* This example casts doubt on the suggestion that difficulties are avoided by the reference to "what is permissible."

Another objection that recurs from earlier discussion is that what the agent does is «hat seams to him to be reasonable rather than %hat is reasonable. one possible answer to this is to write in a ceteris paribus clause; "the agent is likely to do....ceteris paribus." Mellor might reply that the point that what the agent does is «hat seems to him to be reasonable is supplementary to his analysis, but does not invalidate it.

Ths fundamental objection to this story is that it puts the cart before the horse. It is both true and

important that we have the ^praisal vocabulary to which Mellor

appeals. But it cannot be made to serve Mellor's purpose. For the analysis requires us to posit belief and «mnts in the agents such that his actions will appear, or become, reasonable. But if this is how it works, how could we ever assess an action unfavourably? That is, how oould «#e ever say that what someone did was unreasonable or impermissible, even in the li^t of his beliefs and «#ants?

Only acticms can be reasonable or unreason­ able, permissible or impermissible in the required sense. At least, actions are described in these «mys, but events are not. But it is surely absurd to suppose that all actions are reasonable. One may carry out an action in the light of one's beliefs and «dshes, and still do something unreasonable. But if %#s accept the account offered here.

this will not be possible* Ws %#ill construct beliefs end wants such that the action comas out reasonable*

The point can be explained in another way* The vocabulary and standards that we are calling into use are to do with the appraisal of actions from a certain point of view. But we ceinnot appredse the action in these terms until we know what the agent's beliefs and wishes are. When we say that an acticm is reasonable frcm the agent's point of view, we are assessing it in the lig^t of what we have already discovered about it. One thing that it is important to discover is what the agent believes and wants. So in assessing what he does as reasonable, we must already know about them. without beXefs and wishes, the action fails to be an action at all, and so not even a candidate for assessment in this %#ay. An action nay be reasonable or it may not; it d^>ends on the agent's beliefs and wishes. But Mellor assumes the result of the assessment in order to be able to work out one of the factors involved in making it. This is to put the cart before the horse. It is as if one were to say that an Alsation is to be defined as the kind of dog that wins prizes in the Alsation class in the dog show. To the itninformed enquirer this is no use, unless of course we tell him ind^pmndently %diich class is the Alsation class. The whole point of this appraisal vocabulary is that actions can be placed on a scale of assessment by the use of it. one of the things we must consider in placing them on the scale is the agent's beliefs and wishes. So we can hardly expect first to place it, then to discover what the relevant beliefs and wishes were.

Statements about what the agent wants and believes are preliminaries, not postcripts. Mellor does discuss a difficulty closely related to this one on p. 335.

"What, hoiMver, should we say If A, knowing that p, does something very stupid, yet does it because he knows that p?"

"The best answer seems to be that...the agent must by definition have been trying to do something commendable... "

This may be acceptable in cases of lazi­ ness or panic. Mellor deals with this by weakening the sense in %#hich knowledge is an ability to do what is recommendable, and finally admits that any such assimilation must be pretty heavily qualified. For "a man may become dmaoralised, panic-strickw, enraged or %#ildly elated because he knows some fact." He addA that although one cannot recommend lan^ter, fear, anger, etc., they can be commanded as "appropriate."

But this does not meet my objection at all. For my objection is precisely that behaviour is net always assessed favourably, that is, that an agent is not by definition "trying'^ to do something coanendable." Mellor is considering eases

where the agent's behaviour is not assessed favourably. And the assessment is made in the light of the agent's knowledge. How can this be, if the criterion of knowing depends on giving a favourable assessment of the behaviour?

It would be a mistake to press this objection too far. For it is true in general that explanations of actions aim to show that the action did make sense from the agent's point of view.

m

we

nade some sort of sansa* Wh#m his behaviour does not make sense, when it is not warranted or justified by the situation, then ws start to ask questions#

I accept that "the basic question under­ lying these appraisals is 'TO what extent is the agent's behaviour warranted or justified by the situation vAiich provokes it?"* But it is forced and unnatural to insist that "knows" and "believes" apply to behaviour# It is natural and easy to see "knows" and "believes" as part of the language that we use to describe the situation whi^ provWces the bahaviour# After all, "he knows that#.#" and "he believes that.." are usually to be completed by a description of a situation rather than of an action. Contrast in

this respect "wants" and "intends" etc. Only after we have a description of the situation that provc^ees the action can we answer this basic question.

Mellor identifies the problem correctly. It is to explain what the propositional hook is that Ryle mentions in "Concept of Kind" (p. 129, quoted on p. 11 of this thesis.)

But Mellor interprets the problem as giving a characterization of the sort of thing that one who holds a certain belief is prone to do. What we need is an exploration of the complexities of describing the situation that provokes an action, not of actions. He has not really avoided amy of the difficulties in the dispositional approach. But then, why should we expect any such characterisation to be available? perhaps %#e should be prepared to say that there is not any particular sort of thing that one who holds a certain belief is prone to do* Perhaps erven if such a characterization were available, it would be beside the point.

2* Dispositions as

• Disposition words are special. But it is Qot easy to say exactly in what %#ay they are special# Ryle says in "Concept of M W . " p.125*-

"Dispositions are neither reports of observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of affairs. They narrate no incidents. But their are intimately connected with narratives of incidents, for, if they are true, they are satisfied by narrated incidents."

And on p.43:-

**To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state or undergo a particular change."

One orthodox way of suamarising the special job of disposition %#ords is that their job is the licensing of inferences

idxHit %d%at %#ill happen or what is likely to happen in certain circumstances,