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Definiciones y acepciones de los conceptos Educación Física y Deporte

I. CIVILIZACIÒN-MODERNIDAD-CUERPO

1.5 Definiciones y acepciones de los conceptos Educación Física y Deporte

The previous section mentioned some of the main laws and regulations in Oman that were issued by royal decrees, a sign of government intervention from the highest official, the Sultan, and we have seen instances of White Land in Oman. In this last section, I will layout the effectiveness of government intervention in the real estate market and why I argue it is stronger than the Saudi Arabian government in this respect.

A Saudi real estate expert, Suliman Al Rowaishid (2015), mentions that Oman not only has the highest homeownership rate in the GCC, it is also ranked after Singapore. Oman’s homeownership rate is around 89 percent and it is significantly higher than all Arab countries combined, which is averaged around 62 percent (Al Rowaishid, 2015). His data is from a real estate report published by AL Riyadh newspaper. Moreover, he compares the housing experience between Saudi Arabia and Oman and argues that Oman’s homeownership rate is higher than Saudi Arabia because of the latter’s regulations in housing subsidies (Al Rowaishid, 2015). The difference between Saudi Arabia’s and Oman’s regulations in housing subsidies is that Oman has two segments who qualify for the housing subsidies and Saudi Arabia only has one (Al Rowaishid, 2015). Saudi Arabia’s housing subsidies only goes to low income citizens, where in Oman the subsidies are provided to low income citizens and the rest of citizens, and this policy encompasses more citizens (Al Rowaishid, 2015). According to this policy, land is distributed to all citizens who apply. The difference between low income subsidies and all other Omani

applicants is that the first segment earns a zero-interest loan, while the second’s loan includes a 2 to 4 interest on their housing loan (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000). This is why Oman has an 89 percent home ownership rate (Al Rowaishid, 2015). Therefore, the difference between the housing policies in the two countries is that Oman’s policy includes all citizens and Saudi Arabia’s policy is only for low income citizens (Al Rowaishid, 2015). This shows us how the Omani government is strong in its intervention in the real estate market to a point where it put itself as the highest country in terms of home ownership among its GCC counterparts.

With respect to royal decree NO. 56/2014, which is promulgated to prevent GCC citizens from leaving their newly owned land undeveloped (i.e. to prevent White Land), this is a good example of the Omani government’s swift intervention to regulate the real estate market. As Al Fardan (2015) argues that this royal decree was inactive in 2014, but became active in 2015 as soon as the Omani government realized that some GCC citizens who own land in Oman have not developed it and held it off the market to raise prices. This fast government response to a real estate market irregularity shows us that the government does not face obstacles in intervening in the real estate market. But this example pertains to outsiders who enter the Omani real estate market and disrupt it, what about Omani citizens who attempt to do the same behavior?

To answer the previous question, I will use my interviews’ data26. With respect to White

Land owned by Omanis, we can discern from the interviews that there are some plots of White Land in the country. However, almost all interviewees say that White Land cannot be considered to be a phenomenon in the country. The last interviewee said when answering my question about White Land that, “the government prevented it a long time ago by confiscating White Land and some of it was made to housing blocks, and this is not like what GCC governments have done, the Omani government has limited White Land to a point where we cannot say there is a White

Land phenomenon in Oman.” With respect to Omani elites’ presence in the real estate market, one of the interviewees said that, “the elites in Oman are not focusing on the real estate market because they are busy with their commercial interest that they had a long time ago.” Hence, consistent with my argument, White Land in Oman is not a phenomenon that is negatively affecting the real estate market because of the continuation of Oman’s old established elites, who have a diversified economic base, and, thus, the government could easily intervene in the real estate market because it has not coped with strong opposition from elites that do not solely depend on real estate profit.

5 CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The last two chapters utilized the method of process-tracing to explain, with empirical evidence, the causal mechanisms for both monarchies and the difference in the outcomes of White Land between Saudi Arabia and Oman. Both chapters illustrated how the Saudi Arabian and Omani monarchical institutions adopted similar strategies for their survival. Variation in the outcome of the strategies between the two countries was a result of Saudi Arabia’s replacement of its old elites and the continuation of Oman’s old elites. This has led to a variation in the outcome that pertains to the issue of White Land in both countries. In this chapter, I will test my deductive new theory27 with the findings of the structured, focused comparison from the case study chapters. The main findings of the previous two chapter’s causal mechanisms will be presented under subheadings that pertain to their relevant themes. Both causal mechanisms of the two case studies have followed Bennett and Checkel (2015) process-tracing criteria28, and in this chapter, I will illustrate the remaining two criterions on alternative explanations.

Before I begin presenting and analyzing the findings of the two chapters’ structured, focused comparison, I will mention again the two causal mechanisms of the chapters to make it easier for the reader to read them in this chapter instead of going back to the previous chapters. Causal Mechanism for Saudi Arabia’s Case:

1970s Oil Boom→ Government Distribution of Wealth and Land → Creation of New Elites → Elites Entering the Real Estate Market → White Land → Housing Crisis → Weak Government Intervention

27 George and Bennett (2005) explain that deductive theory testing is a test for a new theory or filling in gaps in the

literature. My theory that explains land distribution as a strategy for authoritarian survival is a new theory, and that is why it is deductive.

Causal Mechanism for Oman’s Case:

1970s Oil Boom→ Government Distribution of Wealth and Land → Continuation of Old Elites → Elites Enter the Real Estate Market → White Land → Strong Government Intervention