Definiciones Conceptuales

A crucial factor to take into consideration on the agent level during constructive engagement is what Putnam referred to as the two-level game. Putnam asserts that 162_{this also refers again back to Keohane and Nye´s characteristic of complex interdependence (an ideal}

state of world politics) which among other features requires multiple channels connecting societies including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements as well as informal ties among non-governmental elites, Robert O. Keohane, Joseph N. Nye, Power and

Interdependence, p.21

163_{Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History}

and Current Policy p.10

164

William J. Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation”, in David Cortright, (ed) The Price of Peace – Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, ( New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publ.) 1997, p.89

though Nye and Keohane are the intellectual fathers of international regime theory, the role of domestic factors was largely neglected in their work. Rejecting states as complete unitary actors, Putnam constructed a two-level, win-set-based model, which incorporates a general equilibrium theory for the interaction of domestic and international factors. According to Putnam, international negotiations have to be divided into a two-level game:

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.165

For negotiators, this means that they have to appear at both board games. Moves that are rational on one board may not be perceived as such on the other. The task of a political leader / negotiator is to negotiate outcomes which are consistent on both boards. 166 Given the fact that these two environments have different dynamics, Putnam provides a sequential model: (a) Level I: bargaining between negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement (b) Level II: separate discussions within each domestic group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. At this stage, the domestic groups can only agree or disagree with the outcome; any amendments require agreement from all other parties involved.167Accordingly, Putnam argues that the requirement that any Level I agreement must in the end be ratified on Level II, makes the “win-set” for any given Level II constituents the set of all feasible Level I agreements that would “win”, i.e. gain the necessary majority among the constituents, when simply voted up or down. 168 Thus, Level II “win-sets” are crucial for understanding Level I agreements because (a) larger Level II “win-set”, will make

165_{Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International}

Organization, Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), p. 434 ;see alsoJames Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review Nr. 88:3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 577-592

166

Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, pp.434-435

167_{ibid, pp. 436-437} 168_ibid

Level I agreements more likely (b) the relative size of the respective Level II “win- set” will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. Thus, the larger the perceived “win-set” 169 of a negotiator, the more he/she can be pushed around by another Level I negotiator.170For Putnam three factors determine the “win- set”: (a) distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalition among Level II constituents; (b) Level II political institutions, (c) Level I negotiator’s strategies. Applying these determinants to constructive engagement two-level negotiations, the “win-set” would be determined as following:

(a) Generally, the lower the cost of no-agreement, the smaller the “win-set”. The size of the “win-set” (i.e. the negotiation room for the Level I negotiator) depends on the relative size of, what Putnam refers to, as “the relative size of the isolationist forces (who oppose international cooperation in general) and the internationalists (who offer “all-purpose” support).”171 Again asymmetries in interdependence tend to have impact in that “all-purpose support for international agreements is probably greater in smaller, more dependent countries with more open economies, as compared to more self-sufficient countries, like the US [...]” 172 Thus, during constructive engagement B’s relative vulnerability to no agreement with A, will make “all-purpose support” more likely. By the same token, however, cleavages between “hawks and doves” (i.e. factional conflicts on Level II) raises the risk of involuntary defection on Level I.173

(b) The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger their “win-set” and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement. Yet, ceteris paribus, the stronger a state is

169_{Larger “win-sets” with a broader range of alternatives can achieve a broader supportive collation} 170_{ibid, pp. 437-440}

171

ibid, pp. 442-443

172_{ibid, p. 443} 173_{ibid, p.444}

in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally.174

(c) Each Level I negotiator will want to maximize the other’s “win-set”, but not necessarily his own, as whilst this will increase the likelihood of an agreement, it will also weaken his bargaining position vis-à-vis the other negotiator. A way around this dilemma is the use of conventional side-payments and generic “good-will.” The two-level approach, however, emphasizes that the value of international side-payments should be calculated in terms of its overall value to the likelihood of ratification, rather than in terms of its overall value to the recipient nation.175 Simultaneously, Level I negotiators have a strong interest in the popularity of their counterpart, since state B’s popularity increases the size of his “win-set’, and thus increases both the odds of success and the relative bargaining leverage of state A. As such, negotiators should be expected to try to reinforce one another’s standing with their respective constituents and hence expand their “win-sets.”176

Overall, Putnam’s model of the interaction between the domestic and international spheres and treating them as mutually dependent provides a crucial variable for constructive engagement, in that it helps us to understand domestic roots for voluntary, and more importantly, involuntary defection during international negotiation. In the case of Iran, this means that negotiations are subject to domestic factions.

174_{This refers mainly to totalitarian regimes, where diplomats representing an entrenched dictatorship are}

less able than representatives of a democracy to claim that the domestic pressures at home make it difficult to accept the deal. ibid, p.449

175_{ibid, p.450} 176_{ibid, pp. 450- 451}