Definiciones fundamentales de electrónica

The Chilean Left, one of the oldest of the continent, had developed and grown since the late nineteenth century, and exhibited, in the words of Jocelyn-Holt, a ‘extremely high historical density’ (1998: 116). It went back to the left-wing Popular Front (Frente Popular) coalition which came to power in 1938, and the subsequent participation of the socialists (and, until 1947, the Communists) in the governments led by the Radical

Party. Even further back, it echoed the short-lived Socialist Republic of 1932, a twelve- day populist dictatorship,3 _{and the presidential campaigns of leaders such as} Marmaduque Grove and Luis Emilio Recabarren. The origins of the Chilean Left date back to the social question, especially among the nitrate workers in the north of the country, and the mobilisation and repression of the workers in that era.4

Despite this long trajectory and historical density, much of the project as presented by the Left in 1970 was relatively recent. It reflected a change of strategy, not completely unlike that of the socialcristianos in the 1950s, by both of its main constituents, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista¸ PS) and the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile, PCCh), which took place in the 1950s and which eventually led to the construction of the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’.5 _{The ideology of the UP was by no} means uniform, though. The different parties held heterogeneous views of society and maintained different positions regarding modernity.6

Consequently, the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ left much room for interpretation, especially on the exact nature of socialism.7

It also tended to focus more on the path towards socialism than on the shape and form of a socialist society itself.8

This is not to say that the members of the UP held no common ideologies or common positions regarding modernity. The central postulations of the UP were shared by most members of the coalition, uniting them in a position regarding the modern that was almost as ambiguous as that of the Christian Democrats before them. In this case, the central issues consisted in the consecutive rejection and embrace of elements of what are considered two central institutions of modernity, capitalism and democracy.

3 _{These twelve days would have a great impact on the future. During this Socialist Republic a law was} approved allowing for the takeover by the state of industries that were poorly administrated. This law, long since forgotten, was rediscovered by the UP and would come to play a crucial role in the implementation of the Chilean road. For a detailed description of the Socialist Republic, see: Luis Cruz Salas (1978); Jorge Arrate and Eduardo Rojas (2003a: 146-156).

4 _{It is no coincidence that the first party of the Left, the Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Obrero Socialista,} POS) was founded in Iquique, the centre of the nitrate industry, and as early as 1912.

5 _{The historian Gonzalo Vial traces the origins of the UP back to 1952, when Allende ran for president} for the first time. However, this is, in my view, putting too much emphasis on the person of Allende: in 1952 the Communist-Socialist union, which is the backbone of the UP, was less than embryonic, as the PS was still split into two competing sections, and the Communist Party was still outlawed (2005: 53-55). 6 _{Apart from the Socialist and Communist Parties, the UP consisted of the Movimiento de Acción Popular} Unitaria (Unitary Popular Action Movement, MAPU), and three smaller parties, among which the Radical Party. In 1971, it was joined by the Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left, IC), which was, like MAPU, a splinter from the PDC.

7 _{Marc Falcoff (1991: 25) argues that the UP programme was one of the ‘most thorough and} comprehensive (…) ever offered to the voters of any democratic nation’. This applies mainly for the macro policy level, though. The programme only provided a rough outline of the shape and form the new socialist society should take. Furthermore, it left the question of the actual implementation of the project in terms of political and juridical mechanisms largely open. See: Altamirano (1978: 23), Bitar (1986: 24), and Corvalán (2001: 158).

8 _{In this sense the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ contrasts with the communitarian ideology of the} Christian Democrats, which provided an elaborate blueprint of society but lacked a concrete programme for its implementation.

The UP’s emphasis on these two institutions fitted the particular timeframe Chile experienced at that moment. 9 _{As Garretón and Moulian argue, by the 1970s the} compatibility of capitalism and democracy had become exhausted. The rhythm of economic growth could no longer accommodate the growing popular demands, and the combination of a capitalist economy with a ‘providing state’ had become unsustainable. For the Right, this deadlock could only be overcome by limiting the democratic functions of the state and stimulating economic growth by restricting both participation and redistribution.10 _{For the Left, the solution lay in reversing the patterns of capitalist} development, while reinforcing the democratic structures of the country (Garretón and Moulian 1983: 32-33). However, even if sectors of the Left advocated a full break with the trajectory towards modernity the country had followed so far, the eventual project of the Left was characterised by its gradualist and reformist approach.

The UP and Capitalism

The Chilean Left’s approach to capitalist modernity has been a complex one. For decades, the Left had taken a highly pragmatic position towards capitalism, following more or less a social-democrat line of action. Toward the 1960s this approach changed, and sectors of the Left took a more confrontational stance towards capitalism. This did not, however, constitute a rejection of modernity as such. Rather, it was argued that capitalism was an obstacle to true progress and modernisation, and that true modernity could only be constructed by limiting (or even replacing) the free market.

The actual rejection of capitalism had not been a strong feature of the agenda of the Left until the mid-1950s. Before that time, both the PS and the PC had followed nonconfrontational lines of action, prioritising access to power over political idealism. In 1933 the Communist party already stated that the revolution in Chile was of a ‘democratic and bourgeois’ character, meaning that it should take place gradually, through the ballot and in cooperation with the bourgeoisie. The Socialist Party, founded in the same year by Marmaduque Grove, formally rejected this strategy, stating in its declaration of principles that:

evolutionary transformation through the democratic system is impossible because the dominant class […] has erected its own dictatorship in order to hold the workers in misery and ignorance and to impede their emancipation (quoted in Arrate and Rojas 2003a: 170).

Despite its formal resistance towards gradualism, though, the PS steered a pragmatic course, especially after joining the Centre-Left coalition governments led by the Radical Party, starting with the Popular Front (Frente Popular) government of 1938. During this period, the socialists never seriously proposed fundamental changes to the economic structures of the country, postponing, in the words of the historian Luis Corvalán, ‘the

9 _{Barrington Moore (1966) has argued that capitalism and democracy form key elements in the} trajectories towards modernity. The way societies, and particularly elites, deal with the market and the political system may have a decisive outcome on how modernity takes shape.

socialist ideal to an undefined future’ (2001: 44). Instead, the PS prioritised economic development and ISI industrialisation over the redistribution of wealth (Falcoff 1991: 31; Roxborough et al. 1977: 26).11

Only in the early 1950s, after a profound ideological crisis which split the Socialist Party into the PS Chile and the more radical Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP), was this so-called colaboracionismo (collaboration) abandoned. In the following years both sections re-evaluated their positions and revived their traditional positions towards capitalism. In the General Congress of the PSP in 1955, tellingly titled ‘Revolution or Misery’, the final text issued a call to ‘destroy the capitalist economic order and promote the construction of a Revolutionary State which will promote the interests of the working classes’ (quoted in Corvalán 2001: 50).

Even though the two sections came back together in 1957, the PS remained divided between a moderate camp, led by Salvador Allende, which followed a gradualist approach and sought to create a broad coalition for its reformist views, and a radical camp, which followed a clearly independent line and resisted cooperation with centrist forces. These two conflicting positions were not resolved until the 1980s, and even though generally the PS remained a reformist and centrist party, the radical forces had clearly gained ground after the Popular Front period (Roxborough et al. 1997: 33-34).12 As a result, the position of the PS on capitalism was, although fundamentally dismissive, at best ambiguous.

The Communist Party, for its part, had followed a much steadier ideological course in this respect.13

It had maintained its pragmatic, gradualist and non-confrontational course throughout the years, even though it had been banned from government and subsequently outlawed from 1948 until 1958 under the so-called Ley de la defensa permanente de la Democracia (permanent protection of democracy law). At the 10th Congress of the PC, held clandestinely in 1956, the party reiterated its gradualist position and their strategy of working together with the bourgeoisie within the institutional framework (Corvalán 2001: 47).14

Rather than projecting the rapid abolishment of capitalism as such, it proposed a revolution which was ‘anti-imperialist, anti-feudal [and] anti-oligarchic’, in other words, attacking the economic domination of

11 _{One of the elements contributing to this pragmatism and cooperation of the Left was the need to form} a block against the emergence of fascism both in Europe and in Chile itself (De Vylder 1974: 41). The economic crisis of the 1930s also created a consensus that the fulfilment of the most direct need of the working class, work, should be prioritised above far-fetched ideological ideals.

12 _{As will be shown in the following chapters, the Socialist Party actually split again in 1979 due to more} or less the same ideological differences (see Chapter 5.2.2), only to reunite once more ten years later. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, a similar division, albeit less profound, can be distinguished in the autoflagelante-autocomplaciente debate among the Chilean Left (see Chapter 6).

13 _{This is not to say that the PC did not experience profound ideological changes. In particular the re-} evaluation of Stalin’s rule after his death in 1953 had a considerable impact on the party, which had been deeply Stalinist.

14 _{The gradual and peaceful approach of the PC received ample international support from the twentieth} Congress of the Soviet-Union Communist Party, which in the same year adopted the notion of a ‘peaceful revolution’. Although it merely confirmed the strategies followed so far, this endorsement allowed the Chilean PC to make them official.

the United States, the landowners and the oligarchy (quoted in Furci 1984: 58). This reflected a tendency to prioritise the destruction of patterns of economic exploitation which had been persistent in the country for decades over the establishment of a radically new economic order in the short or even mid-term.15

When, in 1958, the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular, FRAP), a coalition of the reunited Socialist Party and the recently re-legalised communists, took part in the elections, the differences in approach towards capitalism (and, as will be seen later, democracy) were far from resolved. In many ways, the FRAP, like the UP later, could only function effectively when the internal ideological divisions were ignored or neglected (Corvalán 2001: 57). As a result, the project of the Left, taken as a whole, was ambivalent in its position towards capitalism. On the one hand, it shared a fundamental rejection of capitalism as a foundation for modern society while on the other, the actual political position towards capitalism varied from reformist to revolutionary. Even though the Chilean Left had gained considerable influence after the Popular Front period, and had radicalised profoundly in the 1960s, by 1970 large sections of the UP (mainly Allende and the Communists) still did not envisage a clear break with the capitalist system during the presidency of Allende (Roxborough et al. 1977: 72).

The Left’s criticism of modern capitalism did not necessarily constitute a rejection of modernity as such.16 _{Following classical Marxist lines of thought, the UP considered} the adoption of socialism as a form of progress, where the ‘old’ would be replaced by the ‘new’. Capitalism, rather than being a primordial expression of modernity, was seen as obsolete, or, in the words of the UP programme, ‘a system which does not correspond to present-day requirements’. It had remained in place because it was supported by the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy, whose survival depended on it, but it was no longer a viable system. As Luis Corvalán, leader of the Communist Party, argued, some months before the 1970 elections:

The actual production relations have stopped corresponding to the development of the productive forces, the social movement in all its meaning, and the epoch in which humanity lives. (…) Neither the Right, nor the present- day governing party, nor any political form which leaves the foundations of the actual system standing, can satisfy the needs that are imposed by the development of history (speech by Luis Corvalán 1970).

As a result, the implementation of Socialism was considered to be a form of progress, in which an obsolete system would be replaced by a more modern one (Larraín 2001: 122). However, this modernising outlook of the UP was not emphasised in the official

15 _{The moderate position and institutional orientation of the Communist Party may be somewhat} surprising given the repression it underwent, between 1948 and 1958, from its former allies, including the Radical Party and the Socialist Party. Partly this was due to its tight organisation and loyalty to Moscow, as well as by the longstanding parliamentary tradition of the PC, having participated in parliamentary politics from 1921 onwards.

16 _{As has been argued in Chapter 1, Socialism should not be interpreted as an ‘alternative to modernity’} but rather as an ‘alternative modernity’, besides for instance capitalism.

discourse, as it would associate it with the ‘modernisations’ of the Christian Democrats. Any similarity with the project of the PDC had to be downplayed in order not to alienate the radical electorate. The competition between the Centre and the Left did not allow for a ‘modernising discourse’ of the Left, leaving room only for a revolutionary discourse, which emphasised rupture and neglected continuity. As Moulian puts it:

In the Unidad Popular there existed a desire for change, but not for the word modernity. Who stands for modernity? Frei. Who stands for capitalist modernisation? Frei. The UP has another modernity, Socialist modernity. But this could not be said. The Communists within the UP certainly had an obsession with the modern: the battle of production, the development of the productive forces, all kinds of developmental ideas. Allende himself, too, was sensible to the idea of continuity and that fundamentally the revolution is a succession of reforms. But this could not be said. There existed discursive impossibilities that did not allow for these things to be said (interview with Tomás Moulian 15-05-2004).

Beneath this revolutionary discourse, the project contained many developmentalist and reformist elements. It was considered to produce greater levels of development and progress than the present, capitalist circumstances would allow for.17

During his victory speech, on 5 September 1970, Allende put it thus:

We have won in order to overthrow once and for all the imperialist exploitation, to put an end to monopolies, to carry out a serious and profound agrarian reform, to control the import and export trade, and to nationalise credit. These things will make Chile’s progress possible and will create the social capital which will promote our development (speech by Salvador Allende 1970).18

17 _{This line of argument is highly indebted to economists such as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezey, who have} argued that free-market capitalism leads to inefficient allocation of consumption and investment, and that only economic planning can overcome this deficiency. See: Baran and Sweezey (1966). For further discussion of the developmental theories underpinning the UP ideology see section 4.1.2.

18 _{Even those who did not follow this line of argument tended to view socialism as being closely related} to modernity and progress. For instance, Clodomiro Almeyda, one of the more radical Socialist leaders, stressed the link between Socialism and Latin American underdevelopment. In Europe, he argued, economic liberalism had been successful because of the deep entrenchment of modern bourgeois individualism. Consequently, liberalism could not yield positive results in Chile, because of its lack of modern culture and virtues like hard work, foresight and saving. In short, economic liberalism was too modern a system for the traditional Chilean culture: ‘The economic liberalism of the European countries […] has produced results because those peoples have an individualist, bourgeois consciousness which has been formed over the centuries. […] Here, the same freedom to work, invest, consume and live, produces completely contradictory effects. There, in Europe, more savings; here, waste. There, in Europe, efficiency; here, disorder; there, economic stability; here, inflation; there, progress, here stagnation. The attempt to artificially introduce ways of life, of thinking and of organising in Latin America, which are foreign to our historic period, has been the fundamental cause of the dead end in social development which is being experienced by our countries (speech by Clodomiro Almeyda 1964: 22)’. This line of argument interestingly closely follows that of the Chilean conservatives, who have argued that in Chile liberal modernity does not take root, as it is imported from the outside, and does not connect with patterns of Chilean identity. See Chapter 1.

Finally, the attempts of the UP to put an end to the domination over the economic realm by several, largely traditional, minority groups, include strong elements of modernisation. In many ways, this was a form of ‘economic democratisation’, opening up a traditionally exclusive system to the masses, and empowering them in the control over the means of production. Even though the project did not follow strict liberal lines, it was emancipatory and democratising, and sought to replace traditional, restricted economic structures with ones that responded better to the demands of a modern mass society. Allende, in his inaugural address, placed it explicitly in the context of the progress of the country:

Our road, our path, is that of liberty - liberty for the expansion of our productive forces, breaking the chains that have smothered our development so far (…) and liberty for all Chileans who work for a living to gain social control over and ownership of their work centres.

In this sense, and despite the revolutionary discourse, this was a modernising project, which sought to overcome the structural blockages for the true development and progress of the people.

The UP and Democracy

Democracy, generally considered to be another fundamental pillar of modernity, was