Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
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will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court. (n)
a. AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS|G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006 | 487 SCRA 119
JURAT vs. ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The case highlights the fundamental difference between a jurat and an acknowledgment and based on the distinction, the Court held that a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary public.
ISSUE IN THE CASE: Of note is the decision of the RTC which admitted the will to probate notwithstanding the defects thereof (no signature of witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause, no signature of the testator on the left margin of the second page of the will, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages used upon which the will was written, and the lack of acknowledgment).
b. REYES vs. VDA. DE VIDAL | No. L-2867, 21 April 1952
Every will must be executed in a language known to the testator. While this requirement is mandatory and, as a rule, must be proved during probate proceedings, a failure to introduce evidence in this respect DOES NOT necessarily justify the denial of probate. Under certain conditions, knowledge of the language in which the will was written may be presumed.
ISSUE IN THE CASE: the probative value of the testimony of the instrumental witnesses must be noted, particularly when such testimony is sought to be controverted by the testimony of an expert witness.
[Comment: The case included in the Outline is Sy vs. Reyes, but I can’t find the case related to articles 805-806.]
c. ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO | No. L-18979, 30 June 1964
Article 805 requires that each of the subscribing witnesses should sign each and every page of the will on the left margin. This requirement is, as a rule, mandatory and a failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect.
Icasiano holds that the failure of a witness to sign one of the pages of the will through inadvertence or oversight (there being no bad faith or fraudulent intent) can be cured by the presentation of a carbon duplicate of the will which contains all the required signatures. This ruling is based on the principle of liberal interpretation of the statutory requirements for the formal validity of the will, provided that the need to safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the will is not compromised. It is important, for the proper understanding of this case, to differentiate a duplicate copy of a document from a duplicate-original thereof.
d. ORTEGA vs. VALMONTE | G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005
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CORE ISSUES: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud in the making of the will; and (ii) what constitutes a sound and disposing mind.
FRAUD: Fraud “is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretence, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executed, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioners, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
The omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
WHAT CONSTITUTE SOUND AND DISPOSING MIND: The three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of;
(2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty; and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them, and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
3. 808
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice;
once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)
a. ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA, JR. | G.R. No. 74695, 14 September 1993
MEANING OF “BLIND TESTATOR”: A person unable to read the draft of his will, either because of poor, defective or blurred eyesight must be considered blind for the purpose of compliance with the additional formalities prescribed in Article 808.
Inability to read by reason of illiteracy is included within the broader concept of "blindness" for the purpose of the same article.
NOTA BENE: Alvarado makes a landmark exception to the rule of strict compliance when it affirmed the probate order despite non-compliance with the double reading requirement. How this decision will affect the court’s interpretation of the other formal requirements of the law remains to be seen.
4. 810-811
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
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subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)
a. ROXAS vs. DE JESUS, JR. | No. L-38338, 28 January 1985
GENERAL RULE: Article 810 of the Civil Code requires, among others, that a HOLOGRAPHIC WILL BE DATED.
EXCEPTION: While a complete date is generally required, an incomplete date which sets forth only the month and the year of execution, is not a fatal defect if it can be shown that there was no bad faith, fraud, and undue and improper influence and pressure. Probate is further justified if the genuineness of the handwriting of the testator is proved, or otherwise admitted by the parties, and the only ground for opposing probate is the technicality resulting from an incomplete date.
5. 830 & 834 in relation to 172
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (n)
Art. 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made should be revoked.
(714)
Art. 172. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent except in cases provided by law. (1416a)
6. 854
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
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insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. (814a)
a. ACAIN vs. IAC | No. L-72706, 27 October 1987
SURVIVING SPOUSE COULD NOT BE PRETERITED: Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance for she is not in the direct line.
PRETERITION OF THE ADOPTED CHILD: Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
b. ROSALES vs. ROSALES | No. L-40789, 27 February 1987
A daughter-in-law is not a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law. This is because of the absence of blood relationship between the two. The surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
c. VENT*** vs. COURT OF APPEALS – Sister 7. 863
Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator. (781a)
a. NUGUID vs. NUGUID | No. L-23445, 23 June 1966
GENERAL RULE: The area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY of the testator and the DUE EXECUTION OF THE WILL.
EXCEPTION: If it should appear on the face of the will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary disposition and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification of the will itself.
b. DY SEANGIO vs. REYES | G.R. No. 140372-72, 27 November 2006
ISSUES RESOLVED IN THE CASE:
Where the sole disposition of a purported will is the disinheritance of a compulsory heir, the disinheritance is considered a property disposition. Therefore, the document is must be considered a will because it conveys property.
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The failure of the testator to institute an heir or to even mention by name any of the compulsory heir, per se, does not constitute preterition.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE: Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed him in the absence of Alfredo.
c. ARANAS vs. ARANAS | G.R. No. L-56249 May 29, 1987
The Last Will and Testament shows that it was the intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one among themselves.
As a USUFRUCTUARY HAS THE RIGHT TO ENJOY the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, WITH THE OBLIGATION TO RETURN, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
8. 891
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871)
a. SUMAYA vs. IAC | G.R. Nos. 68843-44, 2 September 1991
The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost to an innocent purchaser of the reservable property. For the protection of the said reservees, it is important that the reservable character of the property must be properly annotated at the back of the title thereto. However, even absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third party purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the reservable character of the property, then the reversionary rights of the reservees shall be upheld.
b. MENDOZA vs. DELOS SANTOS | G.R. NO. 176422 : March 20, 2013
TRANSMISSION: There are three lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
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reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.
The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title. Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.
LIMITATION – 3RD DEGREE: The petitioners are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus, the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They CANNOT even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
9. 902; 992
Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
a. MADARCOS vs. DE LA MERCED | G.R. No. 39975, 30 June 1989
LEGAL HEIRS: The restrictive meaning refers to heirs called upon to inherit by intestacy. However, the more liberal interpretation would include any person called to succeed, either by virtue of a will, or by intestacy.
CORE ISSUE IN THE CASE: Proper construction of the term "legal heirs" as used in §119 of the Public Land Act which provides: Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
The term "legal heirs" is used in §119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they maybe so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
The term "legal heirs" is used in §119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they maybe so if the law reserves a legitime for them.