The Royal Commission on Social Policy advocated for ‘biculturalism’ in policy making. They intended it to mean the sharing of responsibility for policy and service
design and delivery by both Māori and non-Māori (1988). Since this time, the idea of biculturalism has become increasingly embedded, not only in policy but also in national values. What this means exactly, or even approximately is still however, not entirely clear.
There are a number of explanations for the growth of biculturalism. Ranginui Walker (2004) argues that biculturalism evolved largely out of urbanisation, specifically out
of the increased interaction between Māori and Pākeha. Intermarriage, shared work places, shared communities and an increased use of Māori icons as national icons
have all led to an inherent biculturalism. Walker also argues, that while Pākeha culture was once simply English culture transplanted to New Zealand, after almost
two centuries of close interaction, there is a distinctly New Zealand Pākeha community which has more in common with its contemporary Māori counterpart
than its English mother.
In a more narrow policy context, Larner (2006) argues that it is the combination of neo-liberalism and tino rangatiratanga discourses that have given rise to the New Zealand conception of biculturalism. The neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s
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had a significant impact on Māori. However, Māori political resurgence had already gained momentum by this time meaning that Māori were in a position to respond to the challenges of neo-liberal reform. It is out of this interaction that Larner argues the rhetoric of biculturalism was born.
Regardless of its specific origins, there is an asymmetry in the bicultural relationship.
For Māori to survive in the political economy, they are “impelled to learn and function in two cultures” (Walker, Ranginui 2004 p.389). Contrastingly, Pākeha who drive the political economy, are not subject to the same imperative and many are mainly monolingual and monocultural. There are however, a growing number of
bicultural Pākeha and it is not uncommon for some Pākeha to have a better fluency in Te Reo Māori and knowledge of tikanga than many Māori, either by choice or by
necessity (Walker, Ranginui, 2004).
Bicultural conceptions of citizenship are increasingly being challenged by the global economy and changing migration flows. Arguably the most important debate is around whether policy emphasis on a bicultural model, based on the relationship
between Māori and Pākeha, is legitimate in a society with growing migrant and
second and third generation migrant communities especially from the Pacific and Asia (Larner 2006). The key arguments of advocates for multiculturalism over
biculturalism are that biculturalism does not represent the reality of the nation’s
makeup and that one minority should not have priority over other minorities. They
argue that other ‘disadvantaged’ communities miss out on opportunities and support because of a biased focus on Māori. This argument however would suggest that the driver behind biculturalism is Māori disadvantage when this is not entirely the case as it critically overlooks the importance of indigineity and Treaty rights in the
relationship between Māori and the government (Cheyne et al. 2008).
The conflicting argument includes an expressed suspicion among bicultural advocates that the multiculturalist rhetoric is diversionary and simply an excuse for
the State to overlook its responsibilities to Māori (Larner 2006). Advocates of
biculturalism cite the Treaty of Waitangi as a constitutional document that justifies the partnership position of Māori as signatories above other cultures. More practical arguments relating to indigineity are also proposed and centre on the idea that it
34 makes more sense for nation states to protect their indigenous cultures above their migrant cultures. Ranginui Walker (2004) provides the example of language protection. He replies to arguments that Asian, Pasifika and other minority languages
should be paid similar attention to Māori language in New Zealand with the counter
argument that the primary protector of indigenous language should and can be the nation to which it is indigenous rather than the nation to which such cultures have emigrated.
Moving on from biculturalism, ‘progressive’ UK and European policy ideas have
materialised on the New Zealand policy scene in fairly recent times, most
particularly the theory of ‘social inclusion’ that was popular with the Fifth Labour Government and noted earlier in the chapter. There is however, a “fundamental tension” between indigenous aspirations in post-colonial society and social policy with a British or European perspective of inclusion and exclusion (Humpage 2006 p.226). Around the mid-2000s, the United Kingdom under Tony Brown was solidifying its New Social Democracy, the ideas of which would make their way
onto the New Zealand policy landscape. During Labour’s tenure as the leader of
successive governments, the party began to push the new social democratic rhetoric of social inclusion. The idea was to identify and analyse why certain groups lack the means for social participation and integration and remedy those shortcomings (Humpage 2006). While on the surface it would seem that such an approach would
be of benefit to Māori, there are some fundamental flaws in the reasoning behind social inclusion. According to Humpage (2006) the social inclusion discourse is fundamentally incapable of dealing with difference as it is based on the artificial
polarisation between two apparently homogenous groups and doesn’t account for all the varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion. The concept also defines a certain
idea of ‘normal’ as an ideal to be aspired to, an ideal which may not be desirable for
all groups in society.
One area specific to Māori where this idea fails is around voluntary exclusion for the betterment of the group. This is expressed through the desire for tino rangatiratanga, the rise in number of Māori service providers and the prominence of Māori medium education (Durie 1998). The Royal Commission summed this up well when they
35 situation, partly from the objective circumstances of colonisation, and partly from
choice” (1988, p.42). A more detailed discussion of this concept is outside the scope of this study. However, the inclusion of social inclusion in national policy has provided interesting lessons on the failures of good intentions and the unique nature of New Zealand society, owing in great part to the place of Māori in that society.
On the international scene, interest in the rights of indigenous peoples has grown in recent decades, culminating in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). The movement toward culturally competent methods of practice is not confined to New Zealand but is apparent in an increasing number of nations with significant indigenous populations.
Anti-racist theories have also developed over the past few decades in communities with indigenous or immigrant populations. Such theories have highlighted historical instances of the impact of racist ideology on social policy. Much of the Northern Hemisphere anti-racist literature however, focuses on migrant rather than indigenous populations. This focus may not be particularly relevant to a Māori population that enjoys a unique standing as a proportionately large group in a unique relationship with the government through the Treaty of Waitangi (Cheyne et al. 2008). Although there are fundamental differences between the plight of an indigenous population and an immigrant one, there are mutual benefits that can be gained from the study of one by another. Such a study is beyond the scope of this review but it is important to note that indigenous and immigrant populations the World-over face similar issues. However, international literature that is centred on immigrant populations in Europe and the USA must be approached with caution when applying it to the New Zealand situation.