D EMOCRACIA Y D ERECHO P ENAL Roberto G ARGARELLA
II. Democracia y procesos penales
AVIS JONES-DEWEEVER, BONNIE THORNTON DILL, AND SANFORD SCHRAM
thing is certain—poverty is not a life-choice, it is an unfortunate condition. Who would choose to be poor when all around the trinkets of wealth are revered, desired, and associated with personal worth?
Examining the plight of the poor through an intersectional lens emphasizes the contemporary outcomes of historic structural patterns of inequality that have resulted in the overrepresentation of people of color and women, especially women of color among the poor. These patterns include that of a two-tiered wel- fare state, which, in treating men as workers and women as mothers, has denied women full access to social benefits. Additionally people of color have consis- tently been denied full access to this social safety net through both policy—such as the exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers from social security benefits—and implementation. These problems are exacerbated in today’s global economy when, “economic restructuring and neo-liberal policy ‘reforms’ have caused increased social inequality and economic polarization in the U.S.” (Goode & Maskovsky, ). The gap between rich and poor is wider today than ever.
Understanding these broad social, economic, and historical patterns reveals the true needs of genuine welfare reform—not merely shrinking wel- fare rolls, but rather, creating opportunities for economic self-sufficiency and improved overall family well-being. It is from this perspective that poverty is seen as a societal failure, not merely a personal one.
Welfare reforms of recent years have had an uneven impact on the U.S. population. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of abolished the longstanding Aid to Families with Depen- dent Children (AFDC) program and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. The TANF program has emphasized time limits and work requirements. It has allowed states to use sanctions to reduce benefits and terminate families from assistance. It has given birth to a “workfirst” welfare reform system that puts in place a series of “get-tough” practices designed to reduce the alleged problem of “welfare dependency” by moving women into the workforce. As a result, the welfare rolls declined percent from to , falling from ,, to ,,.This approach
to social assistance has spurred some families that relied on welfare to achieve a modicum of self-sufficiency through paid employment. For others, it has meant the denial of much needed assistance. For still others, the reforms have meant increased hassles and complications in access to benefits. These effects have not been distributed evenly across the poverty population. Findings indi- cate that welfare reform has spawned its own forms of discrimination.
Who Is Poor? The Changing Composition of the Welfare Rolls
Poverty is not neutral. Race and gender are significant factors affecting the prob- ability of having an income below the poverty line, with both women and people
of color disproportionately overrepresented in the poverty population. In , the poverty rate was . percent, representing . million people living below the poverty threshold. Over nine percent, or . million families were poor; and children, with a poverty rate of . percent, experienced the highest rates of poverty of any age group (U.S. Census Current Population Survey, ).
Among the poor, historic differences in the incidence of poverty in the U.S. population continue. In , the poverty rate for non-Hispanic Whites was . percent, compared to . percent for African Americans, . percent for Hispanics, and . percent for Asians and Pacific Islanders, all historic lows. Yet, even at historically low levels, people of color—particularly African Americans and Hispanics—experience a much higher incidence of poverty than do Whites (U.S. Census Current Population Survey, ).
Gender disparities, especially as apparent in family and household arrangements, are part of the picture as well and women continue to experi- ence greater rates of poverty and predominate among welfare clients and workers (Abramovitz, ). Slightly more than one-quarter (. percent) of female-headed households were poor in , compared with . percent of single male headed households (U.S. Census Current Population Survey, ). These rates are two-and-a-half times the rate for the U.S. population overall and five times that for married couples (. percent in ). For Black women and Latinas, who experience the multiple and intersecting effects of race, gen- der, and class, the poverty rates for female headed households in are even higher: . percent for Blacks and percent for Latinas compared to per- cent for non-Hispanic Whites (Proctor & Dalaker, ).
A critical byproduct of women’s poverty is the poverty of children. In fact, child poverty is higher than poverty for the population overall. While . per- cent of all children were poor in , . percent of Black children and percent of Hispanic children were poor. Although this figure represents a decline in poverty for Black children from a high of . percent in , the Children’s Defense Fund (CDF) has determined that during welfare reform the number of Black children living in extreme poverty (below percent of the poverty line) rose dramatically to its highest level since when the gov- ernment first produced the data (Dillon, ). The CDF explains this devel- opment arguing that as the economy has stagnated, the poorest families have not been able to rely on welfare benefits as much as before due to welfare reform. As a result, they contend, the number of children in extreme poverty has increased. For example, the rate of extreme poverty for Black children rose sharply between and , from . percent to . percent.
Only about percent of the poverty population received welfare or other cash assistance from the government in .The poor who are currently
receiving welfare, especially as a result of the implementation of TANF, have become increasingly different from the poor in general, especially with regard
to race, ethnicity, and gender. One of the results of the workfirst approach of TANF was to move the most employable recipients off the rolls, leaving those with the greatest barriers to employment behind. As a result, the distinctions between those poor who receive welfare and those who do not have increased. TANF recipients, when compared to the entire poverty population, are more likely to be people of color, to be younger and less educated, to be female, to live in metropolitan areas, to receive food stamps and Medicaid, and are only slightly more likely to live in subsidized public housing. They are less likely to be married or to be working. Although the population of welfare recipients has always consisted predominantly of single women (either divorced, sepa- rated, or never married or widowed) the differences in racial composition, age, and geographic location have become more marked, broadening the gap between the poor who receive welfare and those who do not (U.S. Census Cur- rent Population Survey, ; USDHHS, ). Why do the characteristics of those on welfare differ so much from those of the poverty population in gen- eral? What is it about the design and implementation of the program, the overall treatment of poverty, and the characteristics of individuals that result in this distinctive profile of TANF recipients? This chapter attempts to explain how race, ethnicity, and gender disparities interact with TANF program poli- cies and procedures to produce some of these differences.
Much has been made of the apparent successes of welfare reform. Plum- meting welfare caseloads, rising work participation rates, and declining poverty have all seemingly pointed to resounding policy success. What is not so widely acknowledged however, is the extent to which these apparent suc- cesses have been “colored” by the specter of race.
Prior to the implementation of welfare reform it was not unusual for Whites to make up the majority of welfare recipients, despite the stereotypical image of the lazy, sexually loose, and criminally fraudulent Black welfare queen. With the implementation of welfare reform in , however, there has been a dramatic shift in the racial composition of the welfare caseload, which seemingly implies differing levels of success regarding job attainment. As table . illustrates, non-Hispanic White representation among welfare recipi- ents dropped dramatically over the years, from roughly percent in to percent in . Conversely Hispanic representation increased by similar proportions, from roughly percent in to percent in . All the while, Black representation remained comparatively steady over the years, having experienced only a percent increase in caseload representation since TANF implementation (from roughly percent in to percent in ). Notably Blacks were the only racial cohort to experience an increase in the percentage of nonwelfare recipients who are low-income following welfare reform, thus indicating that many Black welfare leavers found themselves worse off after leaving the rolls (Peterson, Song, & Jones-DeWeever, ).
Racial Disparities in Leaving and Returning to Welfare
Analyses of the causes for racial and other demographic changes in the rolls have often focused on studying “leavers”—i.e., families who have left welfare. Studying leavers helps assess how those who have left welfare are faring economically and identifies the significant racial disparities that exist among leavers and returnees. Although Whites have left the rolls more rapidly than other groups (Lower-Basch, ), Blacks are more likely to be forced off welfare due to sanc- tions (Finegold & Staveteig, ; Kalil, Seefeldt, & Wang, ). Families forced off welfare due to sanctions fare relatively poorly compared to families who leave for other reasons and are more likely to have overall rates of recidivism (Moffitt & Roff, ). Using the data from the National Survey of American Families (NSAF), Loprest () found that Blacks and Latinos are far more likely to return to welfare than Whites, with . percent of Black and . percent of Latino leavers returning to welfare within a year, compared with only . percent of non-Hispanic White leavers. Some data suggest that this is, in part, a result of sanction policies forcing people of color off the rolls who, as a group, may be least employable due to limited work experience and skills, low levels of educa- tion, personal problems, and a need to tend to young children (Kalil, Seefeldt, & Wang, ). Additionally similar disparities exist regarding time limit restric- tions imposed by states under welfare reform. Blacks are more likely to be forced off welfare due to exhausting their time allowed to receive TANF benefits, thus placing them in serious economic jeopardy (Duncan, Harris, & Boisjoly, ).
TABLE 7.1
Racial Composition of the National Welfare Caseload (Percent of All AFDC/TANF Families)
FY FY FY 1992 1996 2001 White 38.9 35.9 30.1 Black 37.2 36.9 39.0 Hispanic* 17.8 20.8 26.0 Asian 2.8 3.0 2.1 Native American 1.4 1.4 1.3 Other – – .8 Unknown 2.0 2.0 .7
Source: Department of Heath and Human Services, “2002 TANF Annual Report to Congress.”
While studying leavers is important, it ignores an important, yet under- studied population: the “diverted.” Under welfare reform, states can establish “diversion” programs that work to discourage new entrants from receiving TANF assistance even when they need it and are eligible to receive it (Diller, ). This population actually may be a very important one for understand- ing disparate treatment under welfare reform. For instance, it is questionable to what extent the massive declines in the rolls from the mid-s through were due strictly to people leaving welfare (Schram & Soss, ). In fact, the rolls may have gone down in good part because large numbers of people did not come onto the rolls. For years, the number of recipients was largely static, as new entrants largely replaced leavers. Therefore the rolls could have declined because the numbers of new entrants declined faster than those leaving, contributing to the dramatic change in the rolls in the s (Schram & Soss, ). An important issue that remains understudied is whether there is systematic racial discrimination in the application of diver- sion programs.
Most of the research on the effects of welfare reform on leavers was done while the economy was strong. The economy has recently turned downward and the welfare rolls may begin to inch back up after years of massive declines. Further research is needed to assess whether the racial disparities in leaving and returning to welfare are exacerbated during the current economic down- turn and to determine if some people by virtue of their race or ethnicity are more likely to be diverted from receiving needed assistance.
Racial and Gender Barriers to Job Access
To a large extent, the differences in leaving reflect differing levels of success regarding job attainment. Two well-documented explanations of the effects of race and ethnic discrimination on welfare recipients’ access to jobs are: employment discrimination and geographic location.
Employment Discrimination
Continuing racial discrimination in the labor market makes the transition off welfare more difficult for people of color than our supposedly “color-blind” welfare policies would assume. Bernstein and Hartmann () in a study of the structure of the contemporary low-wage labor market find that: “Discrim- ination (still) negatively affects employment rates of African Americans, even when differences in skills have been taken into account.” Additionally Holzer and Stoll (), in their study of the determinants of employer demand for welfare recipients in four large metropolitan areas, found that Black women and Latinas are less likely to be hired than White women relative to their per- centages in the population. This appears to be due primarily to employer
preferences, not the women’s qualifications. They note that: “Establishments located in the central city, those that are minority-owned, and those that have worked with local agencies appear to be more accessible to welfare recipients, and therefore hire more recipients than do others.” On the other hand, Mullingsand her colleagues, in their study of Harlem in New York City, found that fast food restaurants did not want to hire neighborhood residents as employees allegedly for fear that they would give food away to relatives and friends. These findings highlight the importance of the social capital that comes from participating in local social networks that can refer former welfare recipients to employers who are likely to hire them, but they also point out that low-income workers seeking employment in urban communities face multiple and complex barriers.
Urban-Suburban Differences
Among the factors that account for widely varying outcomes across race and ethnicity with regard to the welfare caseload is geographic location. America’s distinct residential segregation patterns demonstrate the confluence of both race and place on job opportunities. For example, following the implementa- tion of welfare reform, caseloads not only underwent an initial decline, but also experienced a fundamental shift from broader statewide dispersion, to an increasing concentration in America’s urban areas (Allen, ; Allen & Kirby, ; Meyers, ). Although urban rolls experienced a decline during the era of economic expansion, the rate of decline was far less than that experi- enced in suburban areas. This is largely due to the fact that urban communi- ties face a variety of complex problems largely foreign to their suburban counterparts. Cities are home to vast areas of concentrated poverty, failing public school systems, poor job information networks, and scarce employ- ment opportunities. As more and more employers continue to choose subur- ban locations over urban ones, opportunities for employment will remain substantially reduced for inner-city residents.
The physical disconnect from jobs that inner-city residents face is even more problematic when one considers that most welfare recipients do not have access to private vehicles and, thus, are dependent on public transporta- tion that largely fails to provide access to suburban job opportunities. For example, although Cleveland is home to out of of the state’s welfare recip- ients, percent of Ohio’s entry-level job growth occurred in the state’s sub- urban communities. Only a quarter to a third of those jobs were accessible within an hour, one-way, via public transportation. Likewise, in the District of Columbia, between –, the city’s surrounding suburban communities (located in Maryland and Virginia) experienced job growth at a rate of . percent, compared to only percent job growth in the District (Allen & Kirby, ; Meyers, ).
These examples are not unique. According to a study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (), the rate of suburban job expan- sion was twice that experienced in urban areas in all sectors except wholesale trade that grew at a rate six times faster. Additionally the job growth cities did in fact experience, was largely relegated to opportunities requiring high levels of educational attainment, therefore largely out-of-reach to welfare recipients (U.S. Department of Transportation, ).
Given that cities are typically dominated by people of color and suburban communities are most commonly home to non-Hispanic Whites, the signifi- cant declines among White welfare recipients following the implementation of welfare reform seems to at least in part be due to the greater likelihood of non-Hispanic Whites to live in areas that experienced the greatest levels of job growth. The Brookings Institution’s Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy reports that since the passage of welfare reform, Black and Hispanic urban welfare recipients left the rolls at roughly the same rates as their White urban counterparts. Such a finding indicates that place and race are intricately linked.
Two recent reviews provide strong evidence of this relationship. Bernstein and Hartmann () conclude: “While there has been disagreement as to whether there is a spatial mismatch of jobs and workers, the majority of evidence does support the conclusions that the disadvantaged workers from central cities do have trouble getting to jobs located in the suburbs.” They add that this cen- tral city disadvantage is a significant factor contributing to racial disparities in accessing jobs. Considering that job growth is greater in suburbs than in urban areas, this places urban welfare recipients at a particular disadvantage.
But to what extent are place effects themselves, race neutral? The latest National Housing Discrimination Study (Turner, et al., ) finds that hous- ing discrimination persists in both sales and rental markets in large metro- politan areas nationwide, thus constricting opportunities for persons of color to have broad choices when making housing decisions. Not only do limita- tions in housing choice affect job opportunities, we cannot rule out the possi- bility that the racial composition of an area also influences business location decisions, particularly within the low-skilled employment sector.
The Rural Context
Aside from the contrasting opportunities available to urban and suburban welfare users, recipients residing in rural areas face an entirely different set of challenges. In general, rural areas have higher poverty rates than metropolitan areas, but experience less concentrations of poverty than central cities. Hirschl and Rank () describe this geographical poverty pattern as an “inverse doughnut,” where poverty is highest in the middle (central cities), “low in the suburban ring, and high in the outside [rural] ring” (–).
Rural areas offer even fewer and lower paying job opportunities than are commonly available in urban markets. Work is more likely to be seasonal, thus leading to greater cycling on and off welfare in rural communities, and rural residents themselves tend to have lower levels of formal education, making acquiring quality jobs in perhaps neighboring metropolitan areas, even more difficult. The rural population is much more dispersed, thus critical supports