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DEMOCRACIA Y PARTICIPACIÓN ESCOLAR, FORMANDO PERSONAS Y CIUDADANOS

Nivel I: moral preconvencional

6.6 DEMOCRACIA Y PARTICIPACIÓN ESCOLAR, FORMANDO PERSONAS Y CIUDADANOS

The ability to track where attacks are coming from and the techniques that are used within an enterprise depend on the type of attack. If the attacks are coming from external sources, such as the Internet, the enterprises often depend on their providers to be able to track down sources of attack. Additionally, the network telemetry techniques and features discussed in Chapter 3, “Identifying and Classifying Security Threats,” are extremely helpful for tracking where attack traffic is being generated.

One of the most powerful tools is NetFlow because it can give macroanalytical information on the traffic traversing your network. Traceback goes hand in hand with the identification and classification phases of incident response. NetFlow, SYSLOGs, DNS, and other telemetry mechanisms in conjunction with event correlation tools such as Cisco Secure Monitoring and Response System (CS-MARS) and Arbor Peakflow X are particularly helpful to trace back security incidents.

Just from a router command line (CLI), you can use NetFlow to collect valuable

information. For example, if you notice a sudden increase in traffic over TCP port 445, you can use the show ip cache flowcommand with the includeoption to see the hosts that are sending this type of traffic, as shown in the following example:

myrouter>show ip cache flow | include 01BD

Fa1/0 10.36.1.66 Fa0/0 172.18.85.178 06 C5BC 01BD 93123135

Because NetFlow uses hexadecimal numbers for the protocol, source, and destination ports, 01BD is used in the include statement (01BD hexadecimal = 445 decimal). As you can see from the output, the router has received 93123135 TCP port 445 packets on its FastEthernet 1/0 interface from a host with the IP address 10.36.1.66, which is destined to a host with the IP address 172.18.85.178 residing on the FastEthernet0/0 interface.

In the following example, CS-MARS is used in combination with NetFlow and a Cisco IPS sensor. In Figure 4-3, the CS-MARS alerts the administrator about a host spreading the Nachi worm and doing a DoS via ICMP ping. The incident ID is I:155164925.

Figure 4-3 Worm Incident in CS-MARS

When the administrator clicks theAttack Path icon on the right, a new screen with the attack topology is displayed, as shown in Figure 4-4.

In Figure 4-4, you can see that the infected host is 172.19.124.35, and it is attacking a host with the IP address 172.18.124.67. This is a simple topology; however, CS-MARS is able to show you each hop based on the information imported and its configuration. Graphical representation like this one can save you many hours of investigation.

Figure 4-4 Attack Path

In Figure 4-5, a host with the IP address 10.10.1.10 (HQ-host1) is attempting to crash an IIS server (192.168.1.10 or HQ-web-1) by performing a dot-dot crash and running an attack. Notice that each hop in between is clearly represented, making the traceback process simple. CS-MARS correlated this information analyzing events from a Cisco IPS sensor and from firewall logs from a Cisco PIX security appliance.

Tracing botnet controllers and determining if you are a victim can be difficult. The following tips might help you or your organization if it has zombies:

If you see a good deal of IRC traffic within your organization, it may be worth investigating further. IRC traffic is not common in most enterprises, and most of the botnets are organized and controlled over IRC.

You can look for the most commonly used default IRC port (6667). In addition, you will want to expand to the full port range (from 6660 to 6669 or 7000). On the other hand, many botnet controllers can use nonstandard IRC ports. If you have a firewall within your organization, take a look at outbound connection attempts on any suspicious ports.

IRC traffic usually manifests itself in cleartext, so sensors can be built to sniff particular IRC commands or other protocol keywords on a network gateway.

If you notice that a large quantity of systems within your organization are trying to resolve the same DNS names or accessing the same server at once, you should immediately investigate further because those systems may be zombies. Also, periodically check your DNS caches. Many command and control tools will use a DNS domain that the herder (botnet administrator) can easily change as needed to relocate the botnet infrastructure.

You can look for other obvious symptoms of being a victim. For example, if you see much port-scan traffic, it is a definite sign that machines are infected. You can use proper IDS/IPS signatures to find these and then investigate the source. In addition, if you see a lot of unexpected outbound SMTP traffic, you are likely to be hosting spam bots. You can use NetFlow to get statistics about these type of attacks.

NOTE Chapter 12, “Case Studies,” includes case studies with examples of how different types of organizations identify, classify, trace, and react to security incidents. Common traceback mechanisms are used in those examples.

Summary

Tracing back the source of attacks, infected hosts in worm outbreaks, or any other security incident can be overwhelming for many network administrators and security professionals. Attackers can use hundreds or thousands of botnets or zombies that can greatly complicate traceback and hinder mitigation after traceback succeeds. This chapter covered several techniques that can help you successfully trace back the sources of such threats; covering both service provider and enterprise techniques. Remember, traceback mainly involves the packet source. Using network telemetry tools like NetFlow, syslog, DNS, and others in conjunction with event correlation systems can save you hundreds of work hours and, consequently, save you money.

Laws and Computer Crimes

Security Incident Mitigation Tools

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