DENUNCIA REALIZADA EN UN MEDIO DE PRENSA

The first part of this section deals with the motivations which underpinned the introduction of citizenship education in England (2002) and the latter section offers an insight concerning the various contrasting theoretical debates that sought to inform the citizenship curriculum.

Schools as institutional sites of power relations

In order to set the notion of citizenship education in context, it is necessary to examine how schools operate as institutions of policy implementation. As schools in the public sector are institutions funded by the tax payer, they operate through the influences and dictate from government. As education is something offered by an institution and passed on to young people it might be argued that passive ontology is the shared experience. This is further reinforced through the fact that even these powerful institutions have limited autonomy because the educational agenda and the curriculum are determined by the Department for Education. Therefore, not only are the recipients of citizenship education infused with knowledge and values from the government but the disseminating institutions are also equally passive in their ‘modus operandi’. In short, schools must reflect the ideological agenda of their political masters. Schools and Head Teachers in particular, have freedom over issues including the selection and appointment of staff, pay, contracts, promotions, management information systems and budgetary priorities but the curriculum itself is something to be followed through pedagogy and passed down by government, not created.

According to Ball et al (2012), policy is merely taken for granted and is fostered in order to ‘solve a problem’ (p.9). Citizenship education is sometimes viewed as a panacea for a range of social, behavioural, attitudinal and economic ills. Where citizenship education is concerned the problem to be solved, or at least improved, comes about from a lack of employment or the skills to be employed, a fractious lack of social cement and a plurality of cultural attitudes born out of globalisation, immigration and multi-culturalism. This process takes on a directive identity and one which all stakeholders are expected to embrace. Ball et al (2012) argued that teachers become ‘ciphers’ who implement the policy and pupils accept the policy offered from above (p.9). However, although this sort of critical analysis is accurate, the policy in this case seems to be generated from the social needs of the 21st century. Critics like Jennifer Ozga (2000) argued that, although different points of view might be offered, once policy was formulated schools must implement it without reference to such plural discourses. Yet policy is seen as something which is a product of only one moment in time. To offer a critique is viewed as politically incorrect or irrelevant and thus pupils should not think of or offer any credence to such views. Thus the school has the power to create the dominant ideology, such as where to be critical of immigration is to be racist or to be critical of

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homosexuality is to be intolerant and discriminatory. The framework whereby citizenship education is thus offered then becomes one-dimensional and lacking in critical analysis. The institution expects many learners to be lacking in progressive and inclusive attitudes but pupils are also expected to change these socially ‘unhelpful’ views as an outcome of the citizenship education programme. The school is also part of a power structure which seeks to prevent radicalisation and all forms of extremism. However, Murphy (2013) referred to a process of cherry-picking, where only one discourse was offered for normative acceptance. The school as an institution of economic and ideological power necessitates that it passes on values associated with liberal internationalism. Democracy, toleration, self-determination, individualism, human rights, economic activity and human rights must be internalised if the social cement is to hold society together.

It might be argued that schools are thought of as places where controversial issues can be discussed and where young people have a safe environment to develop their views. This suggests freedom, empowerment and a place where argument and differences of opinion operate. Yet schools are also institutions which have long since been charged with promoting conformity (Saldana, 2013, p.228). Although family and religion have been treated with equal respect by schools in the past, it may be argued that, with family breakdown, lone parenthood and secularisation along with its contrary force radicalisation, the education system becomes even more important in fulfilling its role as the main agent which fosters conformity, passes on culture and thus promotes social stability in an unstable world. The school becomes the factory where economic, societal, interpersonal and more general values like patriotism or national identity are developed. Saldana (2013) made the interesting observation that schools have been there as a powerful institution to promote change when it was needed and also as a body to ‘put the brakes on’ or act as a stabiliser when needed (p. 228). It may be argued that schools are attempting to carry out both of these functions today. Change is sought through citizenship education by way of making the individual less parochial, more social, more tolerant, more communitarian and more economically independent. Yet the forces of globalisation, immigration, multi culturalism and post-modern relativism have meant that the brakes also need to be applied. The school is a powerful institution that will tell pupils what it is to be British and what British values are. It will also tell pupils that our political system works and can work for the individual if participation is undertaken. The system is not broken and the only change that is needed is the greater participatory appetite of young people to get involved. As such, this shows that schools are centres of power and that those with political power have the confidence in these organisations to carry out guiding forms of socialisation.

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In conclusion, although schools certainly are centres of power in our society and help to shape the individual and society, they are also mere instruments of their political masters who determine policy and facilitate the necessary funding to operate. The school is expected to shape young people through citizenship education so that they become tolerant, social, communitarian and economically independent and orientated to understand that they live in a diverse and interconnected world where healthy values are a necessity for individual and collective success. The power of the school to carry out this function in addition to its more traditional responsibilities has come about through globalisation. This is a confusing and ever changing process where the economic and social landscape results in a fractious form of social cement. Although young people would have identified as a particular social class in the past, today they often define themselves through peer group, language, ethnicity or regional location. When changing demographics, multi-culturalism, immigration and economic uncertainty affect the individual and the community, people’s attitudes, values and behaviour become very important. The school as a focus of socialising and ideological power then becomes the terrain where citizenship education seeks to shape the individual of the future so they can function as integrated and self-regulated members of a diverse society. Antagonism, racism, homophobia, intolerance, extremism, intimidation and hate crime all work against the objectives of the school and this is why they need to be the powerful institutions they are.

As noted previously, when the Labour Government came into power in 1997 it commissioned Professor Sir Bernard Crick, an eminent Professor of Politics, to head a Citizenship Advisory Group (CAG). This was in response to widely held views that young people were increasingly apathetic about politics, as evidenced by low voter turnout in the younger age groups. For example, Phelps (2005) reported that,

‘Pronounced declines in the number of young (non-) voters casting their ballots in 1997 and 2001 has raised the question: are we witnessing a generational disengagement with electoral politics?’ (p. 2).

In addition, Russell, et al (2005) stated that,

‘The 2001 general election saw voter turnout drop to its lowest level since the advent of universal adult suffrage, with just 59.4% of eligible voters choosing to exercise that right. Research by the MORI Social Research Institute at the time of the election suggested that low turnout was particularly pronounced among young people, with an estimated 39% of 18–24 year olds casting a vote’ (p. 5 )

32 Dar (2013) contributed by suggesting that,

‘There are no official figures for voting by age, but a long-running academic study, the British Election Study, provides reasonably consistent survey-based data for General Elections since 1964: the decline in young people’s engagement in politics has been a common theme of late. As seen above, voter turnout has been low among young people relative to older age groups, but in the context of falling overall turnout at General Elections, the decline has been sharpest amongst voters aged 18-24’ (p. 4)

Political disaffection, a decline in political engagement and a lack of confidence in out-dated political institutions have been offered as reasons behind the development of citizenship education. This was often referred to as the ‘democratic deficit’. A sense of apathy has seen political party membership decline since its height in the mid 1950’s and the political institutions appear to have a low status amongst the masses (Houses of Parliament, 498, June 2015). Crewe (1983) undertook widespread research on elections and voting behaviour and published his results in ‘Decade of Dealignment’. This recognised the loosening of ties to both social class membership and Party identification. As society became more divided and individualised so all notions of ‘political attachment’ declined (Houses of Parliament, 498, June 2015).

The sorts of debate that entered the 1970’s dialogue around political literacy have been criticised as being too narrow in their thinking and educational remit. Even the House of Commons Report (2007, 147) described citizenship education as ‘subject plus’ and difficult to define as it was viewed in different ideological ways (p.10). The status subjects, and those of easy recognition, were clearly viewed as something different to citizenship education. This was perhaps even more significant given that education today was grounded on active views of economic benefits. Whether citizenship education provides a clear economic benefit is open to debate.

Yet for the Government being law abiding, being a good neighbour and being more amenable towards other cultural traditions and ethnicities were viewed as something which prepared every young person for citizenship in the future. So ‘social and moral responsibility, community

involvement and political literacy’ were offered as the guiding principles of citizenship education in

‘Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools’ (1998, p.13). Whilst such moral foundations for the future generation were something clearly worthy, the notion of political awareness and political disapproval was largely absent.

Crick (1998) made it clear that citizenship education was not limited purely to the accumulation of knowledge but that certain skills and attitudes were to be promoted (p.13). Crick (1998) also made

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explicit reference to Personal Social and Health Education (PSHE) and Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural Development (SMSC), which were viewed as linked to this next phase in curriculum development (p.14). The ‘Crick Report’ (1998) focused on the notion of responsibilities. The notion of mutual benefit was employed to legitimise this view, where active citizenship was based on an individual’s responsibilities and behavioural customs, not so much on an individual’s entitlements (p.12). Support for the, ‘Rule of law, being willing and able to engage in society through peaceful

political action and through volunteering’, was also stressed by Crick (1998, p.12). As such,

socialisation towards compliance, deference and being law abiding appeared to be of primary importance.

Crick (1998) noted that, in the run up to the 1992 general election, 25% of 18-24 year-olds said they would not vote (p.17). Although clearly alarming, this figure had risen to 32% by 1997 and as noted previously by Russell (2005), to 39% in 2001. This degree of voter apathy had many causes and whether an individual chooses a lack of political knowledge or a lack of faith in the system, something clearly had to be done to foster political and perhaps social engagement amongst the young. If confidence in political institutions declined to such a stage where they became redundant then the political system of democracy, inputs and outputs may cease to function.

In 2000, citizenship education became an important item on the political agenda due to a number of social and civic concerns (for example, Crick, 1998; Kerr, 1999; Davies, 2001; MORI, 2001). These influential writers and reports suggested that there were deteriorating social and cultural conditions in England and that the participation in political and civic affairs also was in decline. It was suggested that the breakdown in accepted social behaviour was especially evident among young people and presented itself through anti-social behaviour, increased truancy and exclusions from schools, high levels of teenage pregnancy and the increased alienation from the political processes of a democratic society.

More about the origins and rationale behind citizenship education was contained in the 2006-07 Second Parliamentary Report published on 21st February 2007. This report began with a brief review of the previous ‘Crick Report’ (1998) but was more useful in offering obvious reasons for the development of citizenship education. It was interesting to note here that not only was disengagement an issue, but also anti-social behaviour and bullying (House of Commons, 2007, 147, p.8). Although the main philosophical idea in these documents appeared to be engagement and participation in civil and political affairs, the curriculum also sought to fill a greater degree of tolerance towards those who were different.

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Kirwan (House of Commons 2007, 147, p.8) offered a list of descriptors which helped to sum up why citizenship education was introduced. These included apathy, moral crisis, low voter turnout, human rights, immigration, and finally, a renegotiation between citizen and the government. Yet if a critique was offered, individualism, civic mindedness and being a good neighbour appeared to reduce the role of the government and place the responsibility for social cohesion on the individual citizen. For those growing up in the 1960’s and 1970’s there was a definite sense of an authoritarian and controlling government, yet this became somewhat out of fashion as the government sought to place the responsibility for stability and social cohesion on the individual citizen, a shift evidenced by these policies.

Summary

The motivation for the introduction of citizenship education in 2002, therefore, was an attempt to rebalance previous models of citizenship, which stressed rights and to offer far greater emphasis on responsibilities (Crick, 1998). These might be to engage in worthy social or community projects, to vote, to obey the law and to be economically active and thus independent. As mentioned, a ‘democratic deficit’ was also offered as a reason for the introduction of citizenship education. Concerns about social and economic disorganisation and instability were also clearly present in the citizenship education debate. It was felt that perhaps if citizenship education fostered a reinvigoration amongst young people in their political behaviour then such concerns might decrease.

The next section focusses on the theoretical arguments and debates that helped inform the policy on citizenship education.