Las denuncias ciudadanas como una expresión del mundo vital

Overview: The Mauritanian government continued to prioritize counterterrorism in 2013, focusing on improving the capacity of security forces and securing the country’s borders. Mauritania is not a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist groups, although regions in the interior are imperfectly monitored due to their geographic isolation from population centers and inhospitable desert conditions. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained a leading threat to Mauritania in 2013. Mauritania is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). There were no terrorist attacks in Mauritania in 2013.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Mauritania’s counterterrorism legal

framework is relatively new. Enacted in 2010, the national counterterrorism laws define terrorism as a criminal act, describe court procedure in terrorism cases, and prescribe punishment for perpetrators. The Mauritanian government continued to send prosecutors and investigative magistrates to terrorism prosecution trainings organized by the United States and other international partners. In 2013,

Mauritanian law enforcement participated in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which helped to build capacity in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response.

Mauritanian law enforcement has adequate capacity to detect, deter, and prevent terrorism. Although Mauritanian security forces may have successfully deterred or prevented acts of terrorism during 2013, they did not face any great tests of capacity. Mauritania’s National Gendarmerie, a paramilitary police agency within the Ministry of Defense, and the National Guard under the Ministry of Interior are the

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primary law enforcement units performing counterterrorism functions. Cooperation and information- sharing between the two organizations occurred sporadically.

Border security is a priority of the Mauritanian government, but it remains far from perfect due to a lack of capacity and a standing policy that delegates responsibility for different sections of the

country’s long land borders to different security forces. Mauritania’s border forces employ biometric screening capabilities at some – but not all – ports of entry. Information-sharing efforts within the host government and with other countries are embryonic.

Mauritanian authorities continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict terrorists. In the course of the year, the Mauritanian judiciary handled five individual terrorism-related cases:

 On April 14, the Supreme Court of Mauritania upheld a death sentence imposed on a Mauritanian citizen convicted of murdering a U.S. citizen at the behest of AQIM. It also denied appeals of two prison sentences for the same crime, and returned the cases to the country’s appellate court.

 On May 14, Mauritanian soldiers arrested a Tunisian and an Algerian on suspicion of membership in armed Islamic groups in Bassikounou, a city situated in the country’s

southeastern corner along the border with Mali. After transfer to Nouakchott for interrogation, the suspects were placed in pre-trial detention pending the completion of an investigation.

 Also on May 14, Nouakchott’s criminal court sentenced Abdellahi Ould Gheilani, a

Mauritanian gendarme, to 10 years in prison for collaborating with AQIM during a suspected reconnaissance of a Mauritanian airbase. On the same day, a judge from the same court sentenced four students from the Islamic University of Aioun to five years in prison apiece for membership in an unspecified group “planning terrorist attacks in Mauritania.”

 On May 19, Mauritanian security forces took into custody Senda Ould Bouamama, the former spokesman of Ansar al-Dine, who voluntarily surrendered and requested trial in Mauritania, his native country. Bouamama has since been placed in pre-trial confinement pending completion of the government’s investigation against him.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mauritania is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and maintains observer status within the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa. Smuggling and transshipments via the country pose a vulnerability that has been exploited by

terrorists. Bulk cash smuggling is another vulnerability given the undeveloped financial markets of the country.

From May 12 to 16 in Nouakchott, Mauritanian investigative magistrates, prosecutors, law

enforcement officers, and financial intelligence experts joined counterparts from Niger and the United States to discuss new and innovative ways to enforce laws aimed at countering terrorist financing and money laundering.

Although legislation regulating alternative remittances exists, the Mauritanian government does not have the resources to monitor sizable flows of funds through the informal hawala money transfer system.

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For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:

http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Mauritania remained an active member of the UN and the AU. On March 17, the Mauritanian government hosted the AU’s Ministerial Meeting on the

Enhancement of Cooperation in Security and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahel-Saharan Region. In his opening remarks, Foreign Minister Hamadi Ould Hamadi called for a common strategic vision for the Sahel that could ensure the territorial integrity of Mali and defend against the threat of organized crime.

On November 3, Mauritania co-hosted a meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Working Group on Capacity Building (AU, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the International Organization for Migration) in Nouakchott. The conference focused on Mauritania’s civilian capacity gaps, particularly in the civilian criminal justice sector, and on the coordination of donor capacity building efforts in that area.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Mauritanian government continued to manage programs designed to counter violent extremism and to offer alternatives to at- risk individuals. In 2013, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education trained over 300 former mahadra (Quranic school) students in vocational subjects at three education centers in

Nouakchott, Atar, and Kaedi. The Mauritanian government also continued to collaborate with independent Islamic religious organizations to promote moderation, sponsoring radio and TV programming on the themes of temperance in Islam, and paying monthly salaries of US $170 to 800 imams who fulfilled stringent selection criteria. In September, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education organized a training seminar for 137 imams across the country in cooperation with the Institute for Islamic Studies in Nouakchott. The program stressed responsibility for

encouraging moderate interpretations of Islamic doctrine. NIGER

Overview: The Nigerien government prioritized counterterrorism but limited capacity constrained efforts. Porous borders and the huge expanse of Niger that lacks a persistent government presence provided terrorist groups with an environment conducive to recruitment of terrorist operatives and acquisition of resources by illegal means such as smuggling and kidnapping. Terrorists committed coordinated, asymmetric attacks in Niger in 2013. Niger is a member of the Trans-Sahara

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

Historic tensions between the Nigerien state and Tuareg groups traditionally associated with trans- Sahara smuggling contributed to some support for terrorist operatives. Niger sent a force of over 600 troops to intervene against terrorist groups in northern Mali as part of the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali and increased its contribution to over 800 troops in the follow-on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Niger also continued its counterterrorism cooperation with other regional partners and organizations.

The presence of the terrorist group Boko Haram (BH) in northern Nigeria, just across Niger’s southern border, remained a threat. The Government of Niger remained committed to fighting al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), and BH, but needed and welcomed external support and greater regional cooperation.

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The United States significantly increased its security sector capacity building programs with Niger in 2013. A U.S. Department of Justice Resident Legal Advisor also worked with the Nigerien Ministry of Justice to: build counterterrorism capacity in the justice sector, provide training to judges and prosecutors on counterterrorism investigations and legislation, focus on the physical protection of government institutions, and on the prison system.

2013 Terrorist Incidents:

 On May 23, a Nigerien military base in Agadez and a French uranium mine in Arlit (both in northern Niger) were simultaneously targeted by terrorists associated with AQIM. The coordinated attacks used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices followed by explosive vests, grenades, and small arms. All of the attackers were killed, and 12 suspects believed to be facilitators were arrested after the attacks. Even though one of the attacks took place on a military facility, Ministry of Interior forces – trained through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program – were sent to intervene. The attack demonstrated significant gaps in Niger’s ability to detect threats and organize a coordinated response.

 On June 1, prisoners who were associated with BH and AQIM escaped from prison in Niamey, one of whom was indicted for the murder of an American in 2000. Two Nigerien National Guard members and one prisoner were killed in the prison break. Only two of the nine escaped prisoners were recaptured.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Niger has updated its legislation to criminalize acts of terrorism and refine its ability to enact the law through the creation of the new Judicial Counterterrorism Center and the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT). Law enforcement entities as well as military units have created new crisis response units and enhance their border patrol capacity. Niger’s law enforcement capacity is based on the overall willingness and availability of specialized units such as the Ministry of Interior’s National Police Intervention Group (GIPN) for intervention capacity and the SCLCT for counterterrorism investigation. Nigerien units lack some basic and most specialized equipment needed to complete missions. Niger recognized the importance of a sustained in-country training facility by dedicating 12 acres to a joint training facility located near SCLCT.

During 2013, the SCLCT arrested multiple terrorist suspects on charges that included planning acts of terrorism, association with a terrorist organization, recruitment, and financing terrorism. In response to the terrorist attacks in Agadez and Arlit,Nigerien security services significantly increased security in Niamey and other cities, and specifically areas around Niamey’s Presidential Palace and diplomatic quarter. Arrests included an arms network providing weapons to BH. However, there were no terrorism trials during 2013. Judicial proceedings were often delayed by a lack of resources and investigative capacity.

In October, Niger co-hosted its second Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel Cross-Border Workshop in Niamey. In October, Niger also signed a security agreement with Nigeria to include joint border patrols aimed at fighting BH. With the support of the United States, the Government of Niger agreed to install an additional three Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Identification Systems (PISCES) at three key border control locations. Additionally, more than 220 Nigerien security service officers received eight training courses from the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, as well as other training opportunities. Topics included Critical Response Team Operations, Border Control Management, Precursor-Chemical Introduction, and Post-Blast Investigation.

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Resource constraints across the spectrum of basic needs such as electricity, radios, and reliable vehicles made it difficult for the Government of Niger to carry out effective law enforcement and border security.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Niger is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force-style (FATF) regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorism finance typology featured several case studies from Niger that involved bulk cash smuggling and the export of munitions to support Nigerian terrorist activities. Kidnapping for ransom is also a problem, as proceeds from this activity finance terrorist groups in the region.

In 2013, Niger’s financial intelligence unit, known by its French acronym, CENTIF, continued to become fully operational, added staff, and improved its physical infrastructure and information- technology capabilities. In 2013, CENTIF carried out a number of awareness-raising activities for reporting entities, and received a handful of suspicious transaction reports from financial institutions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:

http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Niger deployed over 800 troops to Mali as part of MINUSMA. Niger continued to work with Mali, Algeria, and Mauritania through a combined counterterrorism center called the General Staff Joint Operations Committee (CEMOC) in

Tamanrasset, Algeria. Niger increased efforts to improve joint patrols and operations with Algeria, conducted joint patrols with Nigeria and Chad, and held high-level discussions with Libya regarding border security. The EU continued its support for a 50-person team in Niger to build capacity in countering terrorism and other organized crime.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Nigerien government-led initiatives to provide employment to released prisoners, especially to returnees from Libya, have sought to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism. In November, Niger held a conference on strategic communication to counter terrorism.

NIGERIA

Overview: The terrorist group Boko Haram (BH), and a splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, carried out kidnappings, killings, bombings, and attacks on civilian and military targets in northern Nigeria, resulting in over one thousand deaths, injuries, and significant destruction of property in 2013. The states where attacks occurred most frequently included Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,

Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe. No attacks were conducted in the Federal Capital Territory or the southern states of Nigeria. The area of operations of the violent extremists was somewhat limited following the Government of Nigeria’s declaring a State of Emergency in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in May. Suspected BH and Ansaru attackers killed Nigerian government and security officials, and BH killed civilians of both the Islamic and Christian faiths. Several citizens from Western nations – although no Americans – were kidnapped and held hostage. Some of the hostages were released and others were killed by their captors. Operations to counter BH and Ansaru were led by the Nigerian military.

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In May, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency, with National Assembly approval, in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in northeastern Nigeria for six months. According to government officials, the declaration gave the government sweeping powers to search and arrest without warrants. The military took over all security operations in those three states. Until August, the military headed up a Joint Task Force in these states to combat the violent extremists. In August, these operations were transferred to the command of a new 7th Army Division, headquartered in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. The State of Emergency was extended for another six months on November 15, again with National Assembly approval. Despite the drastic measures, BH has continued to conduct a spate of attacks and the Nigerian military has been roundly accused of large numbers of human rights violations in connection with the military operations.

The Government of Nigeria’s efforts to address grievances among Northern populations, which includes high unemployment and a dearth of basic services, made little progress. Some state governments in the North attempted to increase education and employment opportunities, but with almost no support from the federal government. The United States called on the Nigerian government to employ a more comprehensive strategy to address Boko Haram that combines security efforts with political and development efforts to reduce Boko Haram’s appeal, address the legitimate concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and protect the rights of all of Nigeria’s citizens.

Nigerian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation increased in 2013; the U.S.-Nigeria Binational

Commission Regional Security Working Group was hosted by the Nigerian government in Abuja in August. In June, the United States and Nigeria co-hosted the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) workshop on the Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law held in Abuja. Nigeria has also been an active participant in other GCTF events in the region. The Government of Nigeria formally requested assistance from the United States to develop an intelligence fusion cell, the Joint Terrorist Branch (JTAB), in order to streamline coordination and information sharing on counterterrorism matters among key agencies, which includes the State Security Service (SSS), the intelligence agencies, the national police, and the military.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: In 2013, BH and Ansaru demonstrated their continuing capability to carry out coordinated attacks carried out attacks primarily in 10 northern states. Notable terrorist incidents committed by elements of BH and factions claiming to be affiliated with BH, included:

 On January 19, a military convoy of buses carrying Nigerian troops to be deployed to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces in Mali were bombed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in the road near Lokoja in Kogi state. Seven soldiers were killed and dozens were wounded in the attack.

 On January 29, the motorcade of the Emir of Kano was attacked by armed men on motorcycles. Four people were killed, including the Emir’s driver and two bodyguards; several more were wounded.

 On February 8, nine Nigerian women working in a polio vaccination campaign in Kano were killed by gunmen riding in three-wheeled motorcycles; several other polio workers were injured.

 On February 16, seven non-Nigerian construction workers employed by Italian firm SETRACO were kidnapped from their company housing compound in Bauchi state and taken hostage. None of the seven hostages had been freed by year’s end.

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 On February 19, a French family of seven was kidnapped in northern Cameroon near Maroua and taken by their captors into Nigeria. The family was held hostage, most likely in

northeastern Nigeria, until they were all safely released on April 29.

 On March 18, a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device attack on two luxury buses at a motor park in the Sabon Gari neighborhood of Kano killed more than 20 persons and wounded scores.

 On July 6, over 50 students were killed in their dormitories at Mamudo Government Secondary School in Yobe state.

 On August 11, gunmen killed approximately 44 persons praying at a mosque outside Maiduguri and another 12 civilians in a near-simultaneous attack at a nearby location in Borno state.

 On September 29, gunmen killed more than 40 students in the dormitory of an agricultural technical school in Yobe state.

 On December 2, a coordinated and complex attack by violent extremists on the Maiduguri airport and air force base killed over 24 persons, wounded dozens, and destroyed a large amount of military equipment including several military helicopters.

 On December 20, violent extremists assaulted the Nigerian army barracks in Bama, southern Borno state, in a well-coordinated attack that killed approximately 20 military personnel and