El derecho a la vida

Despite its appalling record of abuse, the Pol Pot regime retained its seat in the UN by vote of the General Assembly in September 1979 as international geopolitics focused its wrath firmly on the Vietnamese, supported by China which launched an attack on northern Vietnam to “teach Vietnam a lesson.”

The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was referred to the UN Security Council by the government of Democratic Kampuchea in January 1979.17 It sough the condemnation of Vietnam’s action and an immediate withdrawal. China’s punitive attack on Vietnam broadened the international debate to include wider issues of security and stability in Southeast Asia.18

Security Council debates placed more emphasis on political rather than on legal argument. The main issues addressed revolved around the principles in the UN Charter concerning fundamental human rights; that states not use forces against each other; that states not interfere in the internal affairs of another; and that disputes within and between states be resolved peaceably. Generally, the position of the Western nations in the debates was that no matter how reprehensible or detestable a government might be, this could not justify a military attack on it by another state.19 This theme carried over into General Assembly credentials debates, and the confirmation of Pol Pot’s regime as the legitimate government of Cambodia resulted, despite its record of abuse and the gross human insecurity it had created.20 While the Vietnamese sought the expulsion of the regime on the grounds of genocide, the word was carefully avoided by China and the US. Only in 1988 would the US Congress change US foreign policy to acknowledge the “genocidal Khmer Rouge.”21

With the permanent members locked into cold war opposition, the Security Council was unable to agree on any resolution, and was simply sidelined as a global governance institution in relation to the human and state security concerns of Cambodia and the immediate region. It was not until 1990 that the Security Council made resolutions on Cambodia and then only to acknowledge and approve a peace process and the agreement made outside the framework of the UN, and to commit the UN to the pivotal UNTAC process.22

17 _{S/13089, 16 February 1979.}

18 _{S/PV.2109 to 2112, 12-15 January 1979; S/PV.2114, 23 February 1979;S/PV.2117, 27}

February 1979.

19 _{S/PV.2111, 15 January 1979, (3); S/PV.2109, 12 January 1979, (17).}

20 _{For issues and voting patterns see Ramses Amer, "The Resolution of the Cambodian}

Conflict: Assessing the Explanatory Value of Zartman's 'Ripeness Theory'," Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 6 (2007).

21 _{Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the}

Khmer Rouge Tribunal (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), 85-86.

22 _{UNSC Resolution 668 in September 1990 was followed by a further 13 resolutions over the}

In the UN General Assembly, countries such as the UK, which had brought evidence of Pol Pot’s human rights abuses to the Commission on Human Rights, effectively set these concerns aside to uphold the continued occupation of the seat by Democratic Kampuchea and supported the annual General Assembly resolutions condemning Vietnam’s actions and demanding immediate withdrawal.23 The General Assembly justified its continued recognition of Pol Pot on the fallacious grounds that to seat the new government, or to leave Cambodia’s seat vacant as proposed by India, would be to condone Vietnam’s invasion and presence in Cambodia.24 Two years later the regime was ‘de-recognised’ and Cambodia’s seat left vacant until it passed to a coalition government in exile in 1992.

From 1979, border camps in Thailand and across the frontier became politico- military bases under the effective control of opposition political factions including the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) under the leadership of Pol Pot (Khmer Rouge); the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under the leadership of president Lon Nol’s former prime minister, Son Sann (created late 1979); and the National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (Funcinpec) formed in 1982 under the leadership of Sihanouk and later his son, Prince Rannarith. To appear united in their resistance against the Vietnamese, the three factions formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under Sihanouk in 1982. However, each continued to receive independent support from their particular patron states.

The camps were used by the opposition factions to support their military operations, by international humanitarian agencies to channel humanitarian assistance to refugees and by states—such as US, China, and Thailand—to provide military support to them. This latter support for the various factions effectively ensured the continuation of the civil war in Cambodia until the late 1980s when relations between the three key states changed due to the collapse of the cold war. As the

23 _{The United Kingdom brought the issue of human rights abuses in Cambodia to the attention}

of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1978. An investigation report was issued early in 1979 after the Vietnamese intervention. See Colin Warbrick, "Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1981): 234.

24 _{Ibid; and Ramses Amer, "The United Nations and Kampuchea: The Issue of Representation}

and its Implications," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 22, no. 3 (1990): 55. It was also the case that the General Assembly accepted changes of government under very similar circumstances in Uganda (by Tanzanian forces in 1978); in Central African Empire (by France in 1979) and in Grenada (by the US in 1983).

three were permanent members of the UN Security Council, the more cooperative climate made peace in Cambodia possible.25

Until then the power of veto and cold war posturing rendered the UN Security Council powerless to protect the Cambodian people and powerless to condemn or act on the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime. For their own security reasons, the US and China had been prepared to countenance the return of the Khmer Rouge regime and thereby to abandon the Cambodian people to further abuse. Their overriding objective was to see Vietnam out of Cambodia. The security of states and international security practice again overshadowed concern for individual human security. States were able to pursue security strategies shielded, as it were, from human security concerns by the efforts of international humanitarian agencies and their programmes of assistance as discussed below.

Despite inflicting major defeats on the Khmer Rouge with their numerical and military superiority, the Vietnamese forces were unable to silence the resistance or, in particular, to wipe out the Khmer Rouge.26 Major offensives in 1984-5 by the PRK forces, which were taking responsibility for fighting the war, severely weakened the Khmer Rouge but did not prevent it from mounting further guerrilla attacks in the east (Pre Veng and Svay Rieng) and on Battambang suburbs.27 However, the civil war was at a “stalemate” by 1987 and the three resistance armies, though barely cooperating, were still able to mount occasional guerrilla attacks across the country.28 The PRK army remained weak and unable to fully counter or defeat the opposition forces.

There was political stalemate, too, as Coalition faction leaders bickered and, in Phnom Penh, a cabinet reshuffle in late 1986 signalled that all was not well within

25 _{The five permanent members are China, France, The United Kingdom, United States of}

America and (then) the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) - now Russia.

26 _{They had, Becker argued, been seriously underestimated by the Vietnamese who had}

originally scoffed at their leaders and believed they had no political support within the country. Elizabeth Becker, "Stalemate in Cambodia," Current History 86, no. 519 (1987): 156-59, 86.

27 _{Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986: Beginning to Tire," Asian Survey 27, no. 1 (1986): 116;}

and Becker, "Stalemate," 158.

28 _{There was also considerable bickering between the resistance parties and one arm of the}

Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate and even attacked KPNLF troops. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986," 117. Chanda also reports that there were desertions of soldiers in both directions.

the government.29 Humanitarian programmes were in a sense also at a stalemate, with little change at the border and a limited programme continuing in Phnom Penh.30 The stalemate meant the continued human insecurity of countless Cambodians either in the camps at the border, or inside Cambodia under government control. Various peace initiatives had been attempted since the early 1980s but, without the serious commitment of the major powers, there would be no relief for Cambodians.31 Only with the end of the cold war in 1989 was the proxy war in Cambodia no longer perceived as critical to the international interests of the key sponsors.

In this new strategic environment the war quickly became little more than an international nuisance. By then, China was more interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union and Vietnam than in supporting the Khmer Rouge which, it conceded, had made mistakes. Vietnam, with the loss of Soviet aid, could no longer afford the war and was keen to improve relations with the US, but insisted that the Khmer Rouge not be allowed back into Phnom Penh through an international peace agreement. Thailand in 1988 began to imagine turning the “battleground into a market place” while the US, reluctantly it seems, was prepared to give peace a chance if the Vietnamese left Cambodia and democratic elections were held.32 In the meantime, international relations and security analysts could pore over the intricate

29 _{Indeed, the Vietnamese were again concerned, as they had been in 1983, that the resistance}

was making inroads in the PRK government. Becker, "Stalemate," 159. Becker also refers to Vietnamese treaties which suggested they were in Cambodia to stay or at least to see it as a sphere of influence.

30 _{Western official aid was restricted as the regime was not recognised by the UN and sanctions}

were in force. However, a significant amount of official aid was disbursed through national NGOs such as Oxfam, Caritas, World Vision and Save the Children Fund which operated as a consortium set up in Phnom Penh.

31 _{The UN General Assembly proposed a peace conference in 1980 which was boycotted by the}

USSR and Vietnam. For brief outline of initiatives in the 1980s see Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report no. 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1-5. Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden was active from 1983 in trying to bring the parties together to negotiate a peace deal. See Philip G O'Brien, "The Making of Australia's Indochina Policies under the Labor Government (1983- 1986): the Politics of Circumspection?," (Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations, Australia-Asia Papers No. 39: 1987). David P Chandler, "Cambodia in 1984: Historical Patterns Re-asserted," Southeast Asian Affairs 12 (1985): 184, refers to attempts by the Vietnamese to “woo Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh …” in 1984.

32 _{Though changing its position later, the US had imagined the Khmer Rouge as part of a new}

government in Phnom Penh. See Ben Kiernan, "Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002," Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (2002): 489. The US was later “berated” by ASEAN for reducing support for the opposition Coalition Government in exile and seeming to back the State of Cambodia. See Justus M van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (1991): 94-102.

details of the perceived interests and positions of the various players—Vietnam, China, ASEAN, the US and USSR—with little or no reference to Cambodia, the Cambodian factions or, more importantly, to the Cambodian people.33

During the civil war from 1979, the wellbeing and security of the Cambodian people, was not the immediate concern of the states involved. This responsibility had been delegated by the very structure of the United Nations to its specialist economic and social agencies, in particular the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and other international agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the many private NGOs. However, in the absence of a common objective for the people, the efforts of humanitarian agencies were not necessarily united nor were they always perceived to be consistent with the interests of states. How this affected the human security of the people in camps and inside Cambodia is outlined in the following sections before returning to the peace process.