Hanson provides an example of this perspective when he considers the epistemological paucity of his perceived three most-used responses to the Old Testament God represented as a warmongering, warrior Deity. Response one is to emit an ominous silence; response two is to accept Yahweh as warrior; whilst response three is to conclude that the God of the Old Testament is in some manner a lesser deity than the God portrayed in the New Testament.171 If these three ways of interpreting God’s biblical activity as One who at least endorses war fall short Hanson proposes a further option of a biblical theology in which Old and New
168
Or, put into the context of specific biblical accounts, what does the ‘love of God’ mean in the face of God’s punishment of offenders – Leviticus 26:14-17; violent acts – Genesis 6:6-7; revenge – Deuteronomy 32:35; wrath – Numbers 16:46 and favouritism – Deuteronomy 14:2.
169
The originator of this parable, Wisdom, whilst enormously appreciative and yet critical of anti-metaphysical arguments nonetheless acknowledged that the extraordinary, paradoxical-sounding claims of poets and
scientists, theologians, and metaphysicians can be illuminating as well as misleading, and are in fact often both. A. Lyon, ‘John Wisdom’, T. Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 912.
170
Hart, Faith, 107.
171
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Testaments bear witness to one universal redemptive drama.172 In the confessions of Israel and the early church this theology discerns the efforts of God to gather an obedient
community around acknowledgement of its sole origin in divine grace and its sole vocation in worshipping God and becoming an instrument in His creative, redemptive plan for the
world.173
Marshall, too, acknowledges the necessity to move away from endorsing any one response to presenting God’s soteriological plan; he appeals to the various metaphors and analogies that together represent Christ’s accomplishments in his incarnation, obedient life, death and resurrection and heavenly reign which are all, he argues, to be treated seriously.174
Unfortunately, Marshall does not elucidate what ‘treated seriously’ means; he is comfortable to engage concurrently with metaphors that express palatable aspects of God’s character whilst questioning those which represent perspectives out of line with his own outlook and sensibilities.
For example, he considers the metaphors of ‘destruction and death’, noting various New Testament references where God incontrovertibly promises the dispensing of physical, ultimate death and destruction for those found in sin and for the Devil and his agents.175 Having assessed this imagery he then baulks at the theological ramifications in regard to God’s character, attributes and purpose.176
He therefore inadvertently debunks his own translation of the metaphors, concluding that he believes it would be wrong to take the imagery to imply that God behaves in a way that would arouse the criticism of a cosmic equivalent of Amnesty International or similar agencies.177
What Marshall means by ‘wrong’ is the apparent potentially negative ethical implications for God in dispensing death and destruction, thereby admitting that what had previously seemed to be a straightforward hermeneutic and application of the metaphors is, in fact, not accurate.
172
In regard to this theme running throughout both Testaments Schmiechen observes that as early as the Apostolic Fathers it had been acknowledged, noting that, “For Irenaeus, Christ recapitulates the history of the race and is the beginning of the new humanity in the Spirit. He sums up all that has gone before, but in his obedience and victory, overcomes all that was destructive of God’s plan for creation.” Schmiechen, Saving, 125.
173
Hanson, ‘War’, 344.
174
I.H. Marshall, Aspects of the Atonement – Cross and Resurrection in the Reconciling of God and Humanity, London: Paternoster, 2007, 10.
175
Marshall, Aspects, 18.
176
“Each and every interpretation of the Atonement is most closely connected with some conception of the essential meaning of Christianity, and reflects some conception of the Divine nature.” G. Aulén,Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement, Oregon: Wipf and Stock,
1931, 12-13. If this is the case, it might be supposed that the link between God’s perceived functions and His character will be even more pronounced in regard to His eschatological activities.
177
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What transpires is that many divergent and difficult aspersions are aimed towards God when considering His biblical responses to sin, the Satan and His dealing therewith.
The danger theologically is, once again, the avoidance of a position which then facilitates subjective ‘cherry-picking’ of favourite metaphors or biblical passages thus enabling the theologian to acknowledge and engage with some issues whilst explaining others away.178 Our position is that it is more consistent and honest and thereby yielding of more accurate results, albeit potentially unpalatable ones, to decide on an interpretative methodology and then apply it in an objective manner, regardless of potential pit-falls for a particular view of God, His attributes and His purposes.
1.7.2.1 Unacceptable Ascriptions.
Such an anachronistic attitude does not have to apply only to biblical perspectives, however, as Macquarrie demonstrates when he decides in advance, having considered Anselm and Calvin in regard to their views of God’s character, that such harsh, even tyrannical, pictures of God are unacceptable.179 Such ascriptions say more, however, about Macquarrie, his own character and outlook than they do about the attributes of God; such will be the case for all anthropocentric theology.
A priori dispositions against presenting God in an ‘unfavourable light’ lead to the pre- exclusion of attributes construed as malicious or capricious on God’s part.180
This pre- ordained desire to be entirely ‘positive’ to God, His attributes and purposes de facto causes theologians to eradicate factors they find negative or ‘unhelpful’. The theological fear of “implicating” God in violence understands such a process as negative and unthinkable, analogous to the perception that it is just as impossible to worship a God implicated in violence as it is to worship One who is the author of evil.181
178
On biblical hermeneutics Stott concedes on behalf of the evangelical church that, “We must therefore acknowledge with deep shame that our treatment of Scripture seldom coincides with our view of it. We are much better at asserting its authority than at wrestling with its interpretation. We are sometimes slovenly, sometimes simplistic, sometimes highly selective and sometimes downright dishonest.” J. Stott, Obeying Christ
in a Changing World, Volume 1 – The Lord Christ, J. Stott (ed.), London: Fountain Books, 1977, 21.
179
Macquarrie, Jesus, 401.
180
G.L. Borchert, ‘Wrath, Destruction’, G.F. Hawthorne, R.P. Martin and D.G. Reid (eds.), Dictionary of Paul
and His Letters, Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1993, 991.
181
Boersma, Violence, 43. Milbank notes that, “Traditionally, in Greek, Christian and Jewish thought evil has been denied any positive foothold in being. It has not been seen as a real force or quality, but as the absence of force and quality, and as the privation of being itself. It has not been regarded as glamorous, but as sterile; never as more, always as less.” J. Milbank, Being Reconciled – Ontology and Pardon, London: Routledge, 2003, 1.
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That said, the distinction, demarcation and status between these elements is essential to a theology of God and His relationship with violence. Anger, for instance, is normally
understood as a sinister, malignant passion, an evil force, which must under all circumstances be suppressed; its association with God, however, is altogether more difficult to pin down in a definitive manner.182 According to Heschel such features are accretions and exuberances – functions, rather than ontological; he admits that anger comes dangerously close to evil and yet concludes that it is ultimately wrong to identify the two together; it may be evil by association, but not in essence.183