Topic: Complex Crimes Facts:
Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Dona Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Due to
her alleged recklessness, she hit the car of Norberto Bonsol causing him physical injuries, and damage to property amounting to P
8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was
charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries"
with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re- affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Issues:
I Whether the penalty
imposed on petitioner is correct.
II Whether the quasi offenses
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.
III Whether the rule on
complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV Whether the duplicity of the
questioned for the first time on appeal.
V Whether the Regional Trial
Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI Whether the quasi offenses
in question have already prescribed.
Ruling:
I No. The Court held that the
proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure, it being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor, and the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods.
II Reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of the Revised Penal Code as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by acorrectional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
III Yes. Applying article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the Court held that it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex
crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to
property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one
information. They are
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties.
IV No. Under Section 3, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
V No. The Court ruled that the
MTC has jurisdiction as it has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. As to the reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
VI No. The Supreme Court held
that the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People
G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts:
Napoleon Macadangdang Roman, an employee of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages. Napoleon had jumped bail and remained at-large, and Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps
bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by the petitioner, filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. The judgment against accused then became final and executory.
The RTC further ruled that Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc., in the event of the insolvency of Napoleon, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that when the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the
judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer
cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer, as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. Javier v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 75379, March 31, 1989 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts:
Private respondent, Leon S.
Gutierrez, Jr., issued to petitioners, Reynaldo and Estelita Javier, a check that was subsequently dishonored and not made good despite the required notice of dishonor. For this he has been charged with estafa under B.P. Blg. 22 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The information against the private respondent was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and the civil case was not reserved. Gutierrez then filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, in the complaint, the herein petitioners were charged with having inveigled Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of the criminal case in the Makati court. The complaint in effect explains why he issued the check for which he was facing
prosecution for. Issue:
Whether or not private respondent can raise the reason that he was inveigled into signing the very check subject of the criminal case in the RTC of Makati in
another court, in a separate civil action for damages filed by him against the petitioners
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court sustaining the trial judge. It held that as the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati in accordance with Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as defendant in the criminal
charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the civil action based on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was also before that same court that he could offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the petitioners. Further, the Court held that the private respondent should have done in the form of a
counterclaim for damages for his alleged deception by the
petitioners. In fact, the
counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action.
Casupanan v. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by
respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan , figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for
Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac which was
dismissed for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi- delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation, and that the petitioners were right in filing an appeal. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under the said articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex- delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi- delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi- delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim
of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action.
General v. Claravall
G.R. No. 96724, March 22, 1991 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action Facts:
Private respondent Benneth Thelmo filed a sworn complaint accusing petitioner, Honesto General, and another person of libel, and alleged that by reason of the offense he had suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in the total sum of P100 million. The information for libel was
subsequently filed with the RTC at Pasig, after preliminary
investigation, did not however contain any allegation respecting the damages due the offended party. At the trial, the defense raised the issue of non-payment of the docket fees corresponding to the claim of damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action therefor. The trial Court overruled the objection. It also denied the defendants' motion for
reconsideration and motion for suspension of proceedings. Issue:
Whether or not the rule should be that the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due course.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found no error in the challenged orders of the respondent and held that when a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action—the rule is as follows:
1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"
Tan v. Mendez
G.R. No. 138669; June 6, 2002 Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111)
Facts:
Petitioners Steve Tan and Marciano Tan are the owners of Master Tours and Travel Corporation and operators of Philippine Lawin Bus Co., Inc., while respondent Fabian Mendez, Jr. is the owner of three gasoline stations in Iriga City, Ligao, Albay, and Sipocot, Camarines Sur. Petitioners opened a credit line for their buses lubricants and fuel consumption with respondent. At the same time, the latter was also
designated by petitioners as the booking and ticketing agent of Philippine Lawin Bus Co. in Iriga City.
Petitioners issued several checks to respondent as payment for oil and fuel products. One of the checks was dishonored by the bank upon presentment for payment for being drawn against insufficient funds. Respondent sent a demand letter dated to petitioners demanding that they make good the check or pay the amount thereof, to no avail. However, petitioners failed to pay the amount thereof. Hence, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against petitioners before the RTC.
Petitioners argue that he cannot be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the amount subject of the check had already been extinguished by offset or compensation against the collection from ticket sales from the booking offices. He presented a memorandum showing the return to respondent of various unencashed checks in the total amount of Php 66,839.25 representing remittance of ticket sales that were earlier sent by respondent. After the alleged offset, there remains a balance of P226,785.83.
On cross-examination, Marciano admitted to have drawn the subject check to pay private respondents gasoline station and that it was not covered by sufficient funds at the time of its issuance due to uncollected receivables. Upon query by the
court, he claimed that he did not talk to private complainant and could not tell if the latter agreed to offset the checks with the remittances.
Respondent disputed petitioners claim of payment through offset or compensation:
1. the amount of the four unencashed checks totaling P66,839.25 could not have offset the amount of the dishonored checks since petitioners total obligations at that time had already reached P906,000; and
2. the compensation did not take place as there was no application of payment made by the petitioners in their memorandum dated June 10,1991.
The trial court ruled against the petitioners, convicting the petitioners for violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be held liable for violation of B.P. 22.
2. Whether or not payment through compensation can offset or preclude prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The elements of B.P. 22 are present in the case at bar. The law enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22:
a. the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
b. the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
c. (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
2. No. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Thus, even if there had been
payment, through
compensation or some other means, there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
Furthermore, according to the Court, petitioners’s defense of compensation is unavailing because petitioners did not clearly specify in the memorandum dated June 10, 1991 which dishonored check is being offset. The Court also said, in accordance Article 1279 of the Civil Code, no compensation can take place between petitioners and respondent as respondent is not
a debtor of petitioners insofar as the two checks representing collections from the Baao ticket sales are concerned.
Republic v. Bello
G.R. No. L-34906; January 27, 1983
Topic: Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111)
Facts:
Private respondent Arceño, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School, was charged for malversation of public funds in the amount of Php6,619.34 which he supposedly failed to produce or to make proper accounting thereof after repeated demands.
After due trial, the respondent Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding the evidence of the prosecution not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, rendered a decision acquitting Arceño on the following grounds:
1. undisputed facts clearly and unmistakably show lack of criminal intent on accused's part;
2. absence of proof that the accused benefited personally from his disbursements nor has it been shown that he was inexcusably negligent in the administration of public funds and properties entrusted to his care;
3. it has not been shown and proven that the government
suffered damage or prejudice as the accused's disbursements were for the benefit of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School; and
4. the funds claimed to be missing in the amount of Php6,619.34 is not really missing for the accused demonstrated that said amounts were spent for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School.
After the acquittal of Arceño, the Provincial Fiscal filed a civil case against Arceño for the recovery of the total sum of Php13,790.71 which represented the accountability of Arceño due to his failure to issue official receipts and to immediately deposit said funds with the National Treasury.
Arceño filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in the said civil case alleging that the petitioner had no cause of action against him inasmuch as "the cause of action had been decided in a prior judgment."
Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal of Arceño in the criminal case bars the filing of the civil action against him.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the decision did not absolve Arceño or free him from responsibility insofar as his accountability as Cashier and Disbursing Officer is concerned.
A judgment of acquittal on the ground that accused had no