7. Desarrollo de la aplicación web
7.3 Desarrollo de la aplicación
It is clear from Table 4.5 showing PTS averages that like the other USA aid recipients, Pakistan has also consistently performed poorly in terms of human rights. As mentioned earlier in the context of democracy, for about half of its life, Pakistan has remained under direct military rule. There are two periods in which the nexus between USA aid and human rights abuses is markedly visible: the military regime of General Zia during the 1980s and the Musharraf tenure in the ‘war on terror’ period. The Freedom House data in Table 4.5 shows that Pakistan scored over three during the 1980s and in the ‘war on terror’ period it has mostly scored four on PTS.
Regarding human rights violations, the regime of General Zia is considered one of the most brutal military tenures in the history of Pakistan. After assuming power following the dismissal and arrest of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on July 5, 1977, General Zia suspended the 1973 Constitution, dismissed federal and provincial governments and banned all political activities. With the abrogation of the constitution, fundamental human rights were suspended. In its 1978
annual report, the Amnesty International (1978, p. 147) observed that the “martial law Government in Pakistan has introduced measures designed to curb political dissent. The number of political prisoners has increased and now totals several thousand”. The report added that at least 160 political prisoners, arrested for taking part in peaceful political activities, have been flogged by the military junta. In April 1979, the ousted prime minister “was hanged after a trial of dubious legality ... [which] ... was a brutal display of state terrorism, designated in part at least to terrify and silence the civilian opponents of the military regime” (Murphy & Tamana, 2010, p. 55). The serious violation of human rights continued throughout his ruthless military reign. The 1985 AI report noted that:
Amnesty International continued to be concerned about the detention of prisoners of conscience. It is also concerned that hundreds of other political prisoners were tried before military courts whose procedures fell short of internationally accepted standards for a fair trial…The organization also received reports of the deaths of criminal suspects in police custody, allegedly due to torture (Amnesty International, 1985, p. 233).
Similarly, there were severe restrictions on the freedom of speech. In March 1978, around 200 journalists were arrested and a number of newspapers were shut down by the military dictator (Amnesty International, 1978). In its 2009 annual commemoration of the fateful day of July 5, 1977 of the military coup, Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ) stated that the Zia regime will always be remembered for its extremely oppressive measures (Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists, 2009). The journalists’ body observed that the period was characterised by widespread censorship, banning of independent newspapers and arrest of editors and journalists, who were not only sentenced to rigorous imprisonment but were actually flogged and whipped under the Zia Martial Law regulations. However, as General Zia was a staunch USA ally against the USSR in the 1980s, human rights violations had no significance vis-à-vis USA security interests. Thus, Pakistan was among the largest recipients of USA economic and military aid despite lack of democracy and prevalence of human rights abuses.
Like the General Zia regime, the ‘war on terror’ period since 9/11 is another distinctive example of USA aid to Pakistan from the perspective of human rights. The Freedom House data shows that Pakistan has been one of the worst offenders of human rights as it has scored more than four on PTS in the post-9/11 years. According the 2011 report by Human Rights Watch, 2010 was a disastrous year for Pakistan concerning human rights. On the one hand common people suffered from the atrocities by the Taliban militants and on the other hand security forces carried out torture, forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch, 2011). There is also a video, made available on popular websites such as ‘youtube’, which shows the killing of a group of young unarmed boys allegedly by army personnel in the Swat region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the military had conducted operation in 2009 against militants. After some uproar in the media, the Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had ordered an investigation but so far no one has been held accountable for the cold-blooded executions (Imtiaz, 2011).
Contrary to the Congressional legislation mentioned earlier, the USA has completely overlooked the status of human rights while allocating aid to Pakistan. This is because the Pakistan army has been a frontline USA ally in the ‘war on terror’ and the curtailment of economic or military aid could jeopardise USA security interests.
These issues were also explored during the course of fieldwork in Pakistan. During interviews with USAID and Pakistani officials, I asked questions whether the provision of USA aid is affected by matters such as human rights, the rule of law and corruption in Pakistan. The principal aim was to elucidate to what extent these issues were important for the USA while deciding the allocation of aid. Joseph Truong, USAID Outreach and Public Information Officer said during an interview in Islamabad:
The USA or USAID has not pressurised Pakistan and it does not touch issues like human rights, corruption and the rule of law. The USA State Department and other departments address these policy issues at present. We do not touch these issues as our focus is only developmental activities (Outreach and Public Information Officer, USAID, Islamabad, July, 2009).
One of the most significant domestic issues that the country witnessed was the unconstitutional removal of the Chief Justice (CJ) of the Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan by military ruler General Musharraf on the charges of corruption and misconduct. The actual reason behind his ouster and dismissal was that the CJ had started taking “public-interest judicial interventions”, (Lodhi, 2011a, p. 69), particularly of the forced disappearances of the separatists in the Baluchistan province and of the suspected religious extremists by intelligence agencies (Murphy & Tamana, 2010). After the CJ was removed from office on March 9, 2007, there were country- wide mass protests spearheaded by lawyers and supported by civil society organisations and opposition politicians. On July 20, 2007, the Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan, a body of judges empowered under the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan to hear and decide cases of misconduct against judges, restored the CJ. It became increasingly difficult for Musharraf to tolerate a free and transparent judiciary under CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry. On November 3, 2007, General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in the country and sacked CJ Chaudhry and 60 other judges, illegally and unconstitutionally, when they refused to take oath under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) issued by Musharraf. All judges of the superior courts who did not submit to Musharraf and thousands of lawyers, opposition leaders and human rights activists were either placed in house detention or jail (Lodhi, 2011a). During the whole judicial crisis and the subsequent lawyers’ movement, the USA never intervened to press General Musharraf to reinstate judges and stop violating human rights. Michael H. Hryshchyshyn, Director Office of Democracy and Governance USAID/Pakistan, explained the stance of the USA government to me during an interview:
We remained quiet on the issue of restoration of the judiciary and viewed it as Pakistan’s domestic problem. Regarding human rights, we continue to push all countries
for human rights and the rule of law and have been engaging with civil society (Director Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID, Islamabad, August, 2009).
Similar opinions were expressed by a number of Pakistani officials when asked about the provision of USA aid and its connection with Pakistan’s domestic governance issues. An official in the EAD informed me during an interview:
There have been no linkages of USA aid with human rights, nuclear proliferation issues, good governance and transparency etc. None of the Strategic Objective Grant Agreement (SOGA) signed between the two countries have mentioned or outlined these issues or themes (Senior Official, EAD, Islamabad, April, 2009).
All this indicates that the USA does not prioritise human rights and related issues in the allocation of aid, particularly when the aid recipient government is a strategic ally. These aspects of USA foreign aid policies are dealt with in detail in the following chapter that illustrates how much the USA has been concerned with its own geo-strategic, security and political goals in comparison to democracy, human rights and economic development in Pakistan.
So far, domestic political regimes of the four comparators have been assessed vis-à-vis USA foreign aid. Like the conclusion drawn from the recipients’ needs versus donors’ interest model, that USA aid has not been consistent according to the poverty needs of the comparators, the preceding discussion of domestic political regimes and its relationship with USA aid offers a similar conclusion. This implies that the USA has been giving most aid to these countries neither on the basis of their poverty needs nor due to their satisfactory domestic political regimes characterised by genuine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.
4.5 Conclusion and summary
Based on the empirical analysis and graphical presentation of the USAID and World Bank data, this chapter has illustrated that the provision of USA ODA has not been primarily guided by poverty needs and developmental concerns of the comparators. The chapter has demonstrated the USA does not give more aid to certain countries on the basis of their poverty status. For example, Israel, despite being a rich country in terms of GDP per capita and average life expectancy, has received the largest amount of USA economic aid between 1948 and 2008. The chapter has also shown that the USA has not linked the distribution of economic and military assistance with human rights in recipient countries. Although Israel has shown little regard for international norms and laws and internationally recognised human rights, the USA has always extended its full support in the form of economic and military aid and has rarely suspended or restricted aid on account of these issues.
A fairly similar conclusion can be drawn from the USA aid relationship with Egypt. As the analysis of the USA aid allocation has shown, USA economic aid to Egypt was characterised by ups and downs in the 1950s and 1960s. However, since the mid-1970s and particularly after the
signing of the Camp David accord with Israel in 1979, the aid relationship has remained steadfast and the USA has never suspended aid to Egypt. While providing both economic and military assistance to Egypt, the USA has largely ignored issues such as the lack of genuine democracy and human rights abuses in this important Middle Eastern ally. Among the comparators, Egypt has received the second largest amount of total USA economic and military assistance over the 1948-2008 period.
Based on development indicators, Pakistan, with the largest population, has remained the poorest in the group. If ODA is given on humanitarian grounds for poverty alleviation only, it is argued that poorer countries with larger population should receive more aid. The analysis of USA ODA to the four selected countries has shown that this is not the case here. At times, Pakistan was the largest recipient of USA economic assistance in the group (see years 1955- 1968 and 2006, 2008 in Table 4.1), while at certain intervals the USA provided meagre aid to Pakistan (for example during the 1978-1981 period and the entire decade of the 1990s). Based on the empirical analysis, this chapter has revealed that the USA has not given more ODA to Pakistan on account of the latter’s poverty. Similarly, the provision of annual USA economic as well as military aid remained considerably high when Pakistan was under military rule and there was meagre aid during civilian regimes, such as in the 1989-2001 period. Overall, the USA has rarely linked the distribution of both civilian and security assistance to Pakistan with respect for human rights.
Although Turkey has progressed from the position of an aid recipient in recent years, at some points, particularly during the Cold War period, it was among the largest USA aid recipients along with the other selected countries. In fact, Turkey has received the fourth largest amount of aggregate USA economic aid and the third largest amount of total economic and military assistance in the group between 1948 and 2008. Despite dictatorial regimes and serious human rights violations, particularly in the 1980s, the USA did not stop aid to Turkey on account of these issues. Like the rest of the selected USA allies, economic and military assistance to Turkey was hardly ever tied with democracy or human rights performance.
This chapter has illustrated that factors such as poverty needs of aid-receiving governments and the nature of their domestic political regimes are not significant determinants of USA foreign assistance. To varying degrees and at different times, most of these recipients have received a huge volume of USA ODA, but not solely on account of their poverty levels. The findings reinforce what has generally emerged in most literature on aid allocation: the principal determinants of most ODA from bilateral donors are not just poverty needs of aid recipients but largely donors’ geo-strategic, political, security and trade interests, which are discussed in detail in the following chapter in the context of USA aid allocations to the four comparators.